MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT
HĪKINA WHAKATUTUKI

# COVERSHEET

| **Minister** | Hon Erica Stanford | **Portfolio** | Immigration |
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| **Title of Cabinet paper** | Outcomes of the 2026 Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme Policy Review | **Date to be published** | 5 August 2026 |

| **List of documents that have been proactively released** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Date** | **Title** | **Author** |
| July 2026 | Outcomes of the 2026 Recognised Seasonal Employers Scheme Policy Review | Office of the Minister of Immigration |
| 1 July 2026 | Outcomes of the 2026 Recognised Seasonal Employers Scheme Policy Review<br>ECO-26-MIN-0120 Minute | Cabinet Office |
| 5 March 2026 | 2026 RSE Policy Review - Proposed scope and consultation | MBIE |
| 11 March 2026 | Industry recommendation for consultation - Accommodation settings industry proposal March 2026 FINAL | Industry, provided to MBIE |
| 14 May 2026 | Recommendations following the 2026 Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme Policy Review | MBIE |

**Information redacted** **YES**

Any information redacted in this document is redacted in accordance with MBIE's policy on Proactive Release and is labelled with the reason for redaction. This may include information that would be redacted if this information was requested under Official Information Act 1982. Where this is the case, the reasons for withholding information are listed below. Where information has been withheld, no public interest has been identified and that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Some information has been withheld for the reasons of confidential advice to government, international relations, legal professional privilege, privacy of natural persons, and free and frank opinions.

**In Confidence**

Office of the Minister of Immigration

Cabinet Economic Development Committee

# Outcomes of the 2026 Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme Policy Review

## Proposal

1 This paper seeks Cabinet agreement to policy changes to the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme.

## Relation to government priorities

2 These proposals seek to balance Government priorities across the Primary Industries, Foreign Affairs, Social Development and Employment, and Economic Growth portfolios, including the Government goals of doubling export value by 2035, Jobseeker targets, and positioning New Zealand as a partner of choice for the Pacific.

## Executive Summary

3 The RSE scheme enables accredited New Zealand horticulture and viticulture employers to recruit workers from primarily Pacific nations to fill seasonal labour needs. Since its launch in 2007, RSE has been guided by the 'triple win' objective of supporting the Pacific, workers, and New Zealand industry. It has enabled significant sector expansion and makes direct contributions to growing exports and the economic security of Pacific workers while maintaining the New Zealanders first principle.

4 The RSE scheme has become more complex in response to emerging issues and is now cumbersome and duplicative in places. I propose three key shifts to improve the RSE scheme:

4.1 Shift One: rebalancing the system to reduce compliance costs for employers and better targeting risk;

4.2 Shift Two: increasing flexibility to protect against exploitation; and

4.3 Shift Three: improving clarity and transparency of key system requirements.

5 Collectively, these changes will ensure agencies' resources are focused on known risks. This will enable industry to focus on investing in core operations, while clarifying benefits for Pacific workers and maintaining safeguards to ensure New Zealanders are prioritised for domestic jobs.

6 Accommodation standards remain a concern for industry and the Pacific, so I have directed Officials to undertake targeted engagement to address this and will make final decisions in September 2026.

7 Confidential advice to Government

## Background

8 The horticulture and viticulture sectors rely on a fluctuating workforce with 60,000 workers in winter and peaks of up to 75,000 workers in summer[1]. Roles are often temporary, lower skilled, and physically demanding. New Zealanders typically make up between 70 to 76 per cent of the workforce[2], and RSE enables businesses to recruit workers from Pacific countries when local labour cannot meet demand. The RSE scheme has been critical in meeting peak demand, and supporting annual export growth from $2.5 billion in 2007 to nearly $9 billion today. Despite increased automation in packhouses, harvesting remains manual and labour-intensive.

9 Employers must hold RSE status (accreditation) and apply annually for an Agreement to Recruit (ATR) for a specified number of workers. Workers can stay up to seven months[3] in New Zealand within an 11-month period. Employers may submit multiple ATRs in a year to recruit different cohorts of workers through the season. The worker cap has expanded from 5,000 in 2007 to 20,750 today. However, the cap has not been reached for the last three years demonstrating that employers prioritise hiring New Zealanders and other people already onshore with the legal right to work.

10 A previous review of RSE was undertaken in 2022-23, however Cabinet only noted the outcomes from that process. I directed my officials at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) to review the scheme in 2026 building on the previous review, to ensure RSE continues delivering a ‘triple win’ for workers, the Pacific and industry. This focused on reducing costs for employers, improving worker wellbeing, and clarifying settings. Targeted consultation by officials included engagement with Pacific governments and visits to key RSE regions.

11 Pacific stakeholders also noted interest in changes to Pacific labour mobility initiatives, both including and beyond immigration settings. These are summarised for reference in *Figure One*.

*Figure One*: *Pacific Labour Mobility initiatives*[4]




[1] Food and Fibre Workforce Insights - MPI
[2] Food and Fibre Workforce Insights - MPI
[3] Up to nine months for workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu
[4] NOA village of learning is an MFAT funded training and education programme that provides education to up to 2,150 RSE workers per year while onshore in New Zealand

12 Following consultation, I propose reforms focused on three key shifts:

- 12.1 Rebalancing the system to reduce compliance costs for employers and better targeting risk;
- 12.2 Increasing flexibility to protect against exploitation; and
- 12.3 Improved clarity and transparency of key system requirements.

13 Industry and Pacific partners broadly support the package.

**Shift One: Rebalancing the system to reduce compliance costs for employers by better targeting risk**

14 The RSE scheme is central to New Zealand - Pacific relationships. RSE workers have a higher risk of exploitation, with workers dependant on employers for work and accommodation, while often being indebted to them on arrival because of associated costs that employers initially meet and workers pay back once earning income in New Zealand (e.g. flights). In response, the RSE scheme has become low-trust, and emphasises a one-size-fits-all, up-front compliance approach. Experienced RSE employers and industry bodies report frustration that this creates inconsistencies with other visa categories. While worker safeguards remain essential, a uniform approach to risk is no longer appropriate.

*Graduated accreditation*

15 RSE Status (or “accreditation”) lasts an initial two years, and must be renewed every three years thereafter. However, the process is time-consuming and duplicative for employers and government agencies.

16 I propose a graduated accreditation model that offers either three or six years for RSE status renewal depending on risk and compliance record. New entrants would also be limited to an initial one year of accreditation to reflect their higher risk. Industry and the Pacific support this proposal, noting the need for higher-trust to be granted to low-risk, established employers in the RSE scheme.

17 Residual risks from longer accreditation periods can be mitigated through introducing graduated penalties for employers, and shifting towards more targeted post-decision checking by Immigration New Zealand (INZ) and the Labour Inspectorate (LI). This is manageable due to the small volume of participating RSE employers[5] [redacted]

*Compliance framework*

18 The current compliance framework is unclear and not fit for purpose. Despite breaches, employers have never had accreditation revoked. Revocation is effectively the only formal lever, limiting avenues for responding to minor non-compliance.

19 I propose a graduated compliance framework, with clear and transparent expectations and scalable penalties. This can be supported by the risk assessment tool currently under development and can help inform decisions on accreditation duration.

[5] 174 total RSE employers as of May 2026

*Cap and ATR*

20 The annual cap on RSE workers and the labour market test within the ATR are both labour market interventions intended to support the New Zealanders first principle. Both require significant administration, with current advice recommending employers submit ATRs between five to seven months in advance due to processing delays.

21 RSE workers are intended to supplement, rather than replace the domestic workforce, making up approximately 19 per cent of the overall horticulture and viticulture workforce, with New Zealanders making up a further 75 per cent [6]. Officials have considered these proposals in consultation with the Ministry of Social Development (MSD). However, the cap has not been reached for the last three years, indicating that employers are prioritising recruiting New Zealanders or other people already onshore with a right to work while creating some administration overheads for both employers and agencies that serve no real purpose.

| Year | Cap | Actual |
|---|---|---|
| 2022/23 | 19,000 | 17,124 |
| 2023/24 | 19,500 | 17,569 |
| 2024/25 | 20,750 | 17,185 |
| 2025/26[7] | 20,750 | 17,119 |

22 Industry are concerned about the complexity and fairness of administering and allocating the cap to individual employers and Pacific views were mixed, with many interested in increasing RSE participation. No partners expressed strong concerns about removing the cap. International relations [redacted]

23 There is a concern this may result in an increased volume of RSE workers, which may have an associated negative impact on the New Zealander labour market. On balance, I consider this risk is low and able to be mitigated. The current cap has not been met for the last three years, and many submitters identified that the cost of providing accommodation was the effective limit on their hiring of RSE workers. Worker volumes have plateaued since 2022 despite cap increases, and that since the cap was first met in 2013, it has consistently been increased in response to demand, suggesting it has rarely been an effective or enduring mechanism for limiting RSE volumes.

[6] Baseline-indicators-FINAL-MAY-2025.pdf
[7] 2025/26 figures officially close on 1 July 2026 so are not yet confirmed and are liable to change.

*Figure Two: Comparison of RSE worker arrivals 07/08 – 24/25 and annual cap*




24 I recommend removing the cap on the basis that it duplicates the function of a labour market test and creates unnecessary administration costs. Removing the cap may mean employers reduce 'labour sharing' through use of joint-ATRs, which help maximise workers' time onshore and increases take-home pay. It may also result in increases in RSE volumes increasing, although I consider these risks manageable.

25 Officials will monitor RSE volumes and proportions of the overall workforce and I expect regular reporting on volumes will help identify if there is a need to resume using the cap. I will report back to Cabinet if this change results in perverse outcomes and officials have advised they can retain the infrastructure necessary to quickly re-instate the cap if required.

26 Another mechanism for managing any risk of increased RSE volumes is more targeted and effective labour market testing at the ATR stage. The current ATR process facilitates labour for one season of work, although the requirements for the labour market test and role of the Ministry of Social Development in this process lack transparency. There are two options for updating the ATR:

*Option One: A streamlined, single-seasonal ATR (Recommended)*

27 Aligning RSE with the labour market test in the Peak Seasonal Visa (PSV) could improve clarity while maintaining a frequent labour market testing. This would include an endorsement model, where MSD can agree that an employer undergo labour market testing up to once every three years if they have demonstrated genuine partnership with MSD. Non-endorsed employers must continue to test the domestic market each time they wish to recruit, including advertising roles and engaging in good faith with MSD[8]. Unlike Peak Seasonal Visas, MSD would confirm this engagement has occurred prior to the ATR being granted.

[8] Good faith engagement requires employers to provide details of the vacancies to Ministry of Social Development and genuinely consider MSD referrals including interviewing and hiring candidates that the employer deems suitable

28 To reduce administration cost and allow the ATR to focus on domestic labour market testing, non-labour market related elements of the ATR would be removed. This includes upfront assessment of the costs employers plan to recover from workers and assessment of accommodation, unless significant changes to accommodation were declared since the last ATR. This model incentivises strong relationships with MSD and reduces administrative burden by clarifying the purpose of the ATR as a labour market test. I am advised it is also industry's broadly preferred option in combination with the cap being removed.

29 More frequent labour market testing provides a stronger mechanism for ensuring that New Zealanders can be prioritised for roles, while making the process significantly easier for employers who develop strong relationships with MSD. This option also provides a regular mechanism for controlling RSE volumes if the cap is removed.

*Option Two – a multi-season, three-year ATR*

30 Alternatively, Cabinet may wish to pursue a three-year ATR cycle. This could approve recruitment for three years at a time, and would require a more robust up-front labour plan. Existing standard practice is for employers to provide an annual labour plan to MSD to support their ATR. This option would enshrine a more robust, three-year plan as a requirement for all employers, with a high administrative cost that is required only once every three years. Employers would still be expected to regularly test the domestic labour market and engage with MSD before recruiting RSE workers, but these would not be evidenced through an ATR application.

31 Submitters typically did not like the requirement to provide a seasonal labour plan, and have raised concerns about the costs associated with a more robust three-year plan, and their ability to forecast labour demand given the volatility of conditions in the sector. Due to these concerns, I am advised industry are not in favour of this option.

32 MSD note there are challenges with genuinely testing the domestic labour market up to three years in advance. This approach carries risk that New Zealanders are not prioritised for suitable roles, and does not provide an incentive to strengthen MSD engagement like in *option one.* This is traded-off against longer-term labour certainty for all employers.

33 If this option is preferred, the requirement to provide cost recovery information and accommodation audits as part of the ATR would be maintained to manage the compliance risks associated with less frequent engagement with INZ. This model enables longer-term labour planning, and shifts administrative burden by increasing intensity, but decreasing the frequency of ATRs.

34 For both options, INZ would retain discretion to limit ATR numbers to manage compliance.

**Shift Two: Increasing flexibility of visa settings to protect against exploitation**

35 RSE settings aim to reduce overstaying risks and preserve seasonality by limiting worker mobility, but this can increase risks of migrant exploitation. Improved design would better balance risks and protections.

*Removal of limited visa status*

36 RSE is a limited visa meaning workers cannot access other visa types while onshore including Migrant Exploitation Protection Visas (MEPV). Legal [redacted]

37 I recommend replacing RSE limited visas with a temporary entry RSE work visa that prohibits access to other visas while onshore, except for MEPVs and limited visas. This protects exploited workers while preserving the seasonal nature of the scheme.

*Enabling Variations of Conditions*

38 Joint-ATRs allow planned sharing of workers between employers (for example workers may work several months picking apples in Hawkes Bay followed by winter pruning in Marlborough). However, there is limited ability to respond to short notice changes in labour demand. Instructions currently require new ATRs and visas be approved to enable this movement, which can take months. Industry submit that weather events and business disruptions can often unexpectedly limit available work. I propose to allow variations of visa conditions (VOCs) to facilitate the movement. This would also offer workers opportunities to more quickly move employers, for example, for better conditions, without having to leave New Zealand.

39 Allowing VOCs carries risk: employers may overuse them to increase worker mobility at the expense of stability, or treat them as a substitute for the joint-ATR process. These risks can be mitigated by limiting access to VOCs to certain situations such as weather impacts, requiring worker consent to move, and limiting movement to accredited RSE employers with space available in an existing ATR, This will improve flexibility, workers earning potential, and workers protections against exploitation, while maintaining labour market protections.

**Shift Three: Improved clarity and transparency of key system requirements**

40 The RSE scheme has become more complex as the system has built processes to respond to new and emerging risks, resulting in a complex and uncertain regulatory environment.

*Cost recovery*

41 RSE employers often pay for up-front costs for workers, such as flights, insurance and visa costs. Actual, reasonable, and verifiable costs are then recovered by employers while workers are onshore. A recent Employment Court case[9] has prompted a shift from recovering costs via payroll deductions to workers setting up automatic payments. Industry and Pacific partners report ongoing uncertainty around recoverable costs.

[9] *Soapi v Pick Hawke's Bay Inc* [2025] NZEmpC 208.

42 The uncertainty is concentrated in transport costs, with employers regularly providing vehicles for workers' use. Unlike New Zealanders, RSE workers cannot choose accommodation locations or commuting distance, restricting their ability to control transport costs. The LI has generally not allowed recovery of transport costs between accommodation and worksites to reflect this lack of choice. I recommend formalising this position. This will require most employers to pay Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) on the use of vehicles for transport to and from work.[10][11]

43 To provide clarity I propose the following exhaustive list of recoverable costs:

- 43.1 accommodation;
- 43.2 50 per cent of the return international flight from a worker's home country to New Zealand (or Nadi, for workers from Tuvalu and Kiribati);
- 43.3 visa application costs (including police checks and medicals);
- 43.4 health insurance;
- 43.5 additional medical or dental expenses not covered by insurance;
- 43.6 transport costs (excluding transport between worker accommodation and the worksite or moving between worksites for the purpose of work);
- 43.7 fines incurred by worker (including driving infringements);
- 43.8 food; and
- 43.9 wage advances.

44 I also propose a templated cost recovery form outlining estimated costs that allows workers to choose repayment timing, and to opt into any additional up-front costs.[12] This will support spot-checking of recovery practices by the LI, and will improve transparency and certainty for all participants.

*Broadening Recognised Seasonal Employer workers tasks*

45 RSE workers can only undertake planting, maintaining, harvesting and packing of crops. While these remain core activities, automation and technological change have altered how they are performed and risk reducing effectiveness of RSE work.

46 I recommend allowing incidental tasks, such as forklift use, where it supports workers' primary roles. Workers must be appropriately trained, licensed, and remunerated, and employers must list any additional tasks in their job advertisement. Confidential advice to Government [redacted] Explicitly allowing this flexibility will increase visibility, and Pacific skills development and earning potential.

[10] Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) scales depending on the value of the vehicle, but is estimated to cost employers up to $7,672 annually for a new $60,000 vehicle, $3,836 for a $30,000 vehicle, and $1,918 for a $15,000 vehicle if used for daily transport to and from work for five days a week, every week of the year. Actual costs may be lower for vehicles only used seasonally. These costs are expected to decrease following recent announcements as part of Budget 2026.

[11] Under Budget 2026 changes, if all other costs for private use of these vehicles are recovered by employers, the maximum annual FBT is expected to decrease to just under $2,000 for a $60,000 vehicle. These changes are intended to be implemented for benefits provided after 1 April 2027.

[12] Such as a mobile phone or other purchases made on behalf of the worker ahead of their arrival.

*Pastoral care*

47 Pastoral care is essential, and requires holistic delivery that varies across cultures, locations, and workers. But it is difficult for employers to identify these expectations, despite prescribed care standards existing in instructions. I have instructed officials to work with industry to develop HortNZ's Whānau Moana Nui pilot, to promote best-practice in pastoral care to provide clear examples of quality pastoral care.

48 I also consider that minimum standards should only be expanded where benefits and expectations are clear. Pacific partners are concerned about workers' ability to maintain family connections while in New Zealand. I propose adding access to internet as a required standard, as it is both clear and can be easily evidenced, and would satisfy Pacific concerns.

*Sick leave*

49 RSE workers can access two days' sick leave on arrival, unlike New Zealanders, who qualify after six months. This reflects research that workers often got sick on arrival due to the change in climate, but would continue to work due to debts. Industry requests this be removed to reduce payroll complexities and remove misalignment with provisions for New Zealanders. The Employment Leave Bill (the Bill) proposes sick leave accrual from the first day of work, rather than a lump sum at six months of work. This is expected to come into force 24 months after it is passed.

50 I intend to leave current settings until the Bill comes into effect, then remove bespoke RSE entitlements. This will remove misalignment between RSE and New Zealand workers and reduces payroll complexities but will reduce the amount of sick leave RSE workers will receive in the first few weeks. I consider this is an acceptable trade-off if changes to cost recovery are agreed, meaning workers can better manage debt repayment and have reduced incentive to work while sick.

*Complaints mechanism*

51 INZ and Employment New Zealand administer channels for addressing immigration complaints, migrant exploitation, and employment disputes, but RSE workers typically prefer to raise issues through their Country Liaison Officers (CLOs)[13]. I intend to formalise this process by clarifying roles for CLOs, INZ and the LI, standardising escalation, and strengthening transparent record-keeping.

**Further work on accommodation standards**

52 Accommodating workers requires significant upfront investment (often recovered from workers) and is a key concern for the Pacific. Most employers provide high quality accommodation, but reports of overcrowding and poor conditions by a minority of employers risk undermining RSE social licence. Industry proposes removing RSE Minimum Accommodation Standards (MAS), arguing these add an unnecessary layer of complexity. Pacific partners express concerns about overcrowding, bunk beds, and inadequate facilities.

[13] Pacific government representatives funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to support Pacific relations

53 Officials are developing new MAS at-pace, with targeted consultation underway. I consider it critical for decisions to be made promptly to provide stakeholders with certainty. I will consult with Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Building and Construction on this and will make decisions before the end of September.

**Visa and insurance settings**

54 Industry and Pacific partners have requested longer visa durations and expanded health insurance. Longer visas would increase health testing costs, outweighing savings, unless workers are exempted or provided access to publicly funded healthcare. Advice from the primary health insurance provider also suggests wider coverage would significantly reduce worker earnings. I do not consider these appropriate trade-offs.

**Implementation**

55 I intend to stage implementation of these changes based on complexity and value, with the following prioritised and delivered in phase one, with a target for implementation within first quarter 2027:

55.1 Removal of cap.
55.2 If chosen, the streamlined ATR (Option One).
55.3 Cost recovery changes.

56 I propose the following changes be delivered as part of a phase two for delivery in the second half of 2027:

56.1 If selected, the three-year ATR (Option Two).
56.2 Accreditation and compliance framework.
56.3 Pastoral care – internet access.
56.4 Variations of Conditions.
56.5 Minimum Accommodation Standards changes.
56.6 Incidental tasks.
56.7 Complaints mechanism.

57 I propose the sick leave changes be delivered when the relevant sick leave changes in the Employment Leave Bill come into effect, expected in 2028.

58 I propose limited visa status removal be undertaken when the RSE system transitions online in 2029 due to the significant ICT impacts of this change, including impacts on other visa products.

**Cost-of-living implications**

59 These proposals have no direct cost-of-living implications.

**Financial Implications**

60 Confidential advice to [redacted]

## Legislative Implications

61 The proposal to replace the RSE limited visa with a RSE work visa will require an amendment to the Fees schedule in the Immigration (Visa, Entry Permission and Related Matters) Regulations 2010.

## Impact Analysis

### Regulatory Impact Statement

62 The Ministry for Regulation has determined that the proposal to replace the RSE limited visa with a RSE work visa, that only enables holders to apply for Migrant Exploitation Protection visas or limited visas while onshore, is exempt from the requirements to provide a Regulatory Impact Statement on the grounds that it has no or only minor economic, social or environmental impacts.

### Climate Implications of Policy Assessment

63 The Climate Implications of Policy Assessment (CIPA) team has been consulted and confirms that CIP requirements do not apply to this policy proposal, as the threshold for significance is not met.

## Population Implications

64 These proposals provide a range of benefits for RSE workers and the domestic labour market, including higher standards and increased compliance. Proposals have been considered in consultation with MSD, and assessed in the context of the Government's Jobseeker target and are unlikely to increase unemployment.

## Human Rights

65 The proposals do not pose any human rights implications.

## Use of External Resources

66 No external resources were used in the development of these proposals.

## Consultation

67 The Ministry of Social Development, Ministry for Pacific People, Ministry for Primary Industries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Health; Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Treasury, Ministry for Ethnic Communities, Health New Zealand, and Inland Revenue were consulted on this Cabinet paper.

68 A wide range of stakeholders were consulted on the proposals, including employers, workers, Pacific governments, unions, academics, and the Human Rights Commission.

## Communications

69 I intend to announce these changes at the RSE conference on 28-29 July 2026.

## Proactive Release

70 I will proactively release this Cabinet paper, with any withholdings as appropriate under the Official Information Act 1982 after announcements have been made.

## Recommendations

The Minister of Immigration recommends that the Committee:

1 **Note** the objectives of the review of the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme were to ensure the RSE scheme continues to meet its core objective of delivering a 'triple win' for industry, workers and the Pacific;

*Rebalancing the system to reduce burden on employers by better targeting risk*

2 **Agree** to introduce a graduated RSE accreditation model with duration based on the employer's risk;

3 **Agree** to introduce a graduated compliance model to address minor, moderate and severe compliance breaches;

4 **Agree** to remove the RSE cap;

5 **Agree** to update the Agreement to Recruit (ATR) process by:

6 **EITHER**

6.1 (Recommended) clarifying the single-season Agreement to Recruit requirements, including adding a Ministry of Social Development endorsement model, and removing most non-labour market related checks from the ATR;

**OR**

6.2 transitioning to a three-year Agreement to Recruit cycle;

*Increasing mobility to protect against exploitation*

7 **Agree** to replace RSE limited visa status with a RSE work visa that only enables holders to apply for Migrant Exploitation Protection Visas (MEPVs) or limited visas while onshore;

8 **Agree** to allow Variations of Conditions (VOCs) for RSE visa holders;

*Improving clarity and transparency of key system requirements*

9 **Agree** to formalise a list of allowable costs employers may recover from RSE workers;

10 **Agree** to introduce and require use of a Cost Recovery Agreement template;

11 **Note** the Minister of Immigration has instructed officials establish further guidance on transport cost calculations;

12 **Agree** to add 'provide access to the internet' to the list of prescribed pastoral care standards;

13 **Note** the Minister of Immigration has instructed officials to support industry to establish a best practice model for pastoral care;

14 **Agree** to enable workers to complete incidental tasks including the use of machinery that supplement their primary roles of planting, maintaining, harvesting and packing;

15 **Note** the Minister of Immigration intends to change RSE worker sick leave provisions to align with the Employment Leave Bill once the Bill comes into effect;

16 **Note** the Minister of Immigration has instructed officials to formalise the existing complaints process;

17 **Note** that accommodation settings are of key-interest to all stakeholders, with significant divergence in views;

18 **Note** the Minister of Immigration has instructed officials to develop proposals for new Minimum Accommodation Standards at-pace with input from stakeholders;

19 **Note** the Minister of Immigration will make decisions on Minimum Accommodation Standards before the House rises in September, in consultation with Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Building and Construction.

Authorised for lodgement

Hon Erica Stanford

Minister of Immigration