MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION & EMPLOYMENT
HĪKINA WHAKATUTUKI

BRIEFING

Recommendations on a national IP policy

Date:	3 July 2025	**Priority:**	High
Security classification:	In Confidence	**Tracking number:**	BRIEFING-REQ-0014640

Minister	Action sought	Deadline
Hon Dr Shane Reti **Minister of Science, Innovation and Technology**	**Agree** to the proposals on the IP policy	11 July 2025

Contact for telephone discussion (if required)				
Name	**Position**	**Telephone**		**1st contact**
Gina Williamson	Manager, Innovation Policy	04 901 8203	Privacy of natural persons	√
Dr Simon Wakeman	Principal Policy Advisor, Innovation Policy			

The following departments/agencies have been consulted
n/a

Minister's office to complete:

- ☐ Approved
- ☐ Noted
- ☐ Seen
- ☐ See Minister's Notes
- ☐ Declined
- ☐ Needs change
- ☐ Overtaken by Events
- ☐ Withdrawn

Comments

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Purpose

To provide you with a proposal on the national intellectual property (IP) policy for universities and Public Research Organisations (PROs).

Recommended action

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) recommends that you:

a **Note** that Cabinet agreed to develop an IP policy for research in universities and PROs, and that for universities it would be based on the model used at Waterloo University in Canada, which vests ownership of IP with the researchers who create it

Noted

b **Note** that discussions with experts highlighted that

i. a drawback of the Waterloo model is that it enhances the risk that the IP is not adequately protected and / or the contributions of all the inventors are not recognised

ii. this problem could be remedied by requiring the researcher(s) assign the legal IP rights to the research organisation, but still allocating researcher(s) the beneficial IP rights

Noted

c **Agree** to propose that the IP policy for universities is a modified version of the Waterloo model that

i. gives researcher(s) ownership of the beneficial IP rights and the first option to lead the commercialisation of the research

ii. requires the researcher(s) assign the legal IP rights to the research organisation

Agree / Disagree

d **Agree** to propose that

i. the IP policy provides different rules for IP generated at PROs and university research institutes where the research is conducted at the specific direction of the research organisation

ii. the IP policy for PROs and university research institutes

- gives the research organisation ownership of both the legal and beneficial IP rights and the first option to lead the commercialisation of the research
- requires the research organisation consult the researcher(s) on the commercialisation and give them an option to lead the commercialisation if the organisation does not do so

Agree / Disagree

e **Agree** to propose that, where a researcher chooses to engage support from the research organisation for commercialisation, the IP policy require that the research organisation offers terms that are in line with a set of national guidelines

Agree / Disagree

f **Agree** to propose that the guidelines in recommendation e be developed in close consultation with the sector, based on best practice in New Zealand and internationally

Agree / Disagree

g **Agree** to propose that research organisations be required to apply the IP policy described in recommendations c, d, and e to IP supported by:

i. the research commercialisation/translation programmes in the SI&T portfolio

ii. the contestable research funds aimed at domestic research in the SI&T portfolio

iii. other research funds in the SI&T portfolio on a case-by-case basis

Agree / Disagree

h **Agree** to propose these conditions will be introduced from 1 July 2026 or whenever MBIE enters new contracts with the research organisations after that date

Agree / Disagree

i **Note** there is a risk that removing beneficial IP ownership from universities could have an unintended consequence of them disengaging from providing commercialisation support

Noted

j **Agree** that officials continue to explore options to ensure there is sufficient commercialisation support provided to researchers Confidential advice to Government

Agree / Disagree



Gina Williamson
Manager, Innovation Policy

Labour, Science and Enterprise, MBIE

03 / 07 / 2025

Hon Dr Shane Reti
Minister of Science, Innovation and Technology

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Background

1. In December 2024 Cabinet agreed that the Minister of SI&T would develop a national IP policy for research in universities and PROs. It specified that for universities it would be based on the model used at Waterloo University in Canada, which vests ownership of IP with the researchers who create it [CAB-24-MIN-0504.02, recs. 18 to 22, refer].
2. We previously provided you with advice on the scope and an early set of options on the IP policy [BRIEFING-REQ-0014638 refers]. More specifically:
    a. We recommended that the current work focus on levers directly affecting the incentives to commercialise research created by university and PRO staff in the course of employment – ie, the IP policy and provision of commercialisation support – while noting the importance of the wider system of incentives and support to encourage commercialisation.
    b. We presented three draft options for the IP policy, including
        i. The status quo allocation of IP rights with a stronger mandate on research organisations to pursue commercialisation.
        ii. A hybrid model that still allows the research organisation to retain the legal IP rights but gives the researcher the first option to commercialise.
        iii. The pure inventor-owned model (as per Waterloo).
3. You indicated an initial preference for the hybrid model but asked us to also consider the "inventor's choice" model used at University of Toronto.
4. You shared the IP policy options with Ministers at the Innovation, Technology and Science Pillar (IT&S) Going for Growth Ministers Group meeting on 16 June.
5. This briefing provides recommendations for the form of the national IP policy and associated actions in line with the hybrid model described in subparagraph ii above. Subject to your agreement, we will prepare a draft Cabinet paper for your review.

Allocation of intellectual property rights

For university researchers, we recommend a modified version of the Waterloo model

6. Cabinet agreed that the IP policy for universities should be based on the Waterloo model. By vesting ownership of IP in the researchers that create it, they have greater incentive to pursue commercialisation, thereby lifting the commercial impact from publicly funded research.
7. The strength of the Waterloo model is that it empowers the researcher(s) to drive commercialisation of the IP and is nested within a well-developed ecosystem of support, including a strongly customer-focused technology transfer office. However, even in this context, many researchers are not well placed to handle the complexities of protecting and maintaining the IP rights. Under this model, there is also risk that contributions of all inventors are not appropriately surfaced and recognised at this early stage. Any such 'untidiness' in the IP rights creates complications when a company spins out and tends to deter investors.

8. Assigning ownership and control of the legal IP rights to the research organisation mitigates these risks. In most cases the research organisation is better placed to manage the legal IP rights and to ensure that any inventors who contributed to the invention (including those from other organisations) are recognised.

9. While the legal rights would sit with the research organisation, giving the researcher(s) the beneficial IP rights and the first option to lead the commercialisation still achieves Cabinet's intent of increasing their incentive to pursue commercialisation.[1]

10. We considered three IP models (the Waterloo and hybrid models noted above and the Toronto model). Annex One summarises the key features of these three models and provides some analysis of the Toronto model.

11. We recommend a hybrid model in which the institution owns the legal IP rights and the researcher(s) owns the beneficial IP rights with a first option to lead commercialisation. The essential elements of this model would be:

    a. The researcher(s) will be required to disclose the invention to the research organisation and to assign ownership of the legal IP rights to the organisation.

    b. The researcher(s) will retain the beneficial IP rights and are not required to compensate the research organisation for using the IP.

    c. The researcher(s) will have the first option to lead commercialisation within a reasonable period.[2]

    d. If the researcher(s) choose not to take up the first option within a reasonable period, the research organisation will have the option to lead the commercialisation.[3]

12. This model is similar to the best practice we observe evolving in New Zealand universities in recent years (albeit it gives the researcher stronger rights upfront). For instance, if researcher(s) wish to be involved in a spin-out, the University of Auckland (or UniServices, its TTO) supports them to do so and grants them a license in exchange for taking a small share in the company (usually no more than 10% of equity at the point of founding).

13. It is important to note that a central feature of our proposed approach is that, in holding the beneficial IP rights and the first option to lead commercialisation, there is no obligation on the researcher(s) to engage the university's TTO or to share benefits from commercialisation (eg, a royalty on the IP or an equity share in a spinout) with the university.[4] As this impacts the potential revenue stream to the university and hence the funding model for the TTOs, it may risk the university disengaging from providing commercialisation support services. This could undermine the desired outcomes of the IP policy.

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[1] In the context of IP, legal ownership refers to the formal control over an IP asset such as a patent or copyright while beneficial ownership is the right to use, exploit, and profit from the IP, even if they do not hold the formal title.

[2] The researcher(s) could exercise this option either

a. at the time of disclosing the invention (in exchange for covering the cost of the IP ownership); or
b. within a reasonable period after that point (in exchange for reimbursing the research organisation for any costs it has incurred to date).

[3] In this case, the research organisation would need to compensate the researcher(s) for their beneficial IP rights and any subsequent involvement in the commercialisation, as negotiated with the parties under the guidelines.

[4] If the researcher(s) do engage the research organisation / TTO in the commercialisation, the terms of the engagement will be negotiated between the parties but under the guidelines for such engagement specified in the IP policy (see below). Nothing in the policy would restrict research organisations' ability to invest in the IP on terms agreed with the researcher(s).

14. Confidential advice to Government

Annex One We recommend a different approach for PROs and university research institutes where the research is directed by the research organisation

15. The operating model and context for Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) / PROs is different from the normal case at universities in three material ways:

    a. CRIs exert more control over the research that their employees undertake, typically selecting which research projects they can apply for funding and managing the direction of the research itself.

    b. CRIs have an intrinsic interest in how the research is commercialised because it affects other industry-facing activities in which they engage.

16. Commercialisation of research for the benefit of New Zealand is central to the mandate of the PROs, and there is an ability of the Minister to set expectations and provide direction to these organisations regarding these activities.

17. We therefore recommend that both the legal IP ownership and the first option to lead commercialisation for CRIs/PROs sit with the research organisation. Essential elements of this model would be:

    a. The researcher(s) are required to disclose the invention to the research organisation and to assign ownership of both the legal and beneficial IP rights to the organisation.

    b. The research organisation has the first option to lead the commercialisation but in doing so must consult the researcher(s):

        i. On the choice of commercialisation strategy (ie, whether to license, found a spinout, etc.)

        ii. If it decides to commercialise via a spinout, on whether they wish to participate in the spinout.

    c. If the research organisation decides not to commercialise within a reasonable period, it must give the researcher(s) the option to lead the commercialisation.

18. We understand that this situation largely mirrors the practice of CRIs at present. In recent years, the practice of CRIs has evolved to involve researcher(s) in the commercialisation. However, CRIs do not generally share the benefits of commercialisation with the researchers that created the underlying IP. We think the proposed approach will balance the role of the PROs with encouraging researchers' involvement in decisions related to the IP they generate.

19. This situation also applies in some cases to university research institutes (eg, Robinson Research Institute and Ferrier Research Institute). These institutes also intentionally build a portfolio of IP in line with the mission of the organisation and direct staff to perform certain research activities to advance this objective. As a result, we would extend the approach outlined above to cover a university research institute that specifically directs the research.[5]

[5] It will be necessary to clearly specify the situations in which the exception to the normal rules for universities apply. We propose that this be done as part of the process of drafting the formal terms of the IP policy to be applied as a condition of the research funding contracts (as discussed below).

When research is funded by a third party, the allocation of IP rights will be determined by the relevant contract

20. We propose that in the situation where the research was funded by a third party, the allocation of legal and beneficial IP rights and the right to commercialise will be determined by the contract between the parties. Normally the third party will require the IP be assigned to it so that it can achieve the outcomes for which it commissioned the research. However, this may be negotiable in some cases. This is consistent with the Waterloo model.

21. Annex Two summarises the rules that we propose would apply in these different contexts.

Terms of engagement between the researcher and research organisation

The terms on which a researcher engages commercialisation support from the research organisation materially impact the benefits the researcher receives

22. An IP policy makes clear between the researcher and the research organisation who owns and has rights to the commercialise the IP. However, the terms of any engagement between the parties – eg, the shares of equity in a spinout – will materially impact the actual benefits received by the researcher. [6]

23. Researchers tend not to have sufficient knowledge or information to assess the terms they are offered as they engage with TTOs. Where a TTO is also a potential investor, or where a researcher may be engaging private commercialisation support, there also tends to be a power imbalance that may lead researchers to accept less beneficial terms than they might otherwise.

We propose to develop best practice guidelines, rather than requiring standardised terms

24. We do not think it is practical or sensible to prescribe a standardised terms of engagement that research organisations must apply to any research that falls under the IP policy. This was strongly emphasised by stakeholders through our engagements. Feedback emphasised that every situation is different (eg, in terms of the nature of the IP and the involvement of the TTO) and there needs to be flexibility to reflect this in different terms. Being too prescriptive may inhibit rather than enable commercialisation activity.

25. In this context, we suggest that providing 'best practice' guidance for such terms of engagement would help better inform and position researchers in these negotiations. These guidelines would essentially set out what 'good' looks like in these agreements, and prompt greater clarity of why any terms being proposed differ from this best practice.

26. We propose to develop a set of guidelines for terms of engagement that is informed by New Zealand and international best practice. The guidelines would essentially provide a set of default terms. The parties could deviate from these terms but any deviations would need to be well-justified and communicated between the parties involved. We also recommend these are developed in close consultation with the sector.

[6] It is standard for a university TTO to take a small equity share in a spin-out in recognition of the university's role in providing commercialisation support. For example, the University of Waterloo's TTO, WatCo, typically takes a 5 percent equity share. The terms stipulate that the WatCo share remains undiluted until the startup reaches $2 million in sales/investment.

27. This follows the approach in other countries such as the United Kingdom and Ireland that have specified a set of guidelines with default terms that research organisations use in engaging with researchers, investors, and others (see Annex Three).

Mechanism to implementing the IP policy

We propose requiring application of the IP policy as a condition of most SI&T funds

28. The most appropriate way to give effect to the national IP policy is for it to be required as a condition of the funding these organisations receive. There is choice over the breadth of funding this applies to.

29. We propose that applying the policy becomes a condition of most funding from the SI&T portfolio, including:

    a. **Research commercialisation/translation programmes** – ie, any project engaging with an investment committee supported by the Commercialisation Partner Network (CPN), receiving funding from the Pre-Seed Accelerator Fund (PSAF), or benefiting from the MedTech Research Translator / Te Tītoki Mataora (TTM).

    b. **Contestable funds in the SI&T portfolio aimed at domestic research** – ie, the Endeavour Fund, the Health Research Council, or the Marsden Fund. It would also apply to any contestable research funding under the new research funding system.

30. We do not recommend the policy automatically be a condition of other SI&T research funds (eg, Strategic Science Investment Fund, Catalyst) because some of these funds (eg, the RNA Platform and Horizon Europe) already have specific rules relating to IP coming out of this research and in other cases applying the IP Policy does not make sense given the specific research that is being funded. However, this could be considered on a case-by-case basis.

31. We propose that these requirements will be included in future funding contracts from 1 July 2026 or whenever MBIE enters into new contracts with research organisations after that date.

32. The policy would apply only to the projects receiving the funding. Organisations may choose to apply it more broadly for consistency across their research activities, but this would be at their discretion. Where the policy is not applied, the organisation would need to be able to demonstrate that funding from the specified SI&T funds was not used in that research. This approach allows independent research organisations, non-university tertiary education organisations, and private entities to receive public research funding in some instances without causing conflict with their wider programmes or operating models.

33. At this stage, we consider the SI&T portfolio funding mechanisms above sufficient to ensure the policy covers most research likely to generate commercialisable IP. It also means the IP policy can also be implemented more quickly and that you have flexibility to adapt the policy in future in response to changing situations. However, if this proves insufficient, we can explore broader application by either:

    a. Broadening the condition on the SI&T portfolio funds to require an applicant organisation have an organisation-wide IP policy that is consistent with the national IP policy, or

b. Confidential advice to Government

Provision of services to support commercialisation

Ensuring sufficient support for researchers for commercialisation is essential to achieving the IP policy's objective and we recommend continuing to pursue this

34. Stakeholders consistently emphasised that, while the proposed IP policy is a necessary step, on its own it is not sufficient to lift commercialisation activity. They highlighted that a limiting factor to greater commercialisation will be the availability and quality of commercialisation support provided to researchers.

35. Under the proposed IP policy, we expect researchers to take a stronger lead in commercialising their IP. This creates an even greater need for accessible, high-quality support to help them protect IP and develop it into investable propositions. While the policy may strengthen incentives and resolve some barriers, it also shifts responsibility and risk toward researchers, many of whom may lack the expertise or resources to navigate commercialisation independently.

36. Currently, the primary form of commercialisation support is provided by research organisations through their TTOs. These organisations cover half of the project-based costs from their own funds (albeit they recover this from the Government through an overhead charge on public research funding); the Government pays the other half through the PSAF. The Government provides additional support by funding the operation of investment committees and system-level capability development through the Commercialisation Partner Network (CPN). Overall, the level of support that research organisations provide for commercialisation varies and some organisations underperform.[8]

37. As we noted earlier (see paragraph 13), there is a risk that TTOs disengage from providing commercialisation services if they cannot be sure they will benefit from the commercialised IP. While the proposed policy lays the foundation for a market for commercialisation support services, at this time it is unclear whether third-party providers – such as incubators or early-stage investors – will step in to fill the gap, especially for such opportunities that are not yet "investor ready".

38. One way to mitigate this risk is to make clear that researchers that choose to commercialise the IP themselves must either pay for the costs of IP protection themselves (if they exercise the right at the time of disclosure) or reimburse the research organisation for any costs that the organisation has incurred (if they exercise the right after the research organisation has begun the process of protecting the IP).

39. Confidential advice to Government

[7] Confidential advice to Government

[8] We estimate that at present research organisations collectively spend roughly $11-16 million per annum on commercialisation support. The Government contributes $13 million per annum through CPN and PSAF.

Confidential advice to Government

40. Confidential advice to Government

41. Confidential advice to Government

Views of key stakeholder groups

Stakeholders appear generally supportive of the main elements of the proposal

42. We have engaged with a series of stakeholder groups throughout the development of this proposal, and we consulted a draft of this current proposal with them over the past week. These groups were:

    a. Deputy Vice Chancellors - Research from New Zealand universities

    b. CRI Chief Executives / Science New Zealand (though we note they were limited in their ability to engage, given the timing relative to amalgamation of the CRIs)

    c. A group of commercialisation experts from the universities and CRIs and KiwiNet

    d. A group of people with experience commercialising research from universities and CRIs.

43. The feedback from stakeholders was generally supportive of the main points of the proposal. Key points from the feedback were:

    a. The current university IP policies are not the main cause of the issues with the lack of commercialisation at present. Wider changes will be necessary to achieve the increase in commercialisation that the Government seeks.

    b. There needs to be more clarity around how the IP policy distinguishes between the different types of research to which the policy would apply different rules.

    c. Ensuring there is stable commercialisation support to researchers will be necessary to prevent any unintended consequences of allocating more benefits to researchers.

44. Annex Four provides a more detailed summary of the feedback provided by stakeholders. We can address the concerns raised in this feedback through the detailed drafting of the policy (ie, clear definitions of the types of research receiving different treatment and further consideration of government's role in supporting the provision of commercialisation services).

Next steps

45. We will be available to discuss this proposal with you at the SI&T Officials meeting on Monday 7 July. Subject to your approval we would draft these proposals into a draft Cabinet paper by Thursday 10 July for your feedback.

46. Progressing the paper to Cabinet by the end of July would be possible on this timeline:

Draft Cabinet paper for consideration	10 July
Ministerial and agency consultation (in parallel)	15-23 July
Lodge for ECO	24 July
ECO	30 July
Cabinet	4 August

Annexes

Annex One: Alternative models for the allocation of IP and commercialisation rights

Annex Two: Proposed rules under different contexts

Annex Three: Guidelines on terms of engagement in other countries

Annex Four: Summary of stakeholder feedback

Annex One: Alternative models for the allocation of IP and commercialisation rights

	Legal ownership of IP rights	Beneficial ownership of IP rights	First option to lead commercialisation	Second option to lead commercialisation	Other
0. NZ default	Research organisation	Research organisation, but researcher(s) typically receive a share	Research organisation, but researcher(s) often encouraged to lead	none	Research organisation has discretion over benefits shared with researcher(s)
1. Hydrid model	Research organisation	Researcher(s)	Researcher(s)	Research organisation	Researcher reimburses research organisation for IP costs if exercises option
2. Toronto model	Researcher(s) decide at point of disclosure*	Joint (by researcher(s) and research organisation)	Researcher(s)	Research organisation	Commercialising party compensates other for their beneficial IP rights
3. Waterloo model	Researcher(s)	Researcher(s)	Researcher(s)	none	Researcher(s) discretion whether to involve research organisation

* Researcher(s) choose whether to file for formal IP protection in own name(s) or assign rights to research organisation

The Toronto model shares the beneficial IP rights more evenly but still creates a risk the IP is not appropriately protected

47. You asked us to consider the "inventor's choice" (Toronto) model. The key features of this are: [9]

    a. The informal (ie, beneficial) IP rights in inventions created with the use of University of Toronto resources (eg, facilities, equipment, or funding administered by the University) are jointly owned by the researcher(s) and research organisation at the point of creation.[10]

    b. At the point when the researcher(s) makes an invention disclosure, the researcher(s) choose whether to take responsibility for obtaining (and therefore owning) the formal IP rights or assign them to the research organisation.

    c. Whichever party commercialises the invention compensates the other for their share of the beneficial IP rights.[11]

48. According to our assessment, the strengths of the Toronto model are:

    a. it provides a clear decision point at which the researcher elects to take responsibility for commercialising the IP

    b. both the researcher(s) and the research organisation have an interest in the IP so both have an incentive to further its commercialisation.

49. The weaknesses of the Toronto model as we see it are:

    a. Giving researcher(s) the choice regarding IP ownership creates the same risks as with the Waterloo model that the IP is not appropriately protected.

    b. Joint ownership can result in uncertainty over what shares the commercialising party owes to the non-commercialising party, which may lead to dispute at a later point.

[9] In the course of our investigations we spoke to Kurtis Scissons, Director – University Ventures, at the University of Toronto to learn more about how the Toronto model works in practice.

[10] As a starting point, the beneficial IP rights are owned 75% by the researcher(s) and 25% by the University of Toronto.

[11] If the researcher(s) commercialise the IP, they are expected to compensate the University of Toronto for its 25% share. This does not mean the University demands a 25% equity share; instead, it expects to receive 25% share of the net revenue generated as a result of the IP. If the University of Toronto commercialises the IP, it takes a 40% share of the benefits and shares the other 60% with the researcher(s). The additional 15% is considered compensation for its contribution to the commercialisation.

Annex Two: Proposed rules under different contexts

Research context	Main situation to which this will apply	Legal ownership of IP rights	Beneficial ownership of IP rights	First option to lead commercialisation	Second option to lead commercialisation
1. Initiated by researcher(s)	Research by university staff and students	Research organisation	Researcher(s)	Researcher(s)*	Research organisation
2. Conducted at direction of research organisation	Research at PROs and university research institutes	Research organisation	Research organisation	Research organisation, in consultation with researcher(s)	Researcher(s)
3. Funded by a third party	Sponsored research	[As per funding contract]	[As per funding contract]	[As per funding contract]	[As per funding contract]

* Researcher(s) may (at their discretion) seek commercialisation support from the research organisation / TTO

Annex Three: Guidelines on terms of engagement in other countries

1. This annex summarises the actions of selected countries to develop guidelines for research organisations to engage with researchers on IP and commercialisation.

United Kingdom – TenU USIT Guide

2. The UK's University Spin-out Investment Terms (USIT) Guide was developed in 2022 under the stewardship of TenU, an international collaboration of leading university TTOs. The UK's guidelines provide a structured set of best-practice terms for university spin-out formation, covering equity, royalties, licensing, governance, and deal negotiation principles across 22 key items. USIT was co-created with experienced commercialisation representatives from UK universities, venture capital firms, and legal experts.

Ireland – National IP Protocol

3. Ireland's National IP Protocol was developed by Knowledge Transfer Ireland on behalf of the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation. It sets out model agreements and practical guidance for licensing, spin-out formation, and collaborative research. An update to the guidelines was undertaken in 2019 and was informed by extensive consultation with research-performing organisations, industry stakeholders, and legal experts. The development of the guidelines was governed by terms of reference, which emphasised transparency, mutual benefit, and the efficient transfer of publicly funded research to industry.

Australia – Higher Education Research Commercialisation (HERC) IP Framework

4. Australia's approach is shaped by the Higher Education Research Commercialisation IP Framework, developed by the Department of Education in collaboration with Universities Australia, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and other research and industry stakeholders. The framework was designed to support consistent IP practices across universities and to facilitate collaboration with industry. It includes model agreements, licensing templates, and guidance on benefit-sharing.

United States – AUTM Guidelines

5. The US Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) developed its licensing and technology transfer guidelines through a collaborative process involving leaders from 12 US universities. These guidelines were shaped by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which enabled universities to retain ownership of IP from federally funded research. AUTM's "Nine Points to Consider" and other resources were created to reflect stakeholder expectations and best practices in licensing, equity sharing, and public benefit.

Singapore – IP Hub Master Plan and Institutional Reforms

6. Singapore's IP commercialisation policy evolved through a series of reforms beginning in the 1990s, culminating in the IP Hub Master Plan launched in 2013. The development process was led by the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS) in collaboration with the Ministry of Law, the Economic Development Board, and research institutions. Stakeholder consultations included universities, law enforcement, and international partners such as the WTO and WIPO.

Annex Four: Summary of stakeholder feedback

1. Commercialisation Experts

- Participants:
  - Will Charles (UniServices), Dave Christensen (Otago Innovation), Amanda Davies (Scion), James Hutchinson (KiwiNet), Peter Cook (Plant & Food Research), Mark Cleaver (Massey)
- Key Themes:
  - Support for researcher rights the hybrid model, with a request to allow institutions to invest in researcher-led ventures.
  - Concerns about disincentivising institutional investment due to removing beneficial IP rights.
  - Calls for clearer language regarding 'beneficial ownership'.
  - Questions around IP ownership in cross-institution projects.
  - Discussion whether TTOs had a ‘kaitiaki’ role vs researchers’ independence.
  - Need for clear decision points and cost responsibilities for patent filing.
  - Advocacy for flexibility in choice of mechanisms to compensate researchers for beneficial IP rights including equity.
  - Scepticism about third-party providers competing with established TTOs.

2. Deputy Vice Chancellors – Research (DVC-Rs)

- Participants:
  - Martin Gagnon (Otago), Margaret Hyland (VUW), Simon Lovatt (Waikato), Lucy Johnson (Canterbury), Chad Hewitt (Lincoln), Frank Bloomfield (Auckland), Giselle Byrnes (Massey)
- Key Themes:
  - Scepticism about the assumption that giving IP rights to academics will increase commercialisation.
  - Concerns about legal ownership and definitional clarity around 'researcher' and research contexts.
  - Debate over rules applying to student IP.
  - Administrative burden of tracing funding sources for IP attribution.
  - Implementation challenges due to fiscal constraints and resource limitations.
  - Appreciation for the policy being an adaptation of the Waterloo model.
  - Questions about applicability of policy to research from other sources.

3. Researchers with commercialisation experience

- Participants:
  - Emily Parker, (Bontia Bio / VUW), Irina Miller (Daisy Lab), Jonathan Good (Scentian Bio), Jonathan Ring, (Zincovery), Justin Hodgkiss, (Admento / VUW), Rod Dunbar (TamoRx / Auckland), Simon Malpas (Kitea Health / Auckland)
- Key Themes:
  - Emphasis on the need for a holistic approach to commercialisation beyond just the IP policy.
  - Warnings that TTOs may disengage without changes to funding models.
  - Issues of patent filing with existing TTOs and pressure to prove commercial viability early.
  - Support for empowering researchers and providing flexibility in commercialisation pathways.
  - Importance of training and institutional incentives to support commercialisation.
  - Concerns about “predatory” behaviour by investors if rights are shifted to researchers.

4. Science New Zealand / CRI Chief Executives

- Participants:
  - John Morgan (NIWA), Mark Piper (Plant & Food Research), Chelydra Percy (GNS Science), James Stevenson-Wallace (Manaaki Whenua Landcare Research), Sue Bidrose (AgResearch), Julian Elder (Scion), Sir Ashley Bloomfield (ESR)
- Key Themes:
  - Need for clarity on how the policy applies to Crown Research Institutes (CRIs).
  - Emphasis on maintaining flexibility for CRIs to meet their unique mandates.
  - Importance of benefit sharing and commercialisation support tailored to CRIs.