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Population Movement in the Pacific:

A Perspective on Future Prospects

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TE TARI MAHI

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Labour.

Introduction: a decade of demographic milestones

Already this century, the global population has passed seven billion, and by 2009 around half were living in urban centres. In the Pacific, the total population reached 10 million in 2010.

The world population is forecast to exceed nine billion by 2050, with more than six billion living in cities. And the Pacific population will have blown out to 18 million.

The Pacific nations have shown little signs of urbanisation over the past century. But in the coming decades, politicians, planners and policy-makers of these countries (as well as Australia and New Zealand) will have to consider how best to deal with the region's increasing urbanisation especially of Papua New Guinea, Solomon islands and Vanuatu.

John Key, the New Zealand Prime Minister, in addressing the 2011 Pacific Forum, identified four sectors that all Pacific nations should focus on: tourism, energy, fisheries and education. He made no reference to urbanisation or the rise in youth numbers. But he did observe that the forum member countries should "work harder to get kids into school in the Pacific region, and teach them the skills they need to succeed and contribute to the economy".

Those four key industries, though critical for the development of many Pacific countries, were unlikely to provide enough jobs for the growing workforce, especially in Melanesia, he said. Mr Key challenged Pacific leaders to "be creative, innovative and open to new ways of approaching old problems" and to "listen to new voices and explore new partnerships".

International migration and development

In the Pacific region, the international migration debate has moved on from concerns about the 'brain drain' effect on the source countries. Now, development agencies recognise its potential for addressing several of the United Nations' 'Millennium Development Goals', especially those concerned with poverty, gender equity, spread of infectious diseases, environmental sustainability and the creation of development partnerships.

Over the next four decades, an interesting reversal in workforce demographics is forecast. While the region's high-income countries (primarily Australia and New Zealand) lose workers because of low fertility and ageing, the poorer countries' populations will continue to grow, though more slowly than before.

The high-income countries, to maintain their workforces, will look to a greater flow of workers from the low-income countries.

The youth bulge

Asia has already had its 'youth bulge' — large numbers of adolescents and young adults who were born when fertility rates were high. But with the more recent decline in Asian fertility rates, this trend has passed and Asia's workforces are growing older. By contrast, the youth population of Pacific countries, especially those in Melanesia, are expected to grow rapidly over the next two decades.

Polynesia's population explosion of the 1960s fuelled their last big period of mass emigration. In the 21st century, it will be Melanesia's population growth that offers the challenge to policy-makers and politicians in New Zealand and Australia.

Between 1960 and 2000, the world's urban population nearly trebled, from just under one billion to 2.84 billion. And in the least developed countries, city-dwellers increased five times as fast as in the more developed countries. The United Nations has projected that the global urban population will soar to 6.3 billion by 2050, with the biggest increases in Africa, Asia and Oceania (the Pacific region in this report).

The Pacific region has wide diversity in its urbanisation rates: from small islands such as Guam and Nauru, with 100 percent urban living, to Papua New Guinea, with less than 20 percent. The populations of Polynesia and Micronesia are generally more urbanised than those of western Melanesia. And New Caledonia and Fiji in eastern Melanesia have very different colonial histories from the western Melanesian populations. By 2050, the Pacific region is projected to be 36 percent urban.

Irregular migration

Irregular (illegal, undocumented or unauthorised) migration is expected to rise markedly around the world. In migration from the Pacific Islands to Australia and New Zealand, this is expected to consist mostly of short-term workers who have overstayed their permits.

Other global problems that have ballooned in recent years include smuggling (people getting paid to help with clandestine border crossings), human trafficking and 'boat people' (asylum-seekers). But other than Australia's boat-people influx from places such as Indonesia, these are not considered major issues in the Pacific region.

What drives Pacific migration

Up to now, migration in the Pacific has been fuelled by simple labour-market supply and demand. The islanders, with limited manufacturing and service sectors at home, seek work elsewhere. The developed, industrialised and urbanised Pacific Rim countries, with their rapidly ageing populations, have filled the gap with workers from their less developed neighbouring countries. The wages that menial jobs in New Zealand and Australia pay is much higher than for high-status skilled jobs in the island countries.

There are simply not enough regular, paid employment opportunities at home, and that will become more of a problem as the unskilled workforce expands over the coming years. Of lesser significance is the demand for skilled workers, though many of them leave the home countries to seek better opportunities abroad. As a result, many Pacific countries now have skills shortages in areas such as health, education and the trades.

At the annual meetings of the Pacific Islands Forum, island leaders have been asking migration policy-makers in their bigger, more developed neighbours to have sympathy for the difficult environmental challenges that island peoples face, such as rising sea, tropical cyclones and drought. But they should also recognise how the Pacific's growing youthful populations can help solve human-resources dilemmas.

The wider region

With European colonisation, Pacific peoples began moving to Pacific Rim countries for the new labour opportunities: on Australia's sugar plantations, and on ships involved in whaling, trading and transport of missionaries. From the 1960s, the demand for low-skilled labour increased, particularly in New Zealand, coincided with air travel from countries such as the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa and Tonga.

But not all Pacific countries have enjoyed equal access to the developed countries. Polynesia and Micronesia have fared much better on obtaining work and residence than the three countries of western Melanesia. Yet those three countries have the lowest levels of urbanisation and the highest population growth rates.

Meanwhile, all Pacific nations have suffered a brain drain in crucial skills areas — notably doctors, nurses, teachers and technicians. This is because of limited training and career opportunities for educated and skilled workers, but also because of Australia, Canada and New Zealand cherry-picking the best and brightest under their their immigration points systems. This problem is projected to worsen over the next 40 years, as the youthful working-age populations balloon and urbanisation intensifies.

Importance of remittances

As more and more young working-age Pacific island people seek work in the developed countries, so have their weekly remittances back home, to their families and communities, became increasingly important. In some of the smaller Pacific countries, the income from remittances exceeds earnings from any other

domestic sector — certainly more than returns from the mixed-subsistence, cash-crop village economy.

The Pacific region's economy is more dependant on remittances than any other world region, including such Asian countries as the Philippines, Bangladesh and Pakistan. However, as migrants get better integrated into their new country, their commitment to remittances may decline. Tonga recently introduced dual citizenship as an incentive for migrants to maintain remittances.

The double lure of overseas work experience and (comparatively) lucrative remittances has spurred a greater urgency for emigration, particularly among Melanesians.

Population growth and urbanisation

The projected rapid growth of working-age Pacific populations over the next 40 years — some to even double their present size — is expected to bring new problems. The World Bank has cited:

- lack of capacity in Pacific rural and urban labour markets to absorb these workers
- a lack of formal sector jobs to absorb educated young people
- the increasing concentration of young people in coastal towns
- the potential for unrest among unemployed and disenfranchised young people in cities.

But the biggest problem is the projected population explosion in the new urban landscape of the Pacific. Censuses since the 1980s have made it clear that the region faces an urban future. Yet this is likely to be very different from the cities in Australia and New Zealand, with millions of residents living off informal activities rather than regular waged employment in the public and private sectors.

The biggest urban explosion is projected for Melanesia — expected to bring an extra four million people to the cities by 2050. By then, the city-dwellers of Melanesia could number 5.45 million, which is larger than New Zealand's projected urban population.

Mobility-related challenges: HIV and climate change

With the increased mobility and urbanisation of the Pacific's youthful population will come new challenges. Changing cultural and social mores brings a bigger risk of HIV infection, through risky sexual behaviour. HIV can lead to Aids, which has already had an impact on mortality rates in Papua New Guinea.
But an even bigger threat to the the livelihoods, security and well-being of Pacific people is climate change, which may force mass migrations.

Forces for change in mobility patterns

Over the next 20 to 30 years, the main forces for change in Pacific mobility patterns are likely to be:

- population growth
- secondary and tertiary education needs

- the increasing role of Papua New Guinea as a destination for migrants, especially from the western Pacific
- more Melanesian influence in Pacific affairs
- more Asian involvement in the region
- a changing power nexus in regional security
- the pace of environmental change.

There is already a growing unease about 'fortress ANZ' — the tightening of immigration policies and residency approvals by Australia and New Zealand. These two traditional regional powers will need very very different levels of engagement with Pacific people if they are to prevent 'illegal' flows.

Pacific migration to the Rim

By 2010, a total of 850,000 people of Pacific ethnicity or ancestry were living in the four main Pacific Rim migrant destinations: New Zealand (350,000), Australia (150,000), USA (300,000) and Canada (50,000). There were also small populations in the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia.

The combined Pacific-born populations in Australia and New Zealand rose by 440 percent between 1971 and 2006, from 46,000 to 250,000. A similar increase up to 2050 would bring the population to around 1.5 million.

Continuity through change

In the late 1940s, very small populations of Pacific-born people lived in New Zealand (just over 3000) and Australia (4700). The main source for both countries was Fiji, followed by migrants from the two countries' respective colonies: the Cook Islands, Niue and Samoa for New Zealand and Papua New Guinea for Australia.

By the mid-1950s, New Zealand's Pacific-born population had exceeded Australia's, and it grew much more rapidly through the 1960s and 1970s in response to labour demand in rural areas and manufacturing. By 1971, New Zealand's Pacific-born population was just under 31,000 — nearly twice Australia's.

But 85 percent of Australia's were from Melanesia, especially PNG, whereas New Zealand had 81 percent from Polynesia, and half of its total were Samoa-born. Fiji had still contributed the second biggest populations for both Australia and New Zealand.

In their 2006 censuses, Australia recorded 106,900 Pacific-born residents and New Zealand 138,400. The Melanesia-born (especially Fijian and Fiji Indian) population continued to dominate in Australia, though the Samoa-born population was rising. New Zealand's figures showed a continuation of the link with Polynesia, though political events after 2000 brought an increase of migrants from Fiji.

Access to residence in Australia and New Zealand

Between 2003 and 2007, three times more Pacific people moved to New Zealand than to Australia with the intention of settling. The main reasons given were:

- the importance of family in Polynesian culture
- New Zealand's special quota systems for Samoa
- New Zealand's 'Pacific Access Category', which grants access to a set number of migrants from Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu each year.

Pacific diaspora to North America and Europe

Historically, most Pacific migration to the US came from American Samoa and, since the Second World War, the American territories of Micronesia. Those migrants tended to settle in Hawai'i and various Californian coastal cities.

By 2000, USA's Pacific-ancestry population totalled more than 200,000 — comparable with New Zealand's. Samoans dominated New Zealand's Pacific-ancestry population, followed by Tongans and Micronesians. More recently, many more Fijians and Fiji Indians have been applying for permanent residency.

Canada is a less important destination for Pacific migrants than USA, Australia or New Zealand, though coup-weary Fijians and Fiji Indians have shown much more interest in recent years. Small Pacific-born populations also live in some European countries, especially the UK (more than 10,000 in 2000), France (more than 1000, mostly from its colonial or former colonial territories) and Germany. In recent years, the Middle East and Japan have entered the frame, especially with Fijian involvement in UN peace-keeping missions and private security firms in global trouble spots.

Temporary movement and access to work

Overall, temporary visas in Australia and New Zealand remain hard to obtain for unskilled or low-skilled Pacific workers. But New Zealand has set up special Pacific migration programmes to fill overloads of seasonal work in agriculture. The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy was launched in April 2007, to allocate up to 5000 places a year for these workers. This has since risen to up to 8000 a year.
Under this scheme, labour comes from (in order of numbers) Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati.

In 2008, Australia introduced a seasonal-work pilot scheme for Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tonga. In 2011 it added Papua New Guinea, and it is preparing to include Samoa, the Solomons and Tuvalu.

Since these two schemes began, other sectors have been putting pressure on the New Zealand and Australian Governments to ease restrictions on temporary workers from the Pacific. These include the New Zealand dairy and meat processing industries, the post-earthquake rebuilding of Christchurch, and the Australian tourism and fishing industries.

Temporary movement: students and visitors

In the 1960s and 1970s, access to New Zealand's secondary and tertiary education drove much of the migration from Samoa and Tonga. In fact, this was a major reason cited for these countries looking to the Australian and New Zealand seasonal-work schemes — so they could cover education costs back in the islands or offshore. At the 2011 Pacific Forum in Auckland, both the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to improving school attendance and literacy and numeracy levels throughout the region.

While the issuing of study visas and permits has grown steadily over the past 15 or so years, visitor visas issued to Pacific citizens have grown more slowly. We believe the temporary movements of Pacific citizens to Pacific Rim countries has reached a watershed. The policy-makers and politicians of Australia and New Zealand must think seriously about how to adapt to a increasingly urbanised populations.

Conclusion: Major shifts in Pacific migration ahead

Australia has already experienced a major rise in immigrants from Melanesian countries — especially Fiji and increasingly Papua New Guinea. As a result, Melanesian people are becoming more prominent in political and policy discourse about Pacific region migration.

The main four forces that will change mobility patterns in the region are:

- urbanisation of Pacific (especially Melanesian) populations
- the demand for skilled labour in PNG's resource-extraction industry
- ongoing environmental deterioration in low-lying coral islands of central and northern Pacific
- the youth bubble and increasing investment by Australia, New Zealand and USA in improving education and skill levels.

Immigration authorities in the two trans-Tasman neighbours should anticipate a rise in temporary work and residence visa applications from the western and central Pacific over the next two decades, as well as continued immigration from Polynesia.

Our understanding of the changing Pacific migration trends can be enhanced through further research especially the use of futures scenario based modeling developed by the Oxford University – based International Migration Institute (IMI).

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1 INTRODUCTION: A DECADE OF DEMOGRAPHIC MILESTONES

The world reached some major demographic milestones late in the first decade of the 21st century. The United Nations' Population Division (2010) estimated that by 2009, half the world's population was living in towns and cities for the first time. The UN predicted that the world's population would pass seven billion by 2011 and the population of the 22 countries comprising the Pacific Islands would exceed 10 million.

These demographic milestones do not mark the end of either global population growth or the urbanisation transition. According to the UN's projections, by 2050 the world's population is likely to exceed nine billion, and around 70 percent (more than six billion) will live in urban places (UN Population Division 2011). The world's urban population recorded in 2009 (around 3.3 billion) is likely to be almost twice as large again by 2050. The Pacific will have millionaire cities and many more urban societies and economies, even though the region has been very much discouraged from developing towns and cities since the early 20th century (Connell 2011).

The 22 countries that comprise the Pacific Islands have no urban tradition before European settlement. They have been rural societies since people settled islands, even though in 2010 most of the smaller island countries had half or more of their people living in places classified as urban within their national boundaries (Table 1). Aside from a few exceptions, such as the military base-dominated island of Guam and the former phosphate-mining island of Nauru, Pacific countries remain 'rural' in the minds of their indigenous peoples, their politicians and, until very recently, most of their planners and policy-makers.

The Pacific Institute of Public Policy (2011: 1) has observed: 'In every country in the Pacific, urban population growth is exceeding the national growth rate. Yet with few exceptions, urbanisation has been ignored or viewed as a negative trait to be stopped, as governments and development agencies have tended to focus their attention on rural development.' It goes on to note: 'A combination of high unemployment, climate change and a looming energy crisis means radical new thinking is needed about how best to evolve our cities and towns for the future.'

Table 1: Size and distribution of Pacific Island populations, 2010

Subregion/country	Land area (km^2)	Population (est. 2010)	Population distribution (%)	
			Rural	Urban
Melanesia	542,370	8,641,900	80	20
Fiji	18,270	847,800	49	51
New Caledonia	18,580	254,500	37	63
Papua New Guinea	462,840	6,745,000	87	13
Solomon Islands	30,400	549,600	84	16
Vanuatu	12,280	245,000	76	24
Micronesia	3,150	547,300	34	66
Federated States (FSM)	700	111,400	78	22
Guam	540	187,100	7	93
Kiribati	810	100,800	56	44
Marshall Islands	180	54,400	35	65
Nauru	20	10,000	0	100
Nthern Mariana Islands	460	63,100	10	90
Palau	440	20,500	23	77
Polynesia	7,990	663,960	62	38
American Samoa	200	65,900	50	50
Cook Islands	240	15,500	28	72
French Polynesia	3,520	268,800	49	51
Niue	260	1,500	64	36
Pitcairn Islands	5	60	100	0
Samoa	2,940	183,100	79	21
Tokelau	12	1,200	100	0
Tonga	650	103,400	77	23
Tuvalu	25	11,200	53	47
Wallis and Futuna	140	13,300	100	0
Pacific Islands	**553,510**	**9,853,160**	**77**	**23**

Source: SPC-SDP Population Data Sheet 2010, www.spc.int/spd/

In 1960, when the world's population reached three billion and 33 percent (nearly one billion people) were living in urban places, there was much concern about a 'population explosion'. As Lam (2011: 5) notes, Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book *The Population Bomb* typified the alarmist rhetoric that dominated debates about population growth and development in the 1960s–70s. Around 1960, when the Pacific Islands' population was just over 3.1 million (400,000 urban, or 12.8 percent), demographers Borrie (1967) and McArthur (1961, 1964) wrote about 'Malthusian' problems and the need for emigration to ease the pressure of rapid population growth in the small-island societies and economies of Polynesia.

On both global and regional scales, population growth in the 1960s was seen to be a threat to the long-term sustainability and security of what were, for the most part, rural societies.

Fifty years on, the world's population has experienced 'one of the most extraordinary periods of demographic history the world has ever seen' (Lam 2011: 3). Now it is more than twice that of 1960, and the urban population is more than three times. There has been a massive shift in the distribution of people from rural to urban areas, caused by a combination of internal and international migration as well as higher levels of natural increase in the younger urban populations. In the Pacific the total population has trebled over the same period, growing faster than the global average, and the urban population increased more than five times to reach around 2.27 million in 2010. The average population growth and pace of urbanisation across Pacific populations over this 50-year period has been higher than the global average. This is set to continue for the next 40 to 50 years, according to UN projections.

Looking ahead, one of the biggest challenges associated with migration globally is going to be 'the great and final shift of human populations out of rural, agricultural life into cities' (Saunders 2010: 1). The urbanisation of a further three billion people globally, including at least a further three million in the Pacific, will be driven by varying mixes of internal and international migration in different parts of the world, depending largely on their current population distributions. But one lesson from the history of urbanisation in Europe, North America and Australasia, where more than 80 percent of people already live in towns and cities, is that the 'great shaking loose from the countryside' is invariably associated with significant international as well as internal migration (Zelinsky 1971).

The rapid increase in the urbanisation of Europe's populations in the 18th and 19th centuries generated major waves of international migration and the dispersal of Europeans across the globe. In the same way, the 'great shaking loose' of rural populations in the Pacific and elsewhere in the 21st century will see large populations flock across international boundaries as well as into local towns and cities. This has been the urbanisation experience of Polynesia and Micronesia; it is likely to be the same for western Melanesia (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), where at least 80 percent of the population was rural in 2010 (Table 1).

As the Polynesian urbanisation experience since the 1970s has shown, local towns are often staging posts for onward migration once the migrants have gathered the appropriate skills, knowledge and wealth. Cities in Australia, New Zealand and the United States will continue play a major role in the ongoing urbanisation of Polynesians and Micronesians. These will also become increasingly important destinations for Melanesians, and it would be prudent for planners, policy-makers and politicians in Pacific Rim countries to anticipate much more immigration from the western as well as the eastern and northern Pacific.

This report addresses the contemporary and possible future drivers of migration in a region that will pose many challenges for the populations in the islands as well as in Australia and New Zealand over the next 40 years. It follows an earlier report which reviewed contemporary literature on Pacific population movement and presented recent data on migration from the Pacific Islands to New Zealand (Hugo and Bedford 2008). Section 2 situates these introductory remarks about population growth and urbanisation globally and in the Pacific in the context of some contemporary international debates about migration and development. Where appropriate, they linking with current trends and issues in the Pacific. This is followed by a review of some current and prospective drivers of mobility in different parts of the region. Section 4 examines the migration links between Pacific countries and Australia and New Zealand, particularly growth in their island-born populations and policies that relate to international migration in the region.

The report concludes with some observations on the current state of the south Pacific migration system—the system of flows between countries in the region and on the Pacific Rim. The second decade of the 21st century may be a defining moment in the evolution of this regional migration system, given the challenges posed by participants in various meetings before and during the Pacific Islands Forum in Auckland in September 2011. A pre-forum 'Engaging with the Pacific' meeting was convened by Fiji's interim Prime Minister, to develop an alternative agenda and vision for the region. In attendance were representatives of all the Melanesian countries, including the Prime Ministers of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; representatives of the Kanaks in New Caledonia; the Prime Minister of Tuvalu; and senior officials from French Polynesia.

There were also various meetings in Auckland to coincide with the forum, organised by groups such as the Lowy Institute, Oxfam and the Pacific Institute of Public Policy. These addressed the challenges for youth in many of the region's towns and villages: corruption and nepotism; poverty and poor health; urbanisation; and lack of opportunities. As Barry Coates (2011: A11), Executive Director of Oxfam New Zealand, observed on the eve of the forum, there is a widening rift between many countries in the region and Australia and New Zealand. This is partly over the way to engage with Fiji's military regime, but also more broadly over the role of Australia and New Zealand in the region as 'an increasing number of countries, particularly the Melanesian nations, align themselves more closely with China and others for strategic and trade partnerships'.

A new development in the Pacific migration system is the emergence of Papua New Guinea as a potential destination for migrants with diverse skills who can fill labour gaps in its burgeoning minerals-based and energy-based industries. Understanding possible futures for migration and development in the region requires thinking beyond analysis of reasonably well-defined demographic and economic trends.

This report concludes with a recommendation that the New Zealand Department of Labour and the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship consider engaging with an innovative Global Migration Futures research programme based at Oxford University's International Migration Institute (www.imi.ox.ac.uk).

The research team presented a very interesting overview of their scenario-building research methodology at the 16th International Metropolis Conference in the Azores in September 2011. Members were willing to participate in a workshop that might build on the findings of the current Pacific project—to increase our understanding of possible migration futures for the region by drawing on the insights of a wide range of stakeholders.

2 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The first decade of the 21st century has seen a shift in the global discourse on how international migration affects origin communities. Previously this debate emphasised 'brain drain' losses of human capital caused by skilled people emigrating from low-income to higher-income countries. Now it is focussing much more on the positive effects that migration has on development in origin nations. As the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, put it in a report prepared for the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006:

> *The potential for migrants to help transform their native countries has captured the imaginations of national and local authorities, international institutions and the private sector. There is an emerging consensus that countries can co-operate to create triple wins: for migrants, for their countries of origin and for the societies that receive them.*
> (United Nations, 2006: 5)

With the debate about migration and development has come renewed activity, both in and beyond the Pacific region. The aim is to gain the most benefit from migration for reducing poverty and bettering the lives of people in poor countries. Development agencies believe migration can help improve the situation of poor countries (World Bank 2006a; Asian Development Bank 2004; United Nations Population Division 2006; DFID 2007). They can also play a role in working towards the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although the the expected benefits from mobility cut across most MDGs, the closest linkages are to Goals 1 (Poverty Reduction), 3 (Gender Equity), 6 (Prevention of HIV/Aids, Malaria and Other Infectious Diseases), 7 (Environmental Sustainability) and 8 (Creation of Global Partnerships for Development).

The World Bank (2006a: 29) has shown that, from 2010 onwards, numbers in the labour-force age groups in high-income countries will begin to decline because of persistent low fertility and the associated ageing of populations (Figure 1). On the other hand, in poorer countries the labour-force age groups will continue to grow, but more slowly. This will necessitate greater flows of workers from low-income to high-income countries, as the latter seek to maintain the size of their workforces. There is evidence that the global financial crisis (GFC) has dampened this flow recently (IOM 2011; Ghosh 2011). However, increasing migration from south to north is considered an important structural feature of the global economy for the foreseeable future. All the key contemporary drivers of international migration are likely to strengthen over the next two decades, so that movement from low-income to high-income countries increases (GCIM 2005).

Figure 1: Labour-force age groups and dependency rates: a global perspective



Source: World Bank (2006a: 30)

The argument that freeing up labour flows between countries can boost economic growth and development in both the south and the north has gained increasing support, from in international agencies such as the World Bank. For example, Walmsley and Winters (2003) have estimated that an increase in developed countries' quotas for the inward movements of both skilled and unskilled temporary workers equivalent to 3 percent of their workforces would generate an estimated increase in world welfare of about US$156 billion. Further work by Walmsley, Ahmed and Parsons (2005) confirmed these results and showed that residents in developed countries would also be major beneficiaries. Their real incomes would increase an average of US$200 per person, compared with US$24 per person on average for permanent residents of developing countries.

Three basic processes bring benefits for origin countries: inflow of remittances from migrants, the role played by diaspora in enhancing growth and development in the origin, and the return movement of former migrants. In the Pacific's case, the World Bank (2006b) report 'At Home and Away: Expanding Job Opportunities for Pacific Islanders through Labor Mobility' stressed that international migration, especially labour mobility, has an integral role to play in alleviating poverty developing economies in the islands. At the same time it helps overcome major labour shortages in several sectors in the New Zealand and Australian economies.

This report has raised awareness in Pacific countries of the potential for migration to help their economies. Its authors document the economic, geographical and demographic challenges facing the region. They cite the results of a 'computable general equilibrium' modelling exercise that demonstrates how increasing international labour migration can raise welfare in Pacific Island countries as well as in the main destinations of Australia and New Zealand (Walmsley et al 2005). They also found that greater gains accrued from unskilled labour migration rather than skilled migration.

On the topic of mobility between the Pacific and New Zealand, the report concludes:

> *… a scenario of only skilled workers migrating permanently with zero mobility for unskilled is probably least development-friendly (no migration at all for skilled would probably be worse), while a scenario of both skilled and unskilled moving in a circular fashion, generating financial flows as well as serving as conduits of social change, is likely to be the most development friendly for the Pacific. In between this worst- and best-case scenario are approaches that provide compensation to sending countries by augmenting supply, which is very welcome in small states, as well as ensuring that financial links are strong.*
> (World Bank, 2006b: 23)

In the early literature, brain drain was seen as being harmful to development in the origin nations, since it deprived them of the scarce human resources required for achieving economic and social progress. Even the loss of small numbers could be significant (see Ward 1967 on the Pacific). Though such effects are still very much in evidence in parts of the Pacific, especially some of the tiny Polynesian countries, there is increasing evidence that emigration of people with skills is not necessarily harmful. In some contexts, the economies and labour markets in small, less-developed countries (LDCs) simply cannot absorb the growing numbers of young, educated men and women seeking work outside of the village-based agricultural economies—the traditional employers for most of the population.

Many of the better educated can better aid development back home by emigrating and remitting earnings rather than by seeking work in local towns, where the pool of wage-earning employment opportunities is quite restricted. However, there is a counter-argument that excessive emigration of the more educated and highly skilled labour from small countries may make it harder for them to reach a critical mass of human resources at home so as to foster long-term economic development.

The smaller the domestic population base the greater the risk that excessive immigration will inhibit rather than foster development. Countries such as Niue and the Cook Islands, whose populations have free access to the New Zealand labour market, has faced such a challenge. The scale of movement overseas is still important—in relation to population size and domestic economy, especially in small island countries.

2.1 Population growth and youth bulge

The importance of international labour mobility for the ongoing development of both countries, in the south as well as the north, becomes very obvious when one examines global changes in population growth in recent decades. Most low-income countries have experienced substantial declines in population growth (United Nations, 2010). However, this has been less pronounced in the Pacific than in most other regions, as Table 2 shows.

This global decline in population growth is due mainly to the significant decline in fertility in all regions. In the Pacific, and especially in Melanesia, the slow rate of fertility decline has potentially major large implications for international migration. It is widely recognised that widening global demographic differentials are an important driver of international migration.

Table 2: Population growth by region, 1980-85 (percent per year)

		Asia				
Year	More developed countries	Eastern Asia	South-Central Asia	South-Eastern Asia	Africa	Pacific
1980–1985	0.58	1.36	2.38	2.25	2.85	2.50
1985–1990	0.60	1.49	2.27	1.98	2.77	2.25
1990–1995	0.47	1.09	2.06	1.75	2.57	2.37
1995-2000	0.34	0.84	1.83	1.50	2.41	2.29
2000-2005	0.36	0.65	1.67	1.38	2.34	2.20
2005–2010	0.34	0.56	1.51	1.24	2.29	2.05

Source: United Nations (2010)

The Global Commission on International Migration has concluded that:

> *In the contemporary world, the principal forces that are driving international migration are due to the 'three Ds': differences in development, demography and democracy… Because the differentials are widening, the number of people seeking to migrate will continue to increase in the future.*
> Global Commission on International Migration (2005: 12)

As already noted, the World Bank (2006a) has also identified the salience of widening global demographic differentials in increasing international population movement. So, in addressing contemporary and future scenarios for mobility in Pacific economies, it is important to consider the role of demographic change in the region.

The Asia-Pacific region contains both high-income and low-income economies, with markedly different demographic trajectories. On the one hand, high-income economies are experiencing low (and in a few cases negative) natural increase of population because of an extended period of low fertility. This is resulting in slow natural growth and projected declines of their workforces as ageing becomes more pronounced.

On the other hand, in low-income economies of the region, fertility decline has been more recent—although it has also been dramatic in some countries. Indeed,

in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole the total fertility rate fell from 5.4 children per woman in 1970 to 2.3 in 2007. The average life expectancy has increased by around 15 years over the same period. These shifts have produced significant changes in age structure.

The Pacific is projected to undergo changes in the size, percentage and growth rate of 15–24s between 2000 and 2040 (shown in Table 3). This already happened in the Asian region between 1960 and 2000. Table 3 depicts the passage of what has been called the 'Asian youth bulge' (Fuller and Hoch 1998; Westley and Choe 2002). As Westley and Choe (2002: 57) point out, the youth bulge resulted from 'a transition from high to low fertility about 15 years earlier. The youth bulge consists of large numbers of adolescents and young adults who were born when fertility was high, followed by declining numbers of children born after fertility declined.'

The Asian youth bulge produced a 'demographic dividend' (Wang and Mason 2007; Mason and Lee 2006; Mason 2007) of economic growth when the workforce was growing faster than both the overall population and the number of dependents (children and the elderly). In Asia, the rapid and sustained declines in fertility have created a special demographic situation: the ratio of the working-age to non-working-age population is the highest ever. Though this does not automatically translate into enhanced economic growth if the policy environment is unfavourable, several empirical studies of Asian countries have confirmed the existence of a dividend. In China the demographic dividend has been responsible for more than 20 percent of national economic growth, according to Wang and Mason (2007).

Table 3: Asian population aged 15-24, for 1960-2000 and projected for 2020 and 2040

Year	Population aged 15–24 Number	Percent	Annual % growth
1960	282,897	17.28	
1980	491,143	19.50	2.80
1985	565,400	20.48	2.86
1990	613,497	20.26	1.65
2000	625,463	17.81	0.39
2020	*679,547*	*15.72*	*0.42*
2040	*653,223*	*13.60*	*-0.20*

Source: United Nations (2007)

The combined effect of a large working-age population and the appropriate health, family, labour, financial and human-capital policies can create virtuous cycles of wealth creation. Asia's demographic dividend has coincided with the era of globalisation. It will continue to increase for the next decade or so before beginning to decline in the late 2020s. Specifically, a demographic dividend can be delivered through:

- ***Increased labour supply***: The passing of the youth bulge into working ages, combined with higher female workforce participation (resulting from smaller families due to low fertility), produces more workers.
- ***Higher savings***: Working age people tend to have a higher level of output and also a higher level of savings than the very young, so a shift away from a younger age distribution favours the economy.
- ***Human capital investments***: Decreasing fertility rates mean that more health and educational resources are going to fewer people, which will boost primary and secondary school enrolment rates.

Almost all of Asia's youth have some formal education, and the current young working populations are easily the region's best-educated. So, not only are there more workers for each dependent than in past generations, but these workers show much greater per capita productivity. What is the position in the Pacific? The key 15–24 age group is projected to continue growing until 2041, in contrast to other regions except Africa. According to the UN's (2010) projections, numbers in this age group will nearly double between 2000 and 2040.

Pacific countries show marked differences in the growth of youth populations. Table 4 shows how the key younger working-age group (aged 15–34) will change in individual countries from 2005 to 2030. What stands out are the high rates of growth in this younger population (more than 2 percent during the next decade) for the Melanesian nations of Vanuatu, Solomons and Papua New Guinea. One in five of the population (19 percent) are aged 15–24, compared with one in seven in Australia and New Zealand.

Table 4: Projected growth of Pacific populations aged 15-34

Category	2005–10		2010–20		2020–30	
Declining					Samoa	0.27
					Fr Polynesia	0.21
					Fiji	0.20
					New Zealand	0.20
	Fr Polynesia	0.50	Fiji	0.10	Micronesia	0.00
Growth 0–0.99% pa	Tonga	0.60	Australia	0.40	New Caledonia	0.00
	New Zealand	0.60	New Zealand	0.40	Tonga	0.00
	Australia	0.60	Fr Polynesia	0.60	Australia	0.10
			Tonga	0.80	Guam	0.30
			New Caledonia	0.80		
Growth 1–1.99% pa	Micronesia	1.00	Micronesia	1.40	PNG	1.20
	New Caledonia	1.00	Guam	1.60	Vanuatu	1.20
	Samoa	1.00			Solomon Is	1.40
	Fiji	1.40				
	Guam	1.60				
Growth 2–2.99% pa	PNG	2.20	Solomon Is	2.10		
	Solomon Is	2.20	Samoa	2.30		
			Vanuatu	2.30		
			PNG	2.50		
Growth 3.00% pa+	Vanuatu	3.00				

Source: Hugo (2009)

Unlike most Asian countries, where the 'youth bulge' has passed or is passing into older age groups, the Pacific youth population is growing rapidly and will keep on growing over the next two decades. This is seen as a major challenge for the region, especially Melanesia, which not only has the fastest growing total and youth populations but, as Table 5 shows, also the highest fertility in the region.

Throughout the Pacific, the total fertility rate (TFR) has been falling over the past two to three decades. Particularly noteworthy are Papua New Guinea's TFR of 5.4 to 4.4 and the Solomon Islands' 7.3 to 4.6 (both measured between 1980 and 2000). But despite these declines in TFR and in comparison with other parts of the region and globally, fertility in western Melanesia remains high.

Comparatively low life expectancy in most of the countries with high fertility has dampened natural increase (the balance of births over deaths each year). HIV/Aids has contributed to this, especially in Papua New Guinea (UNAIDS, 2009; Connell and Negin, 2010). However, because of limited options for emigration overseas in Papua New Guinea, Solomons and Vanuatu, overall population-growth rates (the balance between natural increase and net migration) have remained among the highest in the region (Table 5).

Other countries with high fertility—including Federated Sates of Micronesia (FSM) and Marshall Islands in Micronesia and American Samoa, Samoa, Tokelau and Tonga in Polynesia—have had their annual population growth significantly reduced by net emigration.

It is this diversity in the interplay between fertility, mortality and migration that is producing very different population growth trajectories for Pacific countries—a diversity that is not always given enough credence in assessments of what drives international migration. Population growth has long been an important factor in the region's migration. Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, international migration was seen to be a critical safety valve in the 1960s for the development of several countries in Polynesia (McArthur, 1961, 1964, 1967; Pirie, 1966; Borrie, 1967).

In the 21st century, growth in Melanesia's population will pose serious challenges for policy-makers and politicians in New Zealand and Australia, as they weigh up options for helping Pacific countries find more jobs for young people and, more generally, improved living standards in the islands.

Table 5: Some demographic rates, Pacific populations, 2000s

Subregion/country	Total fertility rate[1] (per woman)	Life expectancy[2] at birth (yrs)	Crude net migration[3] rate (/000)	Annual rate of population growth[4] (%)
Melanesia	c 4.2	c 60	-0.6	2.0
Fiji	2.6	65	-7.7	0.5
New Caledonia	2.2	75	4.6	1.5
Papua New Guinea	4.4	54	0.0	2.1
Solomon Islands	4.6	61	0.0	2.7
Vanuatu	4.0	67	0.0	2.5
Micronesia	c 3.7	c 68	-2.4	1.5
Federated States (FSM)	4.0	68	-14.7	0.4
Guam	2.7	74	13.0	2.7
Kiribati	3.5	61	-1.0	1.8
Marshall Islands	4.4	68	-18.4	0.7
Nauru	3.3	56	0.0	2.1
Nthern Mariana Islands	1.6	75	-15.8	-0.1
Palau	2.0	69	0.0	0.6
Polynesia	c 3.2	c 72	-8.5	0.7
American Samoa	4.0	73	-7.1	1.2
Cook Islands	2.5	73	-6.3	0.3
French Polynesia	2.2	74	0.0	1.2
Niue	2.6	72	-28.1	-2.3
Samoa	4.2	73	-16.7	0.3
Tokelau	4.5	69	-16.2	-0.2
Tonga	4.2	70	-16.6	0.3
Tuvalu	3.7	64	-8.8	0.5
Wallis and Futuna	2.0	74	-13.2	-0.6
Pacific Islands	c 3.9	c 65	-1.2	1.9
New Zealand	2.1	80	-3.8	1.0

Data sources: SPC-SDP Population Data Sheet 2010, www.spc.int/spd/; www.stats.govt.nz

[1] The total fertility rate (TFR) is an estimate of the total number of births a woman can expect during her reproductive ages (usually between 15 and 49).

[2] Life expectancy is how many years a person can expect to live after a specified age (birth).

[3] Net migration is the balance between permanent and long-term arrivals over departures, and the total net migration rate is the net migration gain/loss per 1000 population.

[4] The annual rate of population growth is the percentage increase in population, taking into account the balance between births and deaths (natural increase) and net migration.

There has been little specific investigation of the demographic dividend in Pacific Island contexts. But in the Asian context, a question arises as to whether those countries delivered the demographic dividend of their youth bulges by sending youth workers overseas to work. It is also questionable whether the home country experienced dividends due to:

- remittances the migrants sent home
- migrants getting involved in enterprises in the destination, resulting in foreign investment to the origin
- the return of migrants with new skills and contacts.

For example, a period of significant emigration has clearly pushed along development in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China and India. Can international migration be part of an effective development strategy in the Pacific?

Substantial emigration from Polynesia and Micronesia has delivered some dividends to the home country through remittances, investment and the return of migrants with new skills and contacts. But it has also posed serious problems in the three countries (Cook Island, Niue and Tokelau) whose indigenous populations are automatically entitled to New Zealand citizenship. A major concern of the recent 'Inquiry into New Zealand's Relationship with South Pacific Countries' (FADTC, 2010) was some of the problems of migration-led depopulation in these countries.

We discuss these issues further in the Section 4, with reference to the emerging diaspora of Pacific peoples in countries on the Pacific Rim. But first, we should consider two further dimensions of international migration linked with development: the rapid growth of urban populations in less developed countries that has accompanied the 'population explosion' and the associated 'youth bulges'; and the increasing 'irregular' migration, in various forms.

2.2 Urban futures for all?

Between 1960 and 2000 the world's population doubled—the fastest 'doubling time' on record and a rate that will never be repeated (Lam, 2011: 6). Over the same period, the world's urban population is estimated to have increased by 184 percent—from just under one billion in 1960 to 2.84 billion in 2000 (Table 6). The largest total (172 percent) and urban (612 percent) population increases during the 40 years were in the least developed countries—more than five times the percentage increases found in the more developed countries. Of the regions listed in Table 6, Africa had—and will continue to have—the largest increases in both population and urban population between 1960 and 2000, as well as between 2000 and 2050. The lowest overall increases in the total and urban populations will be in Europe and North America.

Table 6: Total and urban populations in major regions: 1960, 2000 and 2050

Region	Population (thousands)			% increase	
	1960	2000	2050	1960–2000	2000–2050
Total population					
Africa	286,729	811,101	2,191,599	182.9	170.2
Asia	1,707,682	3,719,044	5,142,220	117.8	38.3
Europe	603,854	726,771	719,257	20.4	-1.0
Latin America and Caribbean	220,058	521,429	750,956	137.0	44.0
Northern America	204,318	313,289	446,862	53.3	42.6
Oceania	15,773	31,130	55,233	97.4	77.4
More developed countries	913,330	1,188,809	1,311,731	30.2	10.3
Less developed countries[1]	1,881,432	4,271,965	6,267,928	127.1	46.7
Least developed countries	243,650	661,996	1,726,468	171.7	160.8
World	**3,093,909**	**6,122,770**	**9,306,128**	**97.9**	**52.0**
Urban population					
Africa	53,123	294,602	1,230,915	454.6	317.8
Asia	338,028	1,380,900	3,382,365	308.5	144.9
Europe	344,646	514,422	582,285	49.3	13.2
Latin America and Caribbean	108,341	393,420	647,683	263.1	64.6
Northern America	142,856	252,154	404,248	76.5	60.3
Oceania	10,578	21,932	38,404	107.3	75.1
More developed countries	537,834	869,233	1,099,730	61.6	26.5
Less developed countries[1]	436,261	1,801,016	4,271,781	312.8	137.2
Least developed countries	23,478	167,181	914,370	612.1	446.9
World	**997,571**	**2,837,431**	**6,285,881**	**184.4**	**121.5**

[1] Excluding the least developed countries

Source: UN Population Division (2010 and 2011)

During the first half of the 21st century, according to UN Population Division estimates, the world's population might increase by a further 52 percent—compared with 98 percent between 1960 and 2000 under the medium fertility assumptions (Table 6).

Between 2000 and 2050, the equivalent of the world's total population in 1950 will be added again to reach a population of 9.3 billion in 2050. For urban population, the 2000 total of 2.84 billion will rise to reach just under 6.3 billion by 2050—equivalent to a further 121 percent increase on the 2000 total. This is

more than the projected total population increase of 3.18 billion over the 50 years.

The biggest percentage increases in urban populations between 2000 and 2050 will be in Africa (318 percent) and Asia (145 percent), followed by Oceania (75 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (65 percent) and North America (60 percent) (Table 6).

Europe is projected to have a much smaller increase in its urban population (13 percent). The population division estimates that the total urban population all European countries (including the UK) might increase by 68 million between 2000 and 2050, compared with more than one billion new urban residents in Asian cities and just under one billion extra people living African cities.

In the light of these projected increases in urban populations, it is not surprising that Saunders (2010:1) sees this as 'the great and final shift of human populations out of rural, agricultural life and into cities'. He has adopted a special term for the urban places the migrants first move to: the 'arrival cities'. These are the places 'where the next great economic and cultural boom will be born, or where the next great explosion of violence will occur', just as rural-to-urban migration in Europe and the New World between the late 18th and early 20th centuries saw 'a complete reinvention of human thought, governance, technology and welfare' (Saunders 2010: 1 and 3).

In 1960 just under a third of the world's population lived in town and cities, but less than 20 percent of populations in Africa and Asia (Table 7). The most urbanised regions were North America (70 percent), Oceania (67 percent) and Europe (57 percent).

Oceania had two extremes: Australia and New Zealand with more than 80 percent of residents in towns and cities, but only 13 percent in the Pacific Islands—and some places termed urban were actually very small towns with 500 or fewer people. Though just under 60 percent of the more developed countries' populations were living in towns and cities in 1960, the figure for the least developed countries was just 10 percent (Table 7).

Table 7: Levels of urbanisation, major regions: 1960, 2000 and 2050 (percent)

Region	% of total population in urban places			Change in percentage	
	1960	2000	2050	1960–2000	2000–2050
Africa	18.5	36.3	56.2	17.8	19.8
Asia	19.8	37.1	65.8	17.3	28.6
Europe	57.1	70.8	81.0	13.7	10.2
Latin America and Caribbean	49.2	75.5	86.2	26.2	10.8
Northern America	69.9	80.5	90.5	10.6	10.0
Oceania	67.1	70.5	69.5	3.4	-0.9
Australia and NZ	80.4	87.0	85.8	6.5	-1.1
Pacific Islands	12.7	23.5	36.3	10.8	12.7
More developed countries	58.9	73.1	83.8	14.2	10.7
Less developed countries[1]	23.2	42.2	68.2	19.0	26.0
Least developed countries	9.6	25.3	53.0	15.6	27.7
World	**32.2**	**46.3**	**67.5**	**14.1**	**21.2**

[1] Excluding the least developed countries

Source: UN Population Division (2010 and 2011)

By 2000, after a doubling of the global population since 1960, the share of the total living in towns and cities had increased from 32 to 46 percent. The biggest increases in urban populations were in Latin America and the Caribbean (up from 49 to just under 76 percent), Africa (up from 18 to 36 percent) and Asia (up from 20 percent to 37 percent) (Table 7). The gap between the more developed and the least developed worlds, in percentage of urban populations, remained very similar, even though both had seen massive rises in urbanisation levels since 1960. But there was still a gap of around 48 percent between the more developed (73 percent urban) and the least developed (25 percent urban) regions.

This is projected to narrow between 2000 and 2050, during which time more than half the populations of the least developed countries are estimated to be living in towns and cities (Table 7). By 2050 the figure could be as high as two-thirds, according to the population division (2010).

The regional anomaly in all three years in Table 7 is the Pacific Islands. By 2050 they are projected to have only 36 percent of their aggregate population living in urban places within the region. This is just over half the global average for that year and well behind even Africa (56 percent), which has the lowest urbanisation level of all regions.

There has been a persistent anti-urban view among politicians, planners and academics examining prospects for development in small island states. However

this has shifted in recent years as Pacific governments grapple with the growing numbers seeking work and accommodation in local urban places. In a side event at the Pacific Forum meeting in New Zealand in September 2011, delegates debated whether they should be focus more on urban development to support economic growth in the region (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2011).

The Pacific Institute picked up Lam's (2011: 25) acknowledgement that:

> *Urbanisation is one of the challenges of population growth, but it is also one of the important ways that the world was able to absorb a doubling in 40 years without mass starvation or increased poverty… Cities have been fundamental to economic progress in the last 50 years, and most low-income countries could do well to encourage rather than discourage increased urbanisation.*

Urbanisation of Europe's population was accompanied by extensive international migration of Europeans in the search of opportunities overseas. The cities in many parts of the New World, including North America and Australasia, owe their origins to the early waves of European settlement in the 18th and 19th centuries.

In the 21st century there are no 'new world' settlement frontiers overseas for the rapidly urbanising Asian and African populations. Their flows into other regions tend to be carefully regulated by the governments of destination countries. There is extensive international migration between the major cities in different parts of the world, but much of this is temporary—at least initially.

One side-effect of the speeding-up of urbanisation in Africa and Asia is the difficulty of absorbing the large flows of migrants into cities in their labour markets. Many people, in searching for work and opportunities for a better life, have flocked to urban areas in neighbouring countries and further afield. These migration flows include some people who decide to stay on, often illegally, at the end of their temporary visitor, study or work permit.

Irregular migration is believed to have soared in recent years, and this is the final dimension of international migration and development that this report needs to cover, to set the scene for more specific consideration of what drives contemporary migration in the Pacific.

2.3 Irregular migration

According to Papademetriou (2006: xviii), 'irregular' (illegal, undocumented or unauthorised) migration has been by far the fastest-rising single form of migration during the past 10 years. He estimated that 30–40 million irregular migrants could be among the 214 million people living outside their countries of birth around 2010 (UNDP 2010: 146). This is equivalent to between 14 and 19 percent of the immigrant 'stock' that is often cited in the UN's statistics on international migration.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011: 29) has produced a similar estimate in its 2010 World Migration Report, suggesting that somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of the estimated 214 million international migrant

stock might be in 'an irregular situation'. If so, then the number of migrants without a valid visa for their presence or activities in their countries of residence could be anywhere between 20 and 30 million—well above the UNHCR's (2011) estimates for refugees (10 million) and asylum-seekers (800,000).

However, most of the 'irregular' migrants would have initially entered their countries of residence legally, the IOM suggests. But they would have either overstayed their authorised period of approved residence or engaged in economic activity, including employment, while on visitors' visas.

Irregular migration is complex and very difficult to measure and control. Migrants can wilfully enter a country illegally by crossing a border without the right documentation and gain their irregular status through the way they arrive as undocumented migrants. For migrants already in a country legally their situation can change in-country, either because of their activities (especially gaining employment when on a visitor's visa) or because they have stayed on in the country after their temporary residence or work visa has expired.

This has been the main type of irregular migration from the Pacific into New Zealand and Australia: Pacific Islanders legally in the country for short-term stays who overstay their permits and become 'irregular' in residency status.

A variant of irregular migration is smuggling—helping clandestine border crossings for payment. Criminal gangs are often involved, and the two largest flows of smuggled persons are from Latin America (especially Mexico) to the United States, and from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates there are around three million attempted irregular crossings of the US southern border each year, most facilitated by smugglers. With irregular crossings from Africa to Europe, the numbers are much smaller (around 150,000 a year)—again, smuggling is thought to be involved in many of these.

Data on smuggling is difficult to obtain, but the world now recognises that this is a large and profitable business in most regions. It takes advantage of increasing numbers of people who want to escape human-rights abuses, war, civil unrest, environmental degradation and economic want by moving to another country for a safer and better life. To date, people smuggling has not been regarded as a major problem in the Pacific region, although there are growing concerns about the role of criminal gangs in facilitating cross-border movements in countries with relatively weak border control (Moriarty, 2008).

Successive Australian governments have grappled with the increasing incidence of 'boat people' seeking asylum in Australia and the role of smugglers in Indonesia. However, the actual numbers involved are very small compared with the legal short-term and long-term flows of migrants admitted under Australia's immigration programme.

The most problematic dimension to irregular migration is human trafficking because it involves the violation of basic human rights. Unlike smuggling,

trafficking involves women, men and children being essentially 'sold' for sexual services, bonded labour, domestic servitude, forced marriage, organ removal, begging, illicit adoption, conscription and other forms of exploitation (UNDP, 2010).

The UNDP (2010: 65) captured the essence of the migrants' vulnerability when it observed:

> *Once caught in a trafficking network people may be stripped of their travel documents and isolated, so as to make escape difficult if not impossible. Many end up in debt bondage in places where language, social and physical barriers frustrate their efforts to seek help. In addition they may be reluctant to identify themselves, since they risk legal sanctions on criminal prosecution.*

Trafficking is very difficult to combat. It thrives in environments of labour market exclusion and disempowerment in the country of origin, a demand for illegal labour in the destination country, and a naive belief in the promises of well-paid jobs abroad amongst potential migrants. The IOM has observed:

> *When destination countries tolerate high levels of irregular migration they undermine their own legal migration systems. There is little credibility for immigration law if migrants and migrant smugglers and human traffickers are allowed to circumvent the policies in place to determine who enters, for what purposes and for what period of time.*
> IOM (2011: 30)

There is evidence of trafficking into New Zealand and Australia, especially of women from some Asian countries. However, it is not considered a significant factor in the movement of Pacific peoples.

Irregular migration is an increasingly complex feature of the migration systems in all continents and regions. This is not just because of the variety of routes available, but also because of the difficulty of distinguishing the needs and rights of various types of migrants, including asylum-seekers and unaccompanied minors (UNDP, 2010). It is generally agreed that irregular migration will flourish as the global economic crisis worsens. As countries with developed or emerging economies tighten up on legal entry, more people seeking work will choose irregular routes.

In such situations, the exploiters of international migration thrive. The various forms of irregular migration, especially trafficking and smuggling, often attract media attention. Governments in Europe as well as in the US Administration have resorted to an ancient 'solution' of building solid walls along their borders. These are transit routes for asylum-seekers from countries that are also sources of illegal immigrants. The IOM (2011: 30) reminds us that most people who enter other countries for varying lengths of time do so legally—and voluntarily.

3 DRIVERS OF MIGRATION IN THE PACIFIC

In a thought-provoking review of 'Strengthening national capacities to manage international migration: maximising development benefits and minimizing negative impact in the Pacific Islands subregion', Hayes observed:

> *Underlying migration trends over the past decade is the fact that economic growth rates in Pacific countries have been insufficient to generate enough new employment to absorb the growing labour force. Conversely, healthy economic growth has occurred in the main receiving countries of Australia, New Zealand and the United States and shortages of both skilled and unskilled labour have appeared in these countries. As in other parts of the world, the developed countries to which most Pacific Islanders migrate have ageing populations and potentially declining work forces, whereas the populations of Pacific countries are much younger and have 'surplus labour'. Thus demographic and economic realities suggest that migration, whether permanent or temporary, is an appropriate strategy for both sending and receiving countries.*
> Hayes (2009: 2)

In essence, Hayes has captured the key driver of contemporary international migration in the region. There is a growing imbalance between the rising demand for and the limited local supply of paid work in the islands, with their small manufacturing and service sectors. There is also an imbalance between the rising demand for and limited local supply of labour for the various manual jobs in the industrialised Pacific Rim countries, with their heavily urbanised and rapidly ageing populations.

Wages paid in the more industrialised countries latter for menial manual work are much higher than wages for high-status skilled work in the islands. Hayes (2009: 8) notes the big disparity in GDP and GNI per capita between the island countries and Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This is not the only determinant of international migration in the region, but it has been a key underlying condition for some decades and is expected to continue.

In response to these various demographic and economic factors and widening disparities, the leaders of several Pacific Rim countries, notably Australia, New Zealand and the United States, have exerted political pressure to open up their labour markets to workers across the skills spectrum. Skilled labour in Pacific countries, especially in the specialised health, education and trades occupations, is in short supply, but the demand tends to be small and patchy. These sectors do not offer sustained growth in skilled employment opportunities that will provide secure career prospects for new entrants to local labour markets. Very few school leavers in the islands can expect to find rewarding blue- or white-collar work in their local rural areas and towns.

As the World Bank (2006b) and others have pointed out, only a small proportion of the rapidly growing working-age population can be absorbed into the formal labour force in any kind of regular paid employment. This is because of the slowing economic growth and development in most of these countries.

Hayes' (2009) observations on migration drivers in the region reflect some long-established concerns about employment prospects for the Pacific's indigenous peoples beyond 'peasant agriculture'. For years, the Pacific Islands Forum has been exploring options for further regional co-operation to achieve greater economies of scale for Pacific producers. When an eminent group of Pacific politicians reviewed the forum in 2004, they encouraged all participants to 'listen to the needs and aspirations of the burgeoning population of young people in the region, and recognise the impact of bigger and more youthful populations on the resources required for education and vocational training, healthcare and job opportunities' (Chan et al 2004).

Every year, the forum has discussed migration issues, particularly how Pacific workers can better access the Australian and New Zealand labour markets (see section 4). It has also considered migration as a response to environmental degradation: changes in sea levels and increasing tropical cyclones (see section 3.4).

Though the focus of recent forum meetings has been on governance and security, international migration has figured prominently. At the 2009 meeting, the heads of state gave the go-ahead to begin negotiations on the 'PACER Plus' regional trade and economic agreement. The Pacific countries have indicated that they would like migration to be part of the PACER Plus negotiations, but Australia wants it to focus on trade only.

In the communiqué of the 41st Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Vanuatu in August 2010, the leaders noted 'ongoing developments on labour mobility in the region, as well as parallel developments on temporary movement of natural persons-related activities and the labour mobility objectives of smaller island states under the auspices of PACER-Plus, PICTA, EPA and other trade negotiations' (Pacific Islands Forum 2010).

3.1 The regional context

On the eve of the forum's meeting in Vanuatu in August 2010, Rowan Callick, Asia-Pacific editor for *The Australian*, penned 'Peering into Pacific's perilous future', referring to a series of papers written in 1993 about key challenges facing the island region in the 21st century (Cole, 1993). Callick recalled his own provocative and highly pessimistic 'doomsday scenario' (published in Cole, 1993):

> *By 2010, population growth in the Pacific islands is careering beyond control. It has doubled to nine million. Malnutrition is spreading. Levels of unemployment are high. Deaths from Aids, heart disease and cancers have greatly increased.*
> *Government services have been privatised or in many cases have lapsed. Crime has increased. Pollution and land degradation has spiralled. Much of the surviving rain forest has been logged. Coastal fisheries have been placed under threat from overfishing. Skill shortages in the labour market yawn wide.*
> Callick (2010: 2)

He noted: 'Many of those deliberately exaggerated "doomsday" projections have sadly become a reality in 2010.' He challenged leaders at the 2010 forum to start the long haul back from doomsday. In his view, 'the Pacific has failed to live up to its people's reasonable—and mostly modest—expectations. The blame must largely be sheeted home to its political elites' (Callick 2010: 2).

Population projections by demographers based at the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) in Noumea suggest that the region passed nine million people some time in 2006. More than two-thirds (68 percent) live in Papua New Guinea, and a further 19 percent in the other four countries of Melanesia: Fiji, New Caledonia, the Solomons and Vanuatu. In PNG, the Solomons and Vanuatu, the indigenous inhabitants have very limited opportunity for emigration.

The rest of the region's population (around 1.22 million, or just over 12 percent of the estimated total of 9.8 million in 2010) live in the many scattered, small islands of Polynesia and Micronesia. Most indigenous inhabitants have, as a result of their colonial histories, some outlets for migration to countries on the Pacific Rim. By 2010 around 500,000 people born in Pacific island countries—roughly equivalent to the total population of Micronesia—were living in towns and cities on the Pacific Rim, mainly in Auckland, Wellington, Sydney, Brisbane, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Vancouver.

Population mobility has always been an important part of the lives of the indigenous peoples inhabiting the Pacific islands (Hau'ofa, 1994). European colonisation from the late 18th century changed the drivers of movement and disrupted many time-honoured flows within and between islands. In some places, mobility intensified as a result of improved links between places; in others, it was curtailed by bans on inter-island travel by canoe. Polynesian migrants (Maori) had already reached as far south as New Zealand some hundreds of years earlier. In the early 19th century whalers, missionaries and traders re-established this connection, and this was followed by Pacific islanders moving to North America for the first time as ships' crew.

The reach of Pacific mobility extended to South America and Australia in the mid-19th century through what became known as 'blackbirding'. This described the kidnapping of island labour for work in mines in South America (Maude, 1981) and the recruiting of labour for Australia's sugar plantations (Corris, 1970, Parnaby, 1964, among others).

By the early 20th century small populations of Pacific peoples were scattered through several countries on the southern and eastern peripheries of the Pacific basin. These were the forerunners of much larger Pacific populations, fed by migration and natural increase that evolved in Australia, New Zealand and the United States, especially during the second half of the 20th century.

Indigenous populations in the region had also been redistributed in the late 19th century. Solomon Islanders were taken to Samoa and Fiji to work on plantations in the German and British colonies. I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans were working on phosphate islands in the central Pacific and French Polynesia. Ni-Vanuatu were drawn into plantation work in several countries, including Australia.

Contemporary Pacific mobility within and between islands is nothing new or unusual. Pacific peoples have always been mobile, and they will continue to move to improve their lives through the 21st century.

Since the Second World War indigenous people have migrated to countries on the Pacific periphery in ever greater numbers. So have the descendants of indentured labour, such as the Indians brought to Fiji by the British to work on plantations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the early traders and settlers such as the Chinese and Europeans. A convergence of three major developments contributed to this escalation of movement.

The first was accelerating population growth in the islands as fertility recovered and mortality dropped. This came after a century of colonisation characterised by population decline followed by slow growth (see McArthur 1967). Between 1900 and 1950 the region's island-based population is estimated to have grown by one million, to reach 2.5 million by 1950 (Bedford 2005: 148). Over the next 50 years it was to grow by a further five million, to reach 7.5 million by 2000—a very different demographic situation from just after the Second World War.

The second was a growing demand for low-skilled labour in New Zealand's rural as well as urban economies. This was during an era of sustained economic growth stimulated, in part, by a Keynesian import-substitution industrialisation strategy (Bedford and Gibson 1987). In 1945 the number of people born in Pacific countries and resident in New Zealand totalled just over 3,000. By 1961 this population had increased by more than four times and totalled around 13,500. Fifteen years later, in the mid-1970s, it had more than quadrupled again and was approaching 50,000.

The third development was air travel to New Zealand, Australia, USA and beyond as commercial aviation became established in the region, especially from the 1960s (Kissling 1984). This development stimulated rapid growth in levels of emigration from countries such as the Cook Islands and Niue, whose inhabitants had retained New Zealand citizenship on their transition to self-government in the 1970s. Also in this category was Samoa, after its independence in 1962 and the signing of a Treaty of Friendship that included a quota on migrants moving to New Zealand.

Though there is this long history of mobility among countries in the region and on the Pacific Rim, different parts of the region have shown great variation in types of mobility and levels of access to developed countries. The initial report on this project (Hugo and Bedford 2008) showed that the three subregions—Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia—have become associated with different stories of migration, as illustrated the summaries that follow.

***Melanesia**:*
Despite their large share of the region's population, the three countries of western Melanesia—Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—have very limited outlets for international migration, compared with indigenous populations in other parts of the Pacific. The new seasonal migration schemes—Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) in New Zealand and Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) in Australia—have provided a few opportunities for international labour migration from these countries since 2007. Australia and New Zealand have also received, under their respective points-based skilled migration programmes, small flows of international students and skilled migrants.

But compared with resident populations in the islands, the overseas diaspora of Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders and Ni-Vanuatu is very small (see section 4). Population movement in these three countries is mainly internal, to rural-based resource extraction industries (mines, timber mills and commercial plantations) and urban areas. Because most people still live in rural communities, much of the mobility between rural and urban areas remains circular, especially amongst the older generations. However, generations of young people who were born and raised in urban settings are evolving rapidly in the three countries and urbanisation of their populations is expected to gather pace in the coming decades (see section 3.3).

New Caledonia's indigenous Kanak population has tended not to move offshore, despite having rights of access as French citizens to France and its other Pacific colonies in Polynesia (Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia). New Caledonia's economy has been dominated by nickel mining and the associated development of Noumea, whereas other economies of Melanesia have been agriculture-based. New Caledonia has, in fact, been a destination for Pacific migrants, especially from French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, as well as the former Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides (now the Republic of Vanuatu). The largest overseas community of Ni-Vanuatu is found in New Caledonia.

Fiji is the only country in Melanesia that has extensive diasporas to Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada (see section 4). Fiji's history of labour migration to New Zealand and Australia goes back to the 1950s. There were formal work-permit schemes with New Zealand from the mid-1970s, but these ended with the first military coup in Fiji in 1987. There has also been extensive migration of teachers, nurses, security personnel, entrepreneurs and other skilled Fijians and Fiji Indians to other Pacific countries as well as countries on the Pacific Rim. And many Fijian security personnel have found work in the Middle East.

Fiji rates among the 15 non-OECD small countries with the highest share of their secondary-educated or higher populations living in OECD countries (Table 8). Similar shares can be found for some of the small Polynesian countries, especially the Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga. Such patterns are inevitable given the lack of skilled work in the small private sectors of their homelands and selectiveness of immigration programmes in favoured Pacific Rim destinations.

Table 8: Highly skilled expatriates from selected OECD countries

Country group	Cohen and Soto (2001)	Highly skilled, aged 15+	Barro and Lee (2000)	Highly skilled, aged 15+
15 non-OECD countries with the *lowest* percentage of highly skilled 15+ expatriates in OECD countries	Brazil	1.7	Brazil	1.2
	Myanmar	1.7	Thailand	1.4
	Indonesia	1.9	Indonesia	1.5
	Thailand	1.9	Paraguay	1.8
	Bangladesh	2.0	Argentina	1.8
	Paraguay	2.0	China	2.4
	Nepal	2.1	Myanmar	2.4
	India	3.1	Peru	2.7
	Bolivia	3.1	Nepal	2.9
	China	3.2	Bangladesh	3.0
	Jordan	3.2	Bolivia	3.1
	Venezuela	3.3	India	3.4
	Costa Rica	4.0	Egypt	3.4
	Syria	4.3	Venezuela	3.5
	Egypt	4.4	Swaziland	3.5
15 non-OECD countries with the *highest* percentage of highly skilled 15+ expatriates in OECD countries	Guyana	83.0	Guyana	76.9
	Jamaica	81.9	Jamaica	72.6
	Haiti	78.5	Guinea-Bissau	70.3
	Trinidad & Tobago	76.0	Haiti	68.0
	Fiji	**61.9**	Trinidad & Tobago	66.1
	Angola	53.7	Mozambique	52.3
	Cyprus	53.3	Mauritius	50.1
	Mauritius	53.2	Barbados	47.1
	Mozambique	47.1	**Fiji**	**42.9**
	Ghana	45.1	Gambia	42.3
	Tanzania	41.7	Congo	33.7
	Uganda	36.4	Sierra Leone	32.4
	Kenya	35.9	Ghana	31.2
	Burundi	34.3	Kenya	27.8
	Sierra Leone	33.3	Cyprus	26.0

Source: Dumont and Lemaitre (2005: 129)

Micronesia:

Kiribati and Nauru have strong links to Australia and New Zealand through the British Phosphate Commission's mining of phosphate deposits in these countries during the 20th century. Visa-waiver privileges and a temporary work scheme in New Zealand were also extended to I-Kiribati between 1986 and 2002.

These arrangements ended in 2002 and were replaced with a small (75 persons per year) quota under New Zealand's Pacific Access Category (PAC) (see section

4). Australia and New Zealand have attracted only small Nauruan and I-Kiribati diasporas. However, a series of resettlement schemes for I-Kiribati, beginning in 1947 with the relocation of the population of Banaba (Ocean Island), which was being mined for phosphate, has created sizeable communities of I-Kiribati in Fiji and the Solomon Islands.

Kiribati has also been home since the late 1960s to the Pacific's most successful marine training centre. This has provided crew for merchant marine shipping lines operating out of Europe and, more recently, Asia. For several generations of I-Kiribati, earning money offshore, including on Nauru, has been a way of life.

The other Micronesian countries—Guam, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Commonwealth of the Marianas, and the Marshall Islands—are all linked in different ways to the United States. Parts of Micronesia remain under US administration (Guam and the Northern Marianas); Palau, the FSM and the Marshalls are self-governing in free association with USA. Their citizens have rights of access to USA in the same way that Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans in Polynesia do for New Zealand.

The migration stories of most of Micronesia since the end of The Second World War have very much involved the US military. The Marshall Islands was a site for nuclear weapons and missile testing; Guam is a major military base. Since the 1960s, Micronesians have been flocking to urban areas of their countries at a far higher rate than the resident populations of the Pacific's other two subregions (see section 3.3)

Polynesia:
In Polynesia most countries have agreements with countries on the Pacific Rim or in Europe allow for international flows of migrants seeking short-term or long-term access. American Samoa is part of the United States, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna are colonies of France, and the Tokelau Islands continue to be administered by New Zealand. In these Pacific territories, the indigenous populations have unrestricted entry to their administering power.

New Zealand also has had special migration arrangements with Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu for many years, which has led to sizeable diasporas from these three countries. Although Australia did not have special provisions in its immigration policy for Pacific Islanders until very recently, sizeable diasporas of Polynesians have evolved in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne. These have emerged in part from Pacific Islanders who are New Zealand citizens under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement crossing the Tasman to Australia.

Australia has also had an inflow of skilled Fiji Indians and Fijians since the late 1980s. And for many years, Samoans and Tongans have been moving to the United States, both through American Samoa and religious connections to the Church of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons), which has its headquarters in Utah and a university campus in Hawai'i. The Church of the Latter Day Saints has a very strong presence in several Pacific countries. The American Polynesian

diaspora, especially in California and Hawai'i, is almost as large as the one in New Zealand (see section 4).

A feature of Pacific emigration over the last decade or so has been the increasing involvement of skilled migrants. International migration from Pacific Island countries is strongly selective of educated and skilled workers. Figure 2 shows that in high-emigration Pacific countries such as Tonga, Samoa and Fiji, more than half of the tertiary-qualified citizens live outside of their country of birth.

The loss of such skilled labour clearly constrains development for those countries. In a 2007 survey by the Asian Development Bank, of 277 employers in 13 Pacific countries (Duncan and Voigt-Graf, 2008), two-thirds of employers said they had trouble recruiting quality staff and more than two-thirds fingered emigration as the main reason. The Polynesian countries are experiencing problems not only in key professional areas such as health but also in teaching, construction, technical fields, trades, tourism and management (Duncan and Voigt-Graf, 2008).

In small populations the loss of key skilled people can be devastating. Take the increasing outflow of doctors and nurses from Pacific countries (Connell 2004, 2007). The concern in Polynesian countries is not only the high costs of training these workers but also the associated decline in their own healthcare (Voigt-Graf 2007: 149). Some countries are also concerned that if schoolteachers leave, the population will not be able to improve their human resources through greater education (Voigt-Graf, Iredale and Khoo, 2007).

Apart from low local salary levels for the more skilled and educated workers, part local residents also suffer from a lack of training and education opportunities relevant to their local labour-market needs. Improved training will not only allow access to growing skilled work opportunities in the global labour market but also improve the level of living in origin countries.

Figure 2: Pacific Island countries: percent of tertiary educated national populations living outside their country of birth, 2000



Source: Ratha and Xu (2008)

The problem is not so much as brain drain as a rapidly growing oversupply of labour, a lack of appropriate training and education opportunities, and limited local opportunities for skilled workers. It will only get worse over the next 40 years as youthful working-age populations in many Pacific countries grow rapidly and urbanisation proceeds apace.

The Pacific populations living outside the region are mainly city-based, working in both formal and informal sectors of the urban economy. They are the major sources of remittances back to families and communities in the islands—indeed remittance income in some smaller countries exceeds earnings from any domestic sector. In the 1980s Bertram and Watters (1984) coined an acronym to describe remittance-dependent economies of smaller countries: MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, Aid, Bureaucracy). This captured the major drivers of economic change in countries such as the Cook Islands, Niue, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Samoa and Tonga. The MIRAB model has been applied in other small-island contexts. Though it has its critics, it does draw attention to population movement and associated remittance flows as a key driver of many small economies.

In the mid-1990s Appleyard and Stahl (1995) classified Pacific Island nations by how much their economies relied on remittances from migrants working overseas (see Figure 3). The countries in the region are grouped into three categories: 'fully furnished', 'partly furnished' and 'unfurnished'. The 'fully furnished' have enough resources and economic potential to not rely on migration and remittances. Included here are the larger Melanesian countries with rapidly growing youthful populations.

Two countries—Tonga and Western Samoa—are identified as 'partly furnished' because they rely on remittances but have the potential to achieve higher domestic output if development aid and remittances are properly harnessed. The remaining countries are classified as 'unfurnished' because, with the resource constraints of small volcanic islands and atolls, remittances are essential for their development.

A decade later Stahl and Appleyard (2007) revisited their study and reassessed the situation for the various Pacific countries. They had to revise the status of the 'fully furnished' Melanesian countries, which needed short-term migration as a safety valve for their development strategies so as to ease problems associated with their growing youth populations (Figure 3).

In Fiji the unstable political situation arising from successive coups has been a factor in declining job opportunities. Several small island countries in Stahl and Appleyard's 'unfurnished' classification, which are also those with the highest levels of urbanisation, face the highest risk of rising sea levels and storm surge that might be linked with accelerating climate change. Some, such as Kiribati, have rising levels of HIV/Aids, which affects the willingness of Pacific Rim countries to accept them as migrants.

Figure 3: Classification of Pacific Island countries by resource endowments and migration



Source: Appleyard and Stahl (1995); Stahl and Appleyard (2007)

Underpinning the search by Pacific peoples for work opportunities overseas is a combination of economic and environmental vulnerabilities, projected ongoing population growth and increasing urbanisation. In the next three parts of this

section we deal with remittances; on-going population growth and urbanisation; and challenges posed by HIV/Aids and climate change.

3.2 The importance of remittances

The Pacific region's economy is more dependent on remittances than that of any other world region. Connell and Brown (2005), who have contributed much of the research on remittances, particularly in Polynesia, reviewed most of the important studies in a report for the Asian Development Bank. Other literature focusses on the importance of remittance flows from high-income to low-income countries in reducing and reducing poverty (see, for example, Asian Development Bank, 2004; Johnson and Sedacca, 2004; World Bank, 2006a, GCIM, 2005).

Such remittances flow directly to families and therefore show immediate improvements in well-being at local level. Measurement of remittances is notoriously incomplete—official estimates usually grossly understate flows since many occur outside of the financial system. However the World Bank has made major strides.

Figure 4 shows the ratio of remittances to GDP for seven Pacific Islands Forum countries in 2007 and highlights how important remittances continue to be as a source of revenue, especially for Tonga, Samoa, Kiribati, Fiji and the Solomon Island. Even for Vanuatu and PNG, where remittance/GDP ratios were less than 5 percent in 2007, the figures of US$7 million and US$13 million respectively are significant in real dollar values (Figure 4). Since 2007, when Vanuatu joined the RSE scheme, its revenue from remittances has increased markedly.

Figure 4: Remittances as a percentage of current GDP for selected PICs



Source: World Bank Development Prospect Group (2009), UN Statistics Division (2009)

The World Bank has sponsored research and analysis into how remittances help reduce poverty in several Pacific countries. Brown (2008), who carried out some of this research in Tonga and Fiji in the mid-2000s, shows that total remittances were larger in Fiji but had greater impact per head of population in Tonga (Table 9). The amount received per capita in both countries is considerable but twice as high in Tonga, where 90 percent of households reported receiving some income from remittances. In Fiji, 42 percent of households interviewed reported receiving remittances in 2004.

The World Bank-sponsored surveys showed that, though most households received funds through formal channels (such as banks, and official transfer agencies), 33 percent of sampled Fijian households and 41 percent of Tongan had also received remittances through informal mechanisms. These included money carried by migrants or a friend, ATM withdrawals and cash posted in the mail. Many of the remittances to households were in the form of goods, including food, rather than cash.

Table 9: Estimates of total remittances, 2004 (US$)

	Fiji	Tonga
Remittances received per capita	$370.88	$753.02
Population	836,002	98,322
Percent who are recipients	42	91
Total remittances (US$000)	$130,343	$67,330
As percent of GDP	6.2	41.8
As percent of exports	8.3	154.2

Source: Brown (2008)

The findings from Brown and Connell's are supported by research from Gibson, McKenzie and Rohorua on remittances arising from the seasonal work schemes introduced by New Zealand and Australia. The research looked at how these remittances helped families and communities in Tonga and Vanuatu. These studies have all produced strong evidence that remittances reduce both the incidence and depth of poverty. They can play a very important role in helping many Pacific Island countries—especially PNG and Timor Leste, with their large proportions of unemployed or under-employed young people—meet the Millennium Development Goals.

For example, Brown (2008) showed that the average income of the poorest quintile in Fiji increased by 82 percent when remittances were included and 98 percent if other transfers were also included. In Tonga the increase in average income in the poorest groups is even more dramatic. Moreover the studies have found that remittances boosted income distribution (World Bank, 2006b: 83–6).

A comparison of income distribution and relative deprivation, both with and without remittances, shows that remittances help to redistribute income and protect societies to varying degrees. Migration and remittances raise the

investment in human capital and thus improve the health of those who stay behind.

In the early 2000s, remittances as a proportion of countries' GDP ranged from more than a third in Tonga and Tuvalu to several Pacific countries which contributed very little (Table 10). In between, Fiji contributed 7 percent of GDP (although increased in recent years) and Kiribati and Samoa around an eighth.

In the late 2000s, remittances were more than four times the value of exports in Tuvalu and Tonga, 54 percent the value of exports in Samoa and 25 percent in Fiji (Hayes, 2009: 51). In these countries, remittances play a much larger economic role than in migrant-sending Asian countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Several Pacific countries have GDP-relative remittance figures comparable to some Latin American and Caribbean countries. But Hayes (2009: 51) notes that Tonga 'would appear to be the stand-out country by international standards'.

Hayes continues: 'If national income was calculated as GNP rather than GDP, it is clear that the primary source of economic growth for the nationals of Fiji would be remittances.' In recent years Samoa's and Tonga's economies have been sustained by the MIR (migration-remittance) component of the MIRAB model.

Collectively, the extensive research has shown that remittances in the Pacific:

- have played a key social-protection role by providing a steady and reliable source of income for consumption in poor and vulnerable households (World Bank 2006b, viii)
- benefit the poorest populations most and improve equity in income distribution
- can help alleviate poverty and attain the MDGs
- have led to higher rates of saving
- have stimulated business activity in origin communities
- have contributed to higher levels of children reaching secondary school, which in increases the likelihood of other household members going on to higher education.

Table 10: Contribution of trade, aid and remittances to GDP in Pacific countries, 2003

Country	Imports % of GDP	Aid flows % of GDP	Remittances % of GDP	Exports % of GDP
Cook Islands	46.0	3.5	0.7	4.9
Fiji	49.2	2.3	7.0	30.1
Kiribati	99.4	31.5	12.0	6.9
Marshall Islands	55.8	53.9	0.6	9.3
Federated States of Micronesia	47.3	49.7	1.0	6.5
Nauru	71.0	35.5	N/A	25.5
Niue	68.7	15.1	N/A	1.5
Palau	71.5	20.5	N/A	7.3
Papua New Guinea	31.4	6.4	0.2	47.8
Samoa	51.3	10.4	14.2	5.2
Solomon Islands	28.6	25.7	0	25.2
Tonga	74.1	16.3	39.2	11.6
Tuvalu	75.6	38.6	35.9	0.9
Vanuatu	58.7	11.7	3.3	42.4

Source: Redden and Duncan (2008)

Remittances have aided development in several Pacific Island countries and moved them closer to attaining MDGs. However, not all Pacific island groups and not many low-skilled workers had access to job opportunities outside their homelands.

To get the full benefit of remittances, they need to:

- keep transfer/transaction costs to a minimum
- ensure that remittances reach households in the origin area
- provide a context in both origin and destination to make the sending of remittances easier
- provide appropriate investment opportunities for remittances at the origin.

When used efficiently, remittances help not only households but also the wider community, through local spending, contributions to churches and other social organisations, and transfers to households without any absentee migrant members.

But remittances are not a substitute for sustainable economic growth in a country. They tend to diminish with time. As immigrants settle in destinations, so do their commitments tend to shift away from their origins. Second and later generations of migrants tend to have less strong trans-national ties than the initial generation. This has implications for origin societies which become, to some extent, dependent on remittances.

Studies of remittance patterns over time in the Pacific have shown contradictory results. Several studies have supported the 'time decay' hypothesis; others have

found that migrant communities with a long history of overseas residence continue to remit to their island-based kin at consistent levels.

Lee (2004) has argued that the Tonga's economic future is a concern because of the ageing of its trans-national communities and because its biggest wave of emigration was several decades ago. Later tightening of immigration regulations in destination countries has reduced the recent outflow. Lee stressed that Tonga's future depends largely on younger generations of Tongans overseas, including those born overseas. And the country needs to help them overcome existing barriers to developing trans-national ties with their 'homeland'. To this end, Tonga has recently introduced policies which, for example, give savings and investment incentives for inflowing remittances and which facilitate dual citizenship.

Remittances and the associated experiences of work in mainly urban settings overseas have helped raise aspirations amongst island-based kin for work overseas. They have also stimulated migration to towns within Pacific countries, especially Tonga, Samoa, Kiribati and Tuvalu. Pacific countries, particularly in Polynesia, have long held a desire to educate their children for a life beyond the village. This has increased considerably in recent years, especially given the poor monetary returns for labour invested in the mixed subsistence-cash crop village economy.

As Connell recently reminded us:

> *In this century alone there has been a spectacular increase in international migration from the Pacific, and in unmet demand for it both from individuals and from governments who have put increased pressure on countries such as Australia and New Zealand to relax their immigration policies. After around 30 years of independence, and disappointment over the challenges and fruits of development, a new outward urge is beginning to spill over [from Polynesia and Micronesia] into Melanesia. If internal migration is intensifying urban problems, international migration is reducing them as islanders bypass [local] cities … en route overseas.* Connell (2009: 12)

3.3 Population growth and urbanisation

The next 40 years are likely see big increases in migrant populations from the Pacific Islands region, given the projected population growth for many parts and limited prospects for economic growth. The economic outlook is not positive, because of a combination of:

- constrained resource endowments (especially on the smaller islands in Polynesia and Micronesia)
- political tensions and rising inequality between elites and the population majority
- ongoing concerns about how climate change and associated rises in sea level will affect island environments and societies.

Table 11 shows the projected sizes of populations in each Pacific country and the three major subregions between 1990 and 2050 (as estimated by demographers

in the SPC). Table 12 shows the numerical changes in each 20-year period. It is very clear from these two tables that enormous diversity exists in the trajectories for Pacific populations at country and subregional levels. Most countries will have much larger populations in 2050 than in 2010. In some (such as Vanuatu and the Solomons), the population will have more than doubled; it will have nearly doubled in Papua New Guinea; and others, especially in Polynesia, are likely to change very little, mainly because of ongoing net migration losses (Table 11).

In most countries in the region, the numerical changes in populations, compared with the 20-year period between 1990 and 2010, will be larger between 2010 and 2030 but smaller between 2030 and 2050 (Table 12). However, in all Melanesian countries except New Caledonia, the numerical increases between 2030 and 2050 are projected to be larger than in the previous two periods.

These increases have profound implications for employment demand, especially wage-earning work in towns. On the other hand, in Polynesia and Micronesia, the numerical increases in the populations between 2030 and 2050 are all projected to be smaller than those in the past two decades, except for Tonga, FSM and Nauru (Table 12).

Table 11: Pacific populations, estimates and projections, 1990–2050

Subregion/country	Mid-year estimates		Projections (2010)	
	1990	2010	2030	2050
Melanesia	4,986,700	8,641,900	12,431,600	16,475,700
Fiji	739,300	847,800	946,300	1,060,700
New Caledonia	168,800	254,500	323,200	359,400
Papua New Guinea	3,608,000	6,745,000	9,899,600	13,271,100
Solomon Islands	323,300	549,600	876,400	1,245,800
Vanuatu	147,300	245,000	386,100	538,700
Micronesia	414,300	547,300	675,000	748,800
Federated States (FSM)	96,300	111,400	121,100	137,600
Guam	133,200	187,100	243,100	267,800
Kiribati	72,300	100,800	137,500	163,300
Marshall Islands	44,700	54,400	62,400	61,200
Nauru	9,400	10,000	13,700	16,300
Northern Mariana Islands	43,300	63,100	74,600	80,100
Palau	15,100	20,500	22,600	22,500
Polynesia	543,700	663,900	759,500	825,800
American Samoa	46,800	65,900	83,700	98,300
Cook Islands	17,500	15,500	16,300	16,000
French Polynesia	196,500	268,800	321,800	348,800
Niue	2,300	1,500	1,200	1,300
Samoa	160,500	183,100	197,700	209,700
Tokelau	1,600	1,200	1,200	1,200
Tonga	95,900	103,400	111,700	123,000
Tuvalu	8,900	11,200	12,500	13,900
Wallis and Futuna	13,700	13,300	13,400	13,600
Pacific Islands	**5,944,700**	**9,853,100**	**13,866,100**	**18,050,300**

Sources: Secretariat of the Pacific Commission, www.spc.int/spd/; www.spc.int/spd/ and www.stats.govt.nz

Table 12: Population change, 1990–2050

Subregion/country	Population Change			
	1990–2010	2010–2030	2030–2050	1990–2050
Melanesia	3,655,200	3,789,700	4,044,100	11,489,000
Fiji	108,500	98,500	114,400	321,400
New Caledonia	85,700	68,700	36,200	190,600
Papua New Guinea	3,137,000	3,154,600	3,371,500	9,663,100
Solomon Islands	226,300	326,800	369,400	922,500
Vanuatu	97,700	141,100	152,600	391,400
Micronesia	133,000	127,700	73,800	334,500
Federated States (FSM)	15,100	9,700	16,500	41,300
Guam	53,900	56,000	24,700	134,600
Kiribati	28,500	36,700	25,800	91,000
Marshall Islands	9,700	8,000	-1,200	16,500
Nauru	600	3,700	2,600	6,900
Nthern Mariana Islands	19,800	11,500	5,500	36,800
Palau	5,400	2,100	-100	7,400
Polynesia	120,200	95,600	66,300	282,100
American Samoa	19,100	17,800	14,600	51,500
Cook Islands	-2,000	800	-300	-1,500
French Polynesia	72,300	53,000	27,000	152,300
Niue	-800	-300	100	-1,000
Samoa	22,600	14,600	12,000	49,200
Tokelau	-400	–	–	-400
Tonga	7,500	8,300	11,300	27,100
Tuvalu	2,300	1,300	1,400	5,000
Wallis and Futuna	-400	100	200	-100
Pacific Islands	**3,908,400**	**4,013,000**	**4,184,200**	**12,105,600**

Source: SPC, www.spc.int/spd/

The Pacific's working-age population (between 15 and 60 years) is projected to increase by around 47 percent, from an estimated 5.74 million in 2010 to 8.47 million in 2030. The youthful component of this population (15–29 years) will increase by around 37 percent; the more mature workforce (30–45 years) by 51 percent; and the older workforce by 68 percent (Table 13).

The population of Melanesia in all these age groups will increase more rapidly than for the Pacific as a whole, while the combined populations for Micronesia and Polynesia increase more slowly. The projected increases in the same age groups in the New Zealand population over the 20 years to 2030 are much smaller: just under 3 percent for the 15–29 group, around 7 percent for those aged 30–44; and just over 2 percent for the older workforce (Table 13).

In the 15–29 group, the projected increase of 25,800 in New Zealand's population aged 15-29 by 2030 is 39 times smaller than the 1,001,700 for in Melanesia. The overall increase in New Zealand's population aged 15-60 between 2010 and 2030 is smaller than for the combined populations of Micronesia and Polynesia. This is despite the much bigger population of New Zealand (4,352,100) in 2010 than in Micronesia and Polynesia (1,217,927). This situation reflects the very different age structures between the populations of New Zealand and other Pacific subregions.

Table 13: Population change 2010-2030, selected age groups and regions

Age group	Melanesia	Micronesia/ Polynesia	Total Pacific	New Zealand
Change (no's)				
15–29	1,001,700	14,100	1,015,800	25,800
30–44	882,000	77,700	959,700	66,800
45–60	709,700	44,900	754,600	20,900
15–60	2,593,400	136,700	2,730,100	113,500
All ages	3,995,000	225,500	4,220,500	709,300
Change (%)				
15–29	41.6	4.3	37.1	2.8
30–44	53.5	33.5	51.0	7.5
45–60	75.3	25.6	67.6	2.4
15–60	51.9	18.6	47.8	4.3
All ages	46.1	18.5	42.7	16.3

Sources: SPC projections, 2008–2030; Statistics New Zealand projections (national), 2006–2061

The World Bank (2006b) has drawn particular attention to the rapid growth of the youth population in the Pacific, especially in Melanesia. It cites a number of potential problems, including:

- a lack of capacity in Pacific rural and urban labour markets to absorb these burgeoning numbers of young workers
- a lack of formal sector jobs to absorb educated young people
- the increasing concentration of these young people in coastal cities and towns.

There is also the potential for large groups of unemployed or underemployed young people in cities, resulting in unrest, dissatisfaction with their lives and feelings of disenfranchisement.

Accompanying the growing youthful workforce in Pacific countries has been the accelerating urbanisation of their populations. Based on the UN Population Division (2010) estimates cited earlier, urbanisation appears to have proceeded most rapidly in Micronesia, especially the island groups that were formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) administered by USA (Table 14).

In 1960 just under 38 percent of Micronesia's residents were living in places classified as urban—four times the percentage of Melanesians (9 percent). In Polynesia just under 30 percent were in urban places that year. By 2000 two-thirds of Micronesia's population was urban-resident, compared with 41 percent in Polynesia and 19 percent in Melanesia. The division estimates that, by 2050, 88 percent of Micronesia's population will be town-based compared with just under 60 percent of Polynesia's residents and a third of Melanesia's (Table 14).

Table 14: Urbanisation and urban population growth in the Pacific

Region	% population in urban places			% increase in urban population	
	1960	2000	2050	1960–2000	2000–2050
Melanesia	9.0	19.0	32.9	406.8	310.1
Micronesia	37.5	65.7	88.4	372.5	96.9
Polynesia	28.9	41.1	58.0	181.1	96.8
Pacific	12.7	23.5	36.3	380.6	245.4
Australia	81.5	87.2	85.9	99.5	61.3
New Zealand	76.0	85.9	85.6	83.8	46.7

Source: UN Population Division (2010)

The censuses for the four Melanesian countries—2007 in Fiji and 2009 in New Caledonia, the Solomons and Vanuatu—all indicate that urban populations are growing faster than the populations for the countries as a whole (Table 15).[1] As noted earlier, New Caledonia, with its heavy concentration of population in the greater Noumea urban area, has a very different history of urban-industrial development from the other Melanesian countries.

Fiji experienced more rapid urbanisation after The Second World War than its three western Melanesian neighbours, and its population distribution is more similar to those found in Polynesia. Growth in Fiji's urban and total populations was very slow between 1996 and 2007, largely because of Fiji Indians and increasing numbers of Fijians emigrating after the 2000 and 2006 coups.

The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have both experienced much more rapid urban population growth than either New Caledonia or Fiji since the late 1990s. Their rates remain very high, given that they come from much smaller bases than their more urbanised neighbours do (Table 15). Less than a quarter of the populations of the Solomons and Vanuatu lived in urban areas in 2009 (though people in peri-urban areas may have been under-counted).

In his comprehensive review of Pacific urbanisation, Connell noted that official statistics do not reveal the real growth of towns and cities in the region:

> *While Port Moresby's official population (based on the 2000 census) is recorded at 254,158, this excludes a large number of peri-urban and informal settlements. It is estimated by most government planning agencies in Port Moresby that the city's current [2009] actual population lies closer to 500,000 than official projections of a little over 350,000. These wide estimates of populations alone are indicative of limited knowledge of many aspects of urban life. Similarly recent growth in Port Vila (Vanuatu) is mainly outside formal urban boundaries, and even in several smaller states, such as Samoa and Tonga, but also in the Markham Valley outside Lae (PNG), there is significant commuting. What amounts to urban undercounts exist in many Pacific countries and have serious implications for infrastructure and service provision to rapidly growing urban populations.*
> Connell (2009: 6)

Whatever the real sizes of populations in the Pacific's main towns, census statistics since the 1980s make it clear that 'unmistakably the Pacific faces an urban future' (Connell, 2009: 4).

The towns and cities that will evolve in the islands, especially Melanesia, will house millions of residents earning their livelihood from informal activities rather than regular, waged employment in the public and private sectors. These will be very different from the cities of Australia and New Zealand. The UN Population

[1] Results from the 2010 Papua New Guinea census were not available in September 2011. But when they are published, they are likely to reveal more rapid growth in the urban population than for the total population.

Division estimates that Melanesia's 'arrival cities' will have to absorb an extra four million people by 2050. In 2010 the aggregate urban population in Melanesia was 1.33 million; by 2050 it could be 5.45 million—larger than New Zealand's total population. Two added challenges for Melanesia's urban planners and service-providers will be the spread of HIV infections, with increasing mobility and associated changes in social customs and behaviour.

3.4 Mobility-related challenges: HIV/Aids and climate change

Pacific countries face two potential time-bombs for their mobility and mortality: the spread of HIV infections and extreme weather events, leading to rising sea levels in coastal locations. The sixth Millennium Development Goal is to reduce infectious diseases, including HIV/Aids, because of how it will reduce life expectancy for carriers and the risk of pregnant women transferring the disease to the unborn children. HIV/Aids has another fishhook: if it is notified, the carrier is unlikely to be granted a visa to enter Australia or New Zealand.

The Pacific has a generally low prevalence of HIV infections compared with some other global regions. In 2008, the region (including Australia and New Zealand) recorded 3,900 new infections, bringing the total number of people living with HIV to an estimated 59,000 (UNAIDS 2009: 75). For most countries in the region, the prevalence levels were below 0.1 percent of the population.

Papua New Guinea is a major exception—it accounts for 95 percent of all cases in the Pacific, though it has only 68 percent of the region's population. UNAIDS (2009: 75) points out that Papua New Guinea is undergoing an HIV epidemic, similar to the adjoining Indonesian province of West Papua. Among the smaller island nations, New Caledonia, Fiji, French Polynesia and Guam account for most infections.

Connell and Negin (2010) have established that migration and urbanisation are key factors in the transmission and spread of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases in the Pacific (Figure 5). People who are highly mobile may be at greater risk of engaging in behaviour that involves higher HIV risk exposure. This is especially so for workers who engage in circular migration, are away from home and family, have discretionary income, are targets for the sex industry or are subject to peer pressures. Much of the risk is associated with internal migration (especially in PNG), although risk through international migration is increasing.

Figure 5: Summary of most significant HIV vulnerability, by migration group

Migration Group[1]	Number of Pacific Islanders Involved[2]	Countries Most Affected[3]	Vulnerability to HIV[4]	How Much is Known[5]
Urbanisation	VL	PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Guam, CNMI, New Caledonia		
Sex Work	L (little data on number of foreign CSWs)	Fiji, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, PNG, Guam, CNMI, Palau, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, FSM		
Plantation/ Forestry/ Logging	NA	PNG, Solomon Islands		
Mining	M (approx 8000)	PNG, New Caledonia		
Transport and Seafarers	L (approx 7000 PI seafarers and more than 10,000 foreign seafarers through region)	FSM, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, PNG, Fiji, French Polynesia		
Military	L(approx 8000 domestic soldiers and 4000 overseas soldiers)	Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Guam, CNMI, New Caledonia, Marshall Islands		
Guest Workers	M (approx 7000)	Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa		
Skilled Workers	NA			
Tourism	NA	Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Palau, Guam, CNMI, Vanuatu, Cook Islands		
Refugees and Displaced People	L (10,000 refugees in PNG alone)	PNG		
Students	NA	PNG, Fiji		
Return Migration	NA	Tonga, Samoa, Marshall Islands, Fiji		

Source: Connell and Negin (2010: 5)

Urban areas in the region are sites of migrant concentration and high risk behaviour. But in Papua New Guinea, HIV infection is mainly a rural phenomenon, given the small share of the population living in towns and the prevalence of circular forms of mobility between town and village. As in other parts of the world, HIV infection in PNG is closely related to the commercial sex industry. With the rapidly growing youth population, their movement to and from urban areas and their changing cultural and social mores, the potential for a big increase in risky behaviour and HIV infection is considerable. HIV contributes more and more to mortality in PNG, which has the lowest average life expectancy at birth in the region (Table 5).

Life expectancy in Pacific countries has been increasing slowly, although in Nauru the estimated average number of years a person can expect to live was lower in 2010 than 20 years ago. The Polynesian countries tend to have average life expectancies in the upper 60s and early 70s. Tuvalu is the only country where the average person can expect to live to less than 65 years (Table 5).
In Micronesia life expectancies are generally lower than in Polynesia—except for Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands with their large immigrant populations.

Nauru is an outlier in Micronesia just as Papua New Guinea is the outlier in Melanesia, with an average life expectancy of only 54 years (SPC 2010a and b).

HIV infection has been identified as a risk to health linked with migration and urbanisation, and can constrain the international mobility intentions of carriers. However, a much more critical issue for many Pacific countries is climate change. In 2008 the forum promulgated the 'Niue Declaration on Climate Change' (Pacific Islands Forum 2008). In acknowledging how much climate change might affect communities and their livelihoods, Pacific leaders stressed the desire of many Pacific peoples to continue living in their own countries. They also recognised that, where people could not remain, alternative homes would need to be found.

At the forum's 2010 meeting in Vanuatu, the leaders accepted the need to mainstream climate change into national plans and systems, and to develop appropriate adaptation strategies: 'Climate change remains the greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of the peoples of the Pacific' (Pacific Islands Forum, 2010: 1). This concern about climate change affecting low-lying island countries was re-emphasised at the 2011 forum in Auckland, and the UN Secretary-General's address made it his theme when opening the meeting.

In the global discussion on climate change, the Pacific region has been central. Several countries are identified as being among the most vulnerable places in the world. This is especially critical with rising sea levels: atolls and small island countries which will be more exposed to storms, flooding of low-lying areas, and reductions in the quality and quantity of fresh groundwater.

As Campbell (2010) has pointed out, although sea level rise is the problem that is referred to most often, the increased incidence of droughts and greater tropical cyclone devastation are also significant. A major threat to atoll territories is the saltwater pollution of the freshwater lenses crucial for sustaining residents' livelihoods. These days Tuvalu and Kiribati are stars in the global discussion on the effects of rising sea levels.

The 'drowning islands' of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu, along with various scattered atolls and reef islands in the region, have captured the public imagination. But these islands house only 2 percent of people in the Pacific and occupy only about 2 percent of the region's land area. Most Pacific peoples live on 'high' islands—with land that will not be swamped if sea levels rise and coastal zones become more vulnerable to storm surge and saline fresh water.

In theory, there are options for relocation of coastal peoples inland if their low-lying communities become uninhabitable as environmental conditions change. In practice, this is not straight-forward, as demonstrated in recent attempts by some of the Carteret Islanders to move from their atoll homes onto land in neighbouring Bougainville where they have customary ties (Duguman, 2010). Indeed, early settlers on the 'mainland' returned to their atoll homes in 2009 after finding the relocation process very difficult (Kenneth, 2009).
Obtaining land for resettlement within countries, especially if entire communities have to be relocated, will be very challenging in environments where most land

belongs to customary owners (Barnett and Campbell, 2010). Given the gradual movement of Pacific populations on most 'high' islands towards coastal locations over the past two centuries, environmental degradation from global warming will create problems for all countries in the region.

In the urban areas, rapid population growth resulting both natural increases and internal migration has been creating challenges for some time, especially in housing, sanitation, water supply and jobs. Most Pacific urban areas are already feeling severe environmental and social stress. Climate change will add pressure on residents to move elsewhere.

Already most Pacific countries, especially in Polynesia and Micronesia, are contending with considerable movement, both internally and overseas, not directly linked to climatic or environmental stress. Climate change will push people towards that decision, before conditions become so intolerable that permanent mass relocation is needed.

In this context, this statement by Black et al about the relationship between climate change and migration has great relevance for the region:

> *It is unclear how far climate change will emerge as a significant or predominant factor in influencing human migration, distinct from other economic, social or political factors, and/or overriding their effect. This is perhaps reflected in the fact that the most widely cited figure for climate-change migrants over the coming years [150–200 million at a global scale] is itself not greatly different from the net increase in migration that might be estimated simply by extrapolating existing futures holding migration as a constant percentage of population growth.*
> Black et al (2008: 61)

Black and his colleagues argue that the best way to understand the causes and consequences of migration associated with climate change is 'to develop locally specific, case-study research which highlights how the drivers of existing migration streams might be impacted by, or sensitive to, climate change, rather than seeking to produce crude global [or regional] estimates based on delineation of affected areas' (Black et al, 2008: 63).

Migration brought on by climate-related environmental change is not a new phenomenon in the Pacific (Bedford and Bedford, 2010). In the 1950s and 1960s, when most of Pacific countries were still colonies, entire communities were resettled in other countries of the region (Lieber, 1977). Some resettlement would seem to be necessary, especially from Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tokelau and the Marshall Islands. However, as Bedford and Bedford (2010: 5) point out, this will require 'a mix of strategies that allow both for increasing numbers of individuals and families to move voluntarily to seek livelihoods in other countries as their options at home become more constrained, as well as for planned resettlement of entire communities as those larger groups seek to preserve their social and cultural identifies in new homes'.

Mechanisms will need to be developed for international resettlement. But as Connell (2003) pointed out some time ago, there is a danger that this focus on resettlement is deflecting attention away from other adaptation strategies which will allow some people to remain in their homes if they wish. The key, as McAdam and Loughey (2009) and Barnett and Campbell (2010) have argued, is to develop sustainable solutions so people can remain as long as possible, and to move families and communities gradually.

Options for employment and possible residence overseas are among the various options for small-island peoples—not inevitable outcomes.

3.5 Forces for change in mobility patterns

To conclude this overview, we review some of the main forces for change in mobility patterns, though not in any particular order. We comment further on these in the final section.

The challenge of demography for social stability and development is creating tensions—especially in island countries with rapid population growth but sluggish growth in employment outside subsistence production In the Pacific, some big contradictions surrounding urbanisation—especially the negative stereotyping of towns and the increasingly punitive approach being adopted towards people living in informal settlements just outside the major centres.

This is especially evident in the three countries of western Melanesia. As as result of this negative stereotyping of urban migrants who do not have formal-sector jobs and the associated crime and violence in towns, many middle-class Melanesians will leave for more secure lives overseas. It won't be the poor, but those whose talents are essential for developing urban societies and economies in the islands.

The challenge is how to conceptualise the future Pacific urban economies and societies. They will not be the Mumbais and Shanghais of the future, but much smaller cities reflecting small total populations, limited resources and limited potential for manufacturing as a key employer of labour. They will not be great centres of innovation.

What will the economic base of the future Pacific city be? South Tarawa, with half of Kiribati's population and the only concentration of wage employment opportunities, cannot absorb more than 20 percent of school-leavers each year into the formal, wage-earning, urban economy. Where will the Pacific's educated populations gain the livelihoods they are being taught to aspire for? For most, not in the Pacific's towns and cities. Many will seek their livelihoods overseas, just as Europeans left their burgeoning cities in the 19th and early 20th centuries in search of greener pastures.

Papua New Guinea is likely to become an important destination for migrants from Pacific countries, especially those in the western Pacific. Its mineral and natural gas deposits have attracted major overseas investment over the past 30 years, and it has major shortages of skilled labour (particularly resource extraction-

related skills) to meet the needs of PNG's expanding industrial economy. PNG's Prime Minister signalled at the pre-forum meeting in Nadi in September 2011 that his country envisaged increased labour migration from other parts of Melanesia.

The strengthening 'Melanesian spearhead' group is becoming much more prominent in Pacific affairs. It is increasingly challenging the political influence that Australia and New Zealand, along with their smaller Polynesian neighbours, have wielded in regional organisations over the past 50 years. This is especially true of the South Pacific Commission (now the Secretariat of the Pacific Community) and the Pacific Islands Forum, which has its secretariat in Fiji.

Fiji's military dictatorship is playing off 'Pacific' versus 'ANZ' interests in the region and encouraging Pacific leaders to reduce their dependence on and engagement with their southern neighbours. The pre-forum 'Engaging with the Pacific' dialogue that Fiji's Interim Prime Minister hosted in Nadi is the most visible evidence of this alternative approach to date. Such dialogues are likely to become annual events before future forums.

China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea and, in the longer term, India will become more involved in the region. As Crocombe (2007) has shown in his comprehensive review of Asia in the Pacific Islands, Pacific states are realigning their strategic alliances and leveraging their voting power in UN agencies to gain aid from China and Taiwan especially.

Companies involved in timber extraction in Malaysia and fishing in Korea have gained extensive rights and licences to mill forests in Melanesia and to exploit the extensive Exclusive Economic Zones in several Pacific states. The associated flows of capital, products and labour are reorienting population flows into and out of the islands. The sources of consultants, skilled workers and entrepreneurs is changing as Asia 'replaces the West in the Pacific', according to Crocombe. So too the departures of students, high-skilled and low-skilled workers, government officials and business people.

We will see a recolonisation of island states' commercial economies as Asian business and financial interests become more dominant in the transport, retailing, construction, manufacturing, tourist and professional-services industries. This is in some ways just an extension of what is happening internationally, but it is particularly noteworthy in the forestry and fishing industries as well as growing urban service economies of these Pacific countries. Also these days, imports from Asia are more important in the region than those from Australia and New Zealand.

New Zealand and Australia are increasingly paying attention to security issues in the Pacific, especially in Melanesia. A major concern is the trend among Pacific governments of shunning advice provided by the ANZ governments and not bowing to the influence they exert. The trans-Tasman neighbours have publicly expressed concern about corruption in governments, lack of compliance with regulations and laws, growing civil unrest and violent crime. As a result, Melanesia has attracted new labels in the Australia and New Zealand media: an

'arc of instability', a 'neighbourhood of fragile states'; a 'potential security problem'.

Such labels have harmed people flows into the region, especially tourists and business people from Australia and New Zealand, as well as flows out. The island countries of the western Pacific are coming under increasing pressure to find education and jobs offshore as services deteriorate at home.

Environmental change is speeding up throughout the region, as a result of:

- demographic changes (both population growth and decline)
- transformations in land use (especially more intensive cultivation)
- exploitation of forests and fisheries
- pollution and waste-disposal problems
- longer-term systemic change in the atmosphere, lithosphere and oceans.

The warming of the oceans and climate changes have implications for the coastal communities where most Pacific peoples now live. These will in turn increase the pace of population movement among countries in the region. This driver of change in is very much linked to urbanisation.

Australia and New Zealand have followed USA and other 'rich' nations in their increasing concern about border security over the past decade. In parts of the Pacific, especially Melanesia, there is a growing sense of 'fortress ANZ'. Melanesians are finding it hard get residency approval. And given that the diaspora of indigenous Melanesian peoples (except Fijians) to the two Pacific Rim countries has not been large, they are struggling to work the family reunion/sponsorship categories of Australian and New Zealand immigration policies.

In an increasingly interdependent world, the Pacific Rim countries must shore up their borders to avoid burgeoning illegal flows. Europe and North America have demonstrated clearly that building walls does little to stop flows of undocumented migrants across borders. Australia faces increasing challenges from 'boat people'—but not from the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand can still develop relationships with Pacific neighbours that do not generate the desperation of 'boat people' strategies.

With the end of the colonial era, the next 30 to 40 years will be much more challenging. The bigger, richer countries will need to engage very differently with Pacific peoples—both those still at home as those wishing to leave home.

4 PACIFIC MIGRATION TO THE RIM

We have estimated that by 2010 around 850,000 people of Pacific island ancestry or ethnicity would have been living in the four Pacific Rim 'countries of immigration': New Zealand (350,000), Australia (150,000), USA (300,000) and Canada (50,000). These figures are based on some pro-rata adjustments to the last published census data for 2000 (USA) and 2006 (Australia, Canada and New Zealand). The combined total of these populations is larger than the SPC's estimates of the total populations of either Micronesia (547,300) or Polynesia (663,960) in 2010 (Table 1).

There are also small Pacific populations in the United Kingdom, Europe and parts of Asia. The overall size of the global diaspora of Pacific peoples, measured in terms of ancestry/ethnic identity, could have been close to one million in 2010.

According to the Australian and New Zealand censuses of 1971, around 46,000 Pacific-born people were living in the two countries (16,000 in Australia and 30,000 in New Zealand). In 2006 that figure had risen to just under 250,000 (106,900 in Australia and 138,400 in New Zealand). This means the Pacific-born populations increased by 440 percent between 1971 and 2006. If that percentage increase repeated by 2050, the Pacific-born population in the two countries would total around 1.15 million.

Pacific peoples, collectively, have been one of the major populations defined by ethnicity in New Zealand since the 1980s. They are one of only two populations with their own ministry (Pacific Island Affairs)—the other is for New Zealand's indigenous Maori population (Te Puni Kōkiri). There is a certain symmetry in this distinctive identity that Pacific peoples (or 'Pasifika', as they are often termed locally) have in New Zealand's polity and society: the Maori are a Polynesian people.

4.1 Continuity through change

Around 800 years ago Pacific Islanders from Polynesia settled Aotearoa. Through their occupation of the various islands that comprise New Zealand, these Polynesians, known to Europeans as Māori, became the 'tangata whenua' or 'people of the land'.[2]

Six hundred years later, Europeans began arriving, often via Australia, and some wanted to stay. A treaty between the tangata whenua and representatives of the

[2] The dates for settlement of Polynesia and subsequent migration to other parts of the Pacific and New Zealand have recently become the subject of fierce debate again. This follows a comprehensive reassessment of more than 1,400 radiocarbon dates from at least 15 archipelagoes in eastern Polynesia, including New Zealand (Wilmhurst et al 2010). The authors conclude: 'The results show that, after a relatively brief period of establishment in East Polynesia [around AD 1025–1120], there was a remarkably rapid and extensive dispersal in the 13th century AD to the remaining uninhabited islands [including New Zealand]' (Wilmhurst et al 2010: 5).

immigrants in 1840 paved the way for the settlement of New Zealand by Europeans and several other peoples who came as traders, seafarers, soldiers or labourers. Among others, Chinese, Indians and new waves of Pacific islanders came to live in New Zealand.

Several Māori chiefs had signed the 'Treaty of Waitangi', with its preamble that authorised the entry of British subjects. But Māori did not have any say in who actually migrated to New Zealand. It was the settler-dominated government that set the rules about immigration. The immigrants quickly came to dominate in all spheres of economic, social and political life.

The impact of European migration and settlement was devastating for all indigenous peoples of the region, including Australia and New Zealand, but it was not fatal. Māori, Australia's Aboriginal peoples and Pacific islanders all survived the arrival of people on boats from Europe, with their alien diseases, superior weapons and strange customs. Later, as migrants settled in their new countries, new societies and economies emerged. By the 1880s the European immigrants were implementing regulations to restrict entry to what was now regarded as 'their' country. Immigration policies in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States placed heavy restrictions on the entry of Asians from the late 19th century until well into the second half of the 20th century.

Notwithstanding these restrictions, the four Pacific Rim countries became known as 'countries of immigration' because of their recent settlement by people from Europe. And these were countries where successive governments had sought immigrants, usually from Europe—in some cases even paying them to come and settle in a 'New World'.

Pacific Islanders were not excluded from this movement—especially in Australia, where a major shortage of labour in Queensland's burgeoning sugar-cane plantations from the mid-19th century resulted in a significant demand for and migration of Melanesian labour, especially from the islands that now comprise Vanuatu. This labour trade—or 'blackbirding', as it became known—was ended in 1906 after the creation of the Condominium of the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu).

Just as Australia was ending its recruitment of labour from the Pacific around the turn of the 20th century, New Zealand was assuming responsibility for administering the Cook Islands and Niue. The Tokelau Islands were added to New Zealand's Pacific 'realm' in the 1920s. The League of Nations Mandated Territory of Western Samoa passed from German to New Zealand control after the First World War. At the same time, the Australian Government assumed responsibility for the German colony in New Guinea, linking this with Papua (which it had taken over from the British in the late 1890s) to form the Territory of Papua New Guinea.

These administrative responsibilities were not accompanied by any significant migration from the colonies to New Zealand and Australia until after the The Second World War. The New Zealand Census of 1945 recorded just over 3,000 people born in the Pacific; the Australian census two years later recorded 4,731

Pacific-born. In both countries, the main source country for their Pacific-born was Fiji (1,173 in New Zealand and 1,508 in Australia). The second largest groups were from colonies—Samoa, Cook Island and Niue in New Zealand's case and Papua New Guinea in Australia's. These were the beginnings of the Pacific diaspora that were to rise dramatically in the two countries from the 1960s on.

By the mid-1950s New Zealand's Pacific-born population had exceeded Australia's. Through the 1960s and 1970s it grew much more rapidly as a result of:

- relatively open entry extended for several Pacific countries
- an ongoing demand for labour in rural areas of New Zealand
- a need for labour in the manufacturing industries that thrived under the import-substitution industrialisation policies adopted after The Second World War.

By 1971 New Zealand's Pacific-born population (just under 31,000) was almost twice the size of Australia's (16,700). The compositions of the respective Pacific populations varied markedly. Just over half (53 percent) of Australia's were from Papua New Guinea, and 85 percent of the 16,700 had been born in a country in Melanesia. In New Zealand by far the largest group was the Samoa-born (40 percent of the 30,900), and 81 percent were from countries in Polynesia. The one common feature was the position of Fiji as the second-ranked source of Pacific-born—5,274 in Fiji and 4,012 in Australia. After the first military coup in 1987, Fiji became Australia's largest source of Pacific-born. Samoa has remained the biggest source of Pacific migrants in New Zealand since the mid-1950s.

New Zealand's Pacific-born population has remained larger than Australia's since the mid-1950s because of a range of policies that gave people from selected Pacific countries privileged access to work and reside. Until very recently, Australia had never had policies favouring entry of citizens from any countries other than New Zealand. Under the terms of the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, New Zealand citizens (including Cook Island Māori, Niueans and Tokelauans who gained this status when a separate New Zealand citizenship was established in 1948) can stay in Australia as long as they wish without going through any immigrant selection programme. Many Pacific Islanders have taken advantage of this access after gaining New Zealand citizenship (see section 4.2 below).

At the 2006 censuses in Australia and New Zealand, their respective Pacific-born populations totalled 106,900 and 138,400 (Table 15). The Melanesia-born continued to dominate in Australia (71 percent), with 45 percent born in Fiji. There was also a Samoa-born population of more than 15,000—the third-largest group by country of birth. In New Zealand, Samoa remained by far the largest single country of birth (37 percent), followed by Fiji (28 percent) and Tonga (15 percent).

The dominance of countries in Polynesia as sources remained (69 percent), but it was declining as flows from Fiji and other parts of Melanesia increased in the 2000s. This was brought about by three main factors:

- people fleeing the Fiji coups
- the introduction of the RSE scheme to Vanuatu and Solomon Islands (see section 4.5)
- the increasing numbers of study permits granted to students seeking some of their education in New Zealand (see section 4.6).

Table 15: Pacific island-born populations, New Zealand and Australia, 2006

Subregion/country	New Zealand		Australia		ANZ	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Melanesia	41,184	29.8	75,756	71.3	116,940	47.8
Fiji	38,679	27.9	48,145	45.3	86,824	35.5
New Caledonia	273	0.2	1,102	1.0	1,375	0.6
Papua New Guinea	1,329	1.0	24,022	22.6	25,351	10.4
Solomon Islands	549	0.4	1,495	1.4	2,044	0.8
Vanuatu	354	0.3	986	0.9	1,340	0.5
Melanesia nfd	0	0.0	6	0.0	6	0.0
Micronesia	1,203	0.9	1,059	1.0	2,262	0.9
Federated States (FSM)	51	0.0	15	0.0	66	0.0
Guam	24	0.0	78	0.1	102	0.0
Kiribati	846	0.6	395	0.4	1,241	0.5
Marshall Islands	21	0.0	33	0.0	54	0.0
Nauru	246	0.2	487	0.5	733	0.3
Northern Mariana Islands	9	0.0	12	0.0	21	0.0
Palau	6	0.0	13	0.0	19	0.0
Micronesia nfd	0	0.0	26	0.0	26	0.0
Polynesia	96,039	69.4	29,491	27.7	125,530	51.3
American Samoa	495	0.4	199	0.2	694	0.3
Cook Islands	14,817	10.7	5,026	4.7	19,843	8.1
French Polynesia	1,053	0.8	337	0.3	1,390	0.6
Niue	4,878	3.5	577	0.5	5,455	2.2
Samoa	51,108	36.9	15,236	14.3	66,344	27.1
Tokelau	1,596	1.2	355	0.3	1,951	0.8
Tonga	20,748	15.0	7,582	7.1	28,330	11.6
Tuvalu	1,248	0.9	116	0.1	1,364	0.6
Wallis and Futuna	12	0.0	18	0.0	30	0.0
Polynesia nfd	84	0.1	45	0.0	129	0.1
Pacific Islands	**138,426**	**100.0**	**106,306**	**100.0**	**244,732**	**100.0**

Source: Unpublished tables, Statistics New Zealand and Australian Bureau of Statistics

The migrant populations from Fiji in both countries include a significant number of Indians. The Fiji-born Indian populations in Australia (29,735) and New Zealand (29,733) in 2006 were almost identical in size. Both countries received some migration of Fiji Indians in the 1960s and 1970s, but the main movement has come since the military coups in 1987. Most Fiji Indian migrants admitted in

recent years have had the skills and/or capital to qualify under Australia's and New Zealand's points selection systems and business migration categories.

4.2 Access to residence in Australia and New Zealand

Theoretically, in policy terms at least, Pacific peoples have the same opportunities as people from other countries to seek work and residence in Australia and New Zealand. This access is framed in the form of the destination countries' current points-based selection systems; provision for family reunion and sponsorship; and a range of international or humanitarian categories that accommodate small numbers of migrants each year.

In practice, however, the skills-based points systems do not target the skills of most Pacific peoples, especially those from rural areas. The main routes to residence in New Zealand have been through:

- the special arrangements negotiated when its Pacific colonies gained self-government
- temporary seasonal work schemes
- the family reunion and international/humanitarian streams in immigration policy.

In Australia's case, Pacific numbers have built in the post-war period through a combination of:

- the survivors of a 19th century labour recruiting era in Melanesia
- the movement of family members born in Fiji and Papua New Guinea (often married to Australian citizens)
- the movement of Polynesians across the Tasman from New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement
- the more recent migration of Pacific-born skilled migrants, especially Fiji Indians, who have gained entry under the points system.

As we have already noted, these two countries have differed quite markedly in their approaches to migration from the Pacific (Bedford et al 2007). Since The Second World War, New Zealand has generally given more priority to its Pacific neighbours in both immigration policy and foreign affairs. Australia has played a key role in developing the commercial economies (especially the plantation, retail and service sectors) of all of the Melanesian countries except New Caledonia.

However, its immigration policy has never prioritised the Pacific, and only Papua New Guinea has been a consistent element of the country's aid and foreign policy in the region. Indeed, Australian immigration officials have persistently denied any special relationships with Pacific countries—they are treated the same as other countries (except for New Zealand).

When we examined residence approvals for citizens of Pacific countries between July 2003 and June 2007, we found three times more Pacific people moving to New Zealand than to Australia with the intention of settling (Table 16a). Melanesia, especially Fiji, is the dominant origin for Pacific Islanders moving to Australia, while the Polynesian countries of Samoa and Tonga remain more

important for New Zealand. Distinctively different patterns are in evidence if we consider skilled and family migrants separately.

Melanesia, especially Fiji, is the source of more than 90 percent of skilled migrants in both countries (Table 16b). New Zealand's share of the skilled migrant intake from the Pacific is much less than that of all settlers from the region, which perhaps indicates that Australia is a preferred destination for skilled migrants. Family migration is much more important in New Zealand (Table 16c). Polynesian flows of family migrants are much bigger than the skilled inflows in both countries.

Even greater shares of migrants in the international/humanitarian streams for both countries enter New Zealand under the special quota systems that apply for Samoa and the Pacific Access Category (PAC), which allows for entry of small numbers each year from Tonga (250), Kiribati (75) and Tuvalu (75). New Zealand's more liberal entry policies for Pacific migrants, especially through the residence quotas for selected countries, have boosted growth in Australia's Pacific-born populations through trans-Tasman migration.

Table 16: Approvals for residence in Australia and New Zealand, Pacific citizens, July 2003 to June 2007

a) All approvals

Subregion	Australia	NZ	Total ANZ	% NZ
Melanesia	7,835	10,369	18,204	57
Fiji	6,466	10,138	16,604	61.1
PNG	1,086	84	1,170	7.7
Micronesia	77	554	631	94.5
Kiribati	19	521	540	96.5
Polynesia	845	14,574	15,419	94.5
Samoa	369	8,584	8,953	95.9
Tonga	432	5,230	5,662	92.4
Pacific	8,757	25,497	34,254	74.4
% Melanesia	89.4	40.7	53.1	

b) Skilled migrants

Subregion	Australia	NZ	Total ANZ	% NZ
Melanesia	3,738	4,098	7,836	52.4
Fiji	3,275	3,992	7,267	54.9
PNG	382	20	402	5
Micronesia	28	15	45	33.3
Kiribati	0	10	10	100
Polynesia	74	264	338	78.1
Samoa	20	63	83	76.8
Tonga	40	173	213	81.2
Pacific	3,840	4,377	8,219	53.3
% Melanesia	97.3	93.6	85.3	

c) Family categories

Sub-region	Australia	NZ	Total ANZ	% NZ
Melanesia	3,683	4,390	8,073	54.3
Fiji	2,962	4,281	7,243	59.1
PNG	554	54	608	8.9
Micronesia	40	79	119	66.4
Kiribati	19	64	83	77.1
Polynesia	501	5,549	6,050	91.7
Samoa	130	3,127	3,257	96
Tonga	364	2,194	2,558	85.8
Pacific	4,224	10,018	14,242	70.3
% Melanesia	87.2	43.8	56.7	

Source: Unpublished tables, DIAC (Australia) and DoL (NZ)

4.3 Trans-Tasman Pacific migration

Trans-Tasman migration of Pacific peoples has been a feature of the population exchanges between New Zealand and Australia since the early 19th century (Bedford 1992). Until the 1970s, however, the flows of Pacific-born people between the two countries were very small. The acceleration of Pacific migration to New Zealand after The Second World War was reflected in an increasing trans-Tasman movement of people born in the Pacific, especially among those entitled to New Zealand citizenship.

At times the Australian Government expressed concern about this 'back door' entry. But as long as New Zealand citizens were permitted to enter Australia without having to apply for specific visas entitling them to work and live there,

the Government had no way of limiting the flow of Pacific Islanders who were New Zealand citizens.

As Table 17 shows, many Pacific Islanders, especially Samoans and Cook Islanders, have clearly entered Australia via New Zealand under the trans-Tasman Agreement—in fact, around 20 percent of Australia's Pacific island-born population in 2008. This proportion may be even higher, since some may have taken out Australian citizenship before the change in Australia's social security legislation—this has made it harder for New Zealanders to access employment-related benefits in Australia since 2001 (Bedford et al 2003).

Table 17: Pacific-born NZ citizens in Australia, June 2008

Country	Number
Western Samoa	12,137
Cook Islands	6,293
Fiji	2,858
Tonga	1,450
Niue	890
Other Pacific	1,113
Total	24,741

Source: DIAC (2008: 44)

However, the trans-Tasman movement of Pacific peoples is not all one way. The 2006 census results revealed that the major ethnic/ancestry populations of Pacific indigenous groups living in both countries included people born in their 'home' countries as well as New Zealand, Australia and other countries (Table 18). There were quite marked variations in the distributions by birthplace, but in several cases the share of New-Zealand born in the ethnic/ancestry group living in Australia was much bigger than the other way around. This indicates the trans-Tasman movement has tended to favour Australia.

An interesting exception (shown in Table 18) is Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans—their share of New Zealand-born people in Australia (8.4 percent) was much smaller than the share of Australia-born in New Zealand (14.1 percent). However, the number of New Zealand-born Cook Island Maori, Niueans and Tokelauans to Australia (5,758) was much larger than the number of Australia-born in this ethnic cluster resident in New Zealand in 2006 (693). Also, far fewer New Zealand-born Tongans were living in Australia (8.5 percent) than NewZealand-born Samoans (15.7) or Fijians (15.1 percent).

Between July 2001 and June 2006 the net migration gain to Australia of Pacific-born permanent and long-term trans-Tasman migrants was around 3,200—more than half of this gain (1,713) was Samoa-born migrants who had lived in New Zealand (Table 19). The second largest group was the Fiji-born (747) comprising Fijians as well as Fiji Indians.

The ethnicity of arrivals and departures in New Zealand's border statistics is not so easy to determine. With the total flows of Pacific-born migrants across the Tasman, New Zealand shows a net gain of Fiji-born (900), a larger net loss of Samoa-born (2,471) and a much smaller net loss of all Pacific-born to Australia. However, these net gains and losses derived from the total flows (PLT plus short-term) need to be interpreted with some caution, because only a sample of the arrival and departure cards for people entering and leaving New Zealand for less than 12 months are processed. There is a sampling error associated with the statistics for numbers entering and leaving the country, and this error becomes significant when small flows are examined.

Table 18: Pacific ethnic/ancestry populations resident in New Zealand and Australia in 2006, by birthplace

Ethnic/ancestry group by birthplace	Place of residence 2006			% total ANZ	
	NZ	Aust	ANZ	in NZ	in Aust
Melanesian					
Fijian					
Fiji	5,241	10,466	15,707	33.4	66.6
New Zealand	4,251	754	5,005	84.9	15.1
Australia	84	7,138	7,222	1.2	98.8
Other countries[1]	285	156	441	64.6	35.4
Total	**9,861**	**18,514**	**28,375**	**34.8**	**65.2**
Other Melanesian					
Home country	858	7,765	8,623	10	90
New Zealand	408	56	464	87.9	12.1
Australia	24	5,803	5,827	0.4	99.6
Other countries[1]	72	147	219	32.9	67.1
Total	**1,362**	**13,771**	**15,133**	**9**	**91**
Micronesian					
I-Kiribati					
Kiribati	585	152	737	79.4	20.6
New Zealand	372	15	387	96.1	3.9
Australia	9	190	199	4.5	95.5
Other countries[1]	150	108	258	58.1	41.9
Total	**1,116**	**465**	**1,581**	**70.6**	**29.4**
Polynesian					
Cook/Niue/Tokelauan					
Home country	20,508	4,076	24,584	83.4	16.6
New Zealand	62,787	5,758	68,545	91.6	8.4
Australia	693	4,206	4,899	14.1	85.9
Other countries[1]	3,318	226	3,544	93.6	6.4
Total	**87,306**	**14,266**	**101,572**	**86**	**14**

Samoan					
Samoa	49,860	12,131	61,991	80.4	19.6
New Zealand	77,244	14,409	91,653	84.3	15.7
Australia	1,071	11,861	12,932	8.3	91.7
Other countries[1]	2,928	450	3,378	86.7	13.3
Total	**131,103**	**38,851**	**169,954**	**77.1**	**22.9**
Tongan					
Tonga	20,241	6,181	26,422	76.6	23.4
New Zealand	27,696	2,572	30,268	91.5	8.5
Australia	402	8,495	8,897	4.5	95.5
Other countries[1]	2,139	423	2,562	83.5	16.5
Total	**50,478**	**17,671**	**68,149**	**74.1**	**25.9**
Other Pacific[2]					
Pacific countries	2,094	1,558	3,652	57.3	42.7
New Zealand	3,348	843	4,191	79.9	20.1
Australia	312	1,868	2,180	14.3	85.7
Other countries[1]	789	90	879	89.8	10.2
Total	**6,543**	**4,359**	**10,902**	**60**	**40**

Source: Unpublished census data, Australia and NZ

Table 19: Pacific-born trans-Tasman migrants, July 2001 to June 2006

Subregion and country of birth	PLT			Total		
	Arrival	Departure	Gain/loss	Arrival	Departure	Gain/loss
Melanesia	560	1327	-767	38951	37826	1125
Fiji	452	1199	-747	32248	31348	900
New Caledonia	7	10	-3	512	347	165
PNG	84	98	-14	5486	5738	-252
Solomon Islands	14	12	2	390	197	193
Vanuatu	3	8	-5	315	196	119
Micronesia	9	20	-11	484	387	97
Federated States (FSM)	0	1	-1	17	1	16
Guam	0	0	0	77	23	54
Kiribati	3	11	-8	200	273	-73
Marshall Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nauru	5	7	-2	157	89	68
Nthern Mariana Islands	0	1	-1	16	1	15
Palau	1	0	1	17	0	17
Polynesia	1199	3681	-2482	47951	50789	-2838
American Samoa	2	40	-38	422	433	-11
Cook Islands	216	581	-365	9623	9178	445
French Polynesia	9	15	-6	416	322	94

Niue	45	179	-134	1512	1689	-177
Pitcairn	0	0	0	44	56	-12
Samoa	739	2452	-1713	25011	27482	-2471
Tokelau	18	67	-49	367	530	-163
Tonga	164	335	-171	10419	10963	-544
Tuvalu	6	12	-6	113	108	5
Wallis and Futuna	0	0	0	24	28	-4
Pacific	1768	5028	-3260	87386	89002	-1616

Source: Unpublished arrival and departure statistics, Australia and NZ

The main point to take from the data above is that flows between the two countries are complex—the often cited expression 'exodus' of New Zealand residents to Australia does not do them justice. Pacific societies, which have major population concentrations in the islands as well as New Zealand, Australia and the United States, are linked through complex overlapping circuits of people, money, goods and information. These are best viewed as interconnected trans-national societies rather than as separate populations of Pacific peoples. The dynamics of population movement between the islands and Australia and New Zealand are very much affected by these interconnections.

The importance of the Australian connection in the PLT arrivals and departures of Pacific-born migrants between July 2001 and June 2006 varied considerably by country of birth. Not surprisingly, trans-Tasman PLT arrivals and departures accounted for much higher proportions of those Pacific-born people who were New Zealand citizens by right (Cook Islanders, Niueans or Tokelauans) or who had special arrangements for access to New Zealand citizenship, such as the Samoan Quota (Table 20).

Table 20: Trans-Tasman share of all Pacific-born PLT migrants entering and leaving New Zealand, July 2001 to June 2006

Subregion and country of birth	Arrivals			Departures		
	PLT-TT	PLT-Tot	% TT	PLT-TT	PLT-Tot	% TT
Melanesia	560	13478	4.2	1327	3623	36.6
Fiji	452	12265	3.7	1199	2716	44.1
New Caledonia	7	138	5.1	10	62	16.1
Papua New Guinea	84	565	14.9	98	421	23.3
Solomon Islands	14	366	3.8	12	312	3.8
Vanuatu	3	144	2.1	8	112	7.1
Micronesia	9	244	3.7	20	204	9.8
Federated States (FSM)	0	8	0	1	9	11.1
Guam	0	5	0	0	1	0
Kiribati	3	173	1.7	11	158	7
Marshall Islands	0	13	0	0	1	0
Nauru	5	33	15.2	7	31	22.6
Nthern Mariana Islands	0	4	0	1	1	100
Palau	1	8	12.5	0	3	0
Polynesia	1199	12738	9.4	3681	8280	44.5
American Samoa	2	176	1.1	40	161	24.8
Cook Islands	216	1379	15.7	581	1302	44.6
French Polynesia	9	189	4.8	15	73	20.5
Niue	45	291	15.5	179	327	54.7
Pitcairn	0	2	0	0	5	0
Samoa	739	7007	10.5	2452	4634	52.9
Tokelau	18	230	7.8	67	170	39.4
Tonga	164	3338	4.9	335	1457	23
Tuvalu	6	120	5	12	148	8.1
Wallis and Futuna	0	6	0	0	3	0
Pacific	1768	26460	6.7	5028	12,107	41.5

Source: Bedford (2008: 154)

The number of departures with Australia as their country of next permanent residence who were born in countries such as Niue (55 percent), Samoa (53 percent), Cook Islands (45 percent), Fiji (44 percent), Tokelau (39 percent) is relatively high. This shows clearly that return migration to the islands cannot automatically be assumed from the statistics on Pacific-born leaving New Zealand for 12 months or more. Indeed, 42 percent of all Pacific-born PLT departures from New Zealand moved across the Tasman rather than to the islands or other destinations between I July 2002 and 30 June 2006 (Table 20).

Migrants born in the Pacific who are entering and leaving Australia and New Zealand are not just moving between the islands and each of these countries.

There is also a sizeable exchange of Pacific labour across the Tasman, especially from New Zealand to Australia, as well as movement between important nodes in the diaspora such as the United States and Canada.

4.4 North American and European Pacific diaspora

The history of migration from the Pacific to USA dates back to the sealing and whaling era of the early 19th century. This expanded further after the changes in US immigration policy in the mid-1960s, when restrictions on migration from the Asia-Pacific region were removed. Historically, most Pacific migrants to USA have come from Polynesia—usually via American Samoa, which is an unincorporated US territory. Since The Second World War, they have also come from the UN-mandated territories in Micronesia that were under American administration. Most of these early migrants settled in Hawaii and in cities along the US west coast, especially Los Angeles. A comprehensive history of the links between Pacific peoples and USA can be found in Crocombe (1995).

Between 1998 and 2007 around 22,000 Pacific Islanders obtained legal permanent residence in the United States (Table 21). The more recent flows of legal immigrants from the Pacific have been dominated by Fiji-born people. Almost three quarters of those admitted for permanent residence in the decade ending 2007 had were Fiji Indians or Fijians fleeing the civilian and military coups of 2000 and 2006 respectively.

Tongans, rather than Samoans, have been the second largest Pacific immigrant group in recent years. This reflects both the strong links the Church of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons) has with Tongan communities, as well as a tendency for many Samoan immigrants to enter USA via American Samoa. As noted earlier, American Samoans have residence rights and citizenship in USA, and a common route to America from neighbouring Samoa is via kinship connections with their aiga (extended families) in American Samoa.

Numbers entering USA as legal permanent migrants from states of Micronesia are small, because rights of residence extend to the indigenous populations of these island groups as part of their Compacts of Free Association negotiated when the US Trust Territory administration was terminated.

Table 21: Pacific-born who gained residence status in the USA, 1998-2007

Country of Birth	Number
American Samoa	158
Fiji	15,321
French Polynesia	174
Kiribati	35
Marshall Islands	248
Federated States of Micronesia	49
Palau	63
Papua New Guinea	255
Samoa	1,870
Solomon Islands	55
Tonga	3,176
US Virgin Islands	58
Total	21,459

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

By 2000 the Pacific ancestry population in the United States totalled more than 200,000—approaching the size of New Zealand's population that identified with Pacific ethnic groups. Samoans were by far the largest group, followed by Tongans and Micronesians from the northern Pacific, notwithstanding the recent domination of Fiji Indians and Fijians in the legal permanent-residence flows. By far the most Pacific peoples in USA live in Hawai'i and in the west coast cities of California, and they move extensively between these cities and their island homelands.

Canada is a much less important destination for Pacific migrants than the United States, Australia or New Zealand but, as Table 22 shows, immigration from Fiji has been significant in recent years, again linked with the military coups since the mid-1980s. In 2006, just under 97 percent of the 25,475 of the Pacific-born in Canada were from Fiji, and most were Fiji Indians joining Canada's sizeable Indian population that had its origins in the late 19th century. Canada is an important part of the Fiji Indian diaspora, which has expanded massively in the last two decades.

Table 22: Canada: Pacific-born population, 2001 and 2006

Country of birth	2001	2006	% annual growth
American Samoa	–	10	na
Fiji	22,770	24,575	1.5
French Polynesia	145	105	-6.3
Guam	60	35	-10.2
Micronesia	–	50	na
Nauru	–	20	na
New Caledonia	115	115	0
Palau	–	20	na
Papua New Guinea	300	300	0
Samoa	65	95	7.9
Solomon Islands	–	30	na
Tonga	105	80	-5.3
Tuvalu	–	10	na
Vanuatu	–	10	na
Total Pacific	23,560	25,475	1.6

Source: Statistics Canada (?)

Although Australia, New Zealand and the United States are clearly key destinations for Pacific migrants, Pacific-born populations are also found in some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, France and Germany. However, these are very small birthplace populations compared with those in countries on the Pacific Rim. Only the UK had more than 10,000 Pacific-born residents in 2000, and France (1,056) was the only continental European country with a Pacific-born population of more than one thousand, according to OECD estimates.

The UK's Pacific-born population is mainly from its former colonies in Melanesia (Fiji, Solomons and Vanuatu), as well as Papua New Guinea and, to a lesser extent, Kiribati. Germany's Pacific-born are mainly from Samoa, which was a German colony until 1918. France's Pacific-born come mainly from its colonies French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna, as well as from the Republic of Vanuatu, which was jointly administered until 1981 by France and Britain.

A feature of Pacific emigration in recent years has been its diversification from the traditional destinations of New Zealand, Australia and the United States. New destinations include Japan and the Gulf states of the Middle East (Voigt-Graf 2007: 151). Thousands of Fijians have been involved in UN peace-keeping missions and working for private security firms in global trouble spots (Voigt-Graf 2007). Some of these movements are laying the foundations for further small nodes in the wider diaspora networks which are helping to transform Pacific societies and economies.

From a development perspective, of development, the size of the diaspora of Pacific Island communities living outside their country of origin is important. The diaspora is the main base for generating and sending remittances back to origin countries, as well as helping island-based development in other ways. Diasporas serve as anchors for future generations of migrants since they supply information and aid to their kin at the destination.

Figure 6 indicates the sizes of the emigrant stocks living outside selected Pacific countries. As a result of emigration out of Fiji since the 1980s coups in the 1980s, this country has the largest diaspora. However, Samoa, Tonga and Papua New Guinea also have significant numbers

In terms of proportions of population resident overseas, Samoa (54.6 percent) and Tonga (50 percent) lead Fiji (17.5 percent), but Papua New Guinea's ranking is well down (0.9 percent) (Ratha and Xu 2008).

Figure 6: Emigrant stocks in 2005, selected Pacific countries and Timor Leste



Source: Ratha and Xu (2008)

The diasporas help emigrants to gain temporary entry for their kin, especially those wishing to build up capital for investment in village-based activities back in the islands. At he same time, this provides the necessary guarantees of support for kin wishing to spend time working or studying on temporary permits in New Zealand or Australia. Most Pacific citizens who spend time in these two countries on temporary visas return when their visas expire. Only a small proportion stay on illegally, often encouraged by members of the diaspora, who help them find jobs or avoid detection by immigration authorities.

The Department of Immigration and Citizenship estimated that the total number of overstayers in Australia was around 48,500 in the year ended June 2008 (Table 23). The four major sources of Pacific overstayers in Australia – Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Papua New Guinea – accounted for around 2,100 of these, less than 5 percent. Pacific countries were well down in the ranking of overstayers in Australia despite the sizeable temporary flows of Pacific-born people in and out of the country each year. New Zealand's overstayers in October 2010 numbered 15,614 according to Moses (2011: 1), and the main Pacific contributors were Tonga, Samoa and Fiji.

Table 23: Estimated number of overstayers, Australia 2008

Country	2008		2007
Total	**48,456**		**46,543**
Fiji	989	(14th)	1,008
Tonga	622	(19th)	640
Samoa	272	(34th)	287
PNG	230	(35th)	253

Source: DIAC (2009: 149)

Much of the mobility between the Pacific and Australia/New Zealand is inherently circular. For example, in 2001–06, 28,600 Pacific people who were not Australian citizens moved to Australia permanently or long term and 14,600 moved in the opposite direction. Over the same period, New Zealand recorded 26,500 Pacific-born permanent and long-term arrivals compared with 12,100 departures. Clearly a big share of this reciprocal movement is return migration. However, many New Zealand departures head to Australia rather than back to the islands.

There are not many detailed studies of return migration in the Pacific. Maron and Connell (2008), who studied return to a village in Tonga, describe this as a diverse and complex process. The growth of communities of Pacific Islanders in both New Zealand and Australia has generated a high level of short-term visiting. A detailed analysis of 36,585 Pacific Island settlers arriving in New Zealand between 1998 and 2004 (Shorland 2006) found that almost two thirds had since revisited their homeland. The challenge is how best to capture the skills, capital and experience of the returning to benefit the local economy long term.

4.5 Temporary forms of movement: access to work

Permanent settlement is clearly only one part of the complex movement of people between Australia/New Zealand and the Pacific island nations. Both destination countries have temporary worker programmes attracting higher-skilled migrants, which counts out most Pacific Islanders. In Australia the '457 visa programme', for temporary work visas, has grown rapidly. In the year to June 2008, it had granted entry to 134,228 people from all countries—an increase of 29 percent over the previous year. Only 1.6 percent of workers were from the Pacific, mostly Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

In New Zealand the flows of islanders on general work permits—as distinct from the visa for seasonal workers in horticulture and viticulture—are very small. Fiji has been the main source of Pacific migrants on temporary work permits in New Zealand, followed by Tonga and Samoa (Table 24).

Table 24: Transitions to residence from work permits (WP), NZ 1997–2005

Subregion and country of citizenship	1st time WP approvals 1997–05	Transition to residence by June 2005	% transition to residence by June 2005
Melanesia	7925	3890	49.1
Fiji	7256	3768	51.9
New Caledonia	19	7	36.8
Papua New Guinea	410	37	9.0
Solomon Islands	174	51	29.3
Vanuatu	66	27	40.9
Micronesia	388	104	26.8
Federated States (FSM)	1	1	100
Guam	0	0	0
Kiribati	360	93	25.8
Marshall Islands	0	0	0
Nauru	24	10	41.7
Nthern Mariana Islands	0	0	0
Palau	3	0	0
Polynesia	7577	4805	63.4
American Samoa	17	5	29.4
French Polynesia	23	8	34.5
Pitcairn	0	0	0
Samoa	3200	2028	63.4
Tonga	3805	2479	65.2
Tuvalu	531	285	53.6
Wallis and Futuna	1	0	0
Pacific	15890	8799	55.4

Source: Bedford (2008: 162)

Many Pacific migrants in New Zealand have shifted from from temporary work permits to residence. Table 24 details the total number of Pacific island citizens granted temporary work permits between July 1997 and June 2005, and the numbers who later transitioned to residence via the skilled migrant, family sponsorship or international streams. Over half the people granted temporary work permits during this period had gained residency by June 2005, and rates were especially high (more than 60 percent) for citizens of Samoa and Tonga (Table 24).

Citizens of Fiji and Tuvalu also had transition rates of more than 50 percent. The lowest rate for citizens of a country where more than 100 work permits had been granted was Papua New Guinea (only 9 percent out of 410 temporary workers). This is probably due as much to the very small PNG population in New Zealand (only 1,329 in 2006, see Table 15) as to any problems these workers had with the residence transition process. Most Pacific temporary workers shifting to residence between 1997 and 2005 did so through the family sponsorship and international/humanitarian streams, and having kin already resident in New Zealand (Bedford, 2008).

While skilled Pacific Island workers have some options for moving to Australia and New Zealand on temporary visas and then gaining residence, opportunities for work-related migration opportunities for the low-skilled remain very limited.

The World Bank, in its report on Pacific labour migration, argued:

> *If migration is to be used as an instrument to foster greater regional stability and achieve pro poor outcomes (in the Pacific), migration options need to be extended beyond the skilled and elite to the poor and unskilled who are unlikely to find such opportunities domestically. Evidence from other parts of the world where international mobility for unskilled labour exists points to its positive impact in improving social equity in sending countries, reducing social tensions, and creating a larger consistency for economic growth and governance reform.*
> World Bank (2006b, ix)

A major development in recent years has been the migration programmes for seasonal agricultural worker that are outside existing arrangements for temporary migration of skilled labour. In October 2006 New Zealand's Prime Minister announced at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Fiji that a scheme would be trialled to help local horticulture and viticulture employers attract immigrant seasonal workers on secure contracts. The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme was formally launched in April 2007. It prioritises recruitment of seasonal workers from the Pacific to help with planting, maintaining, harvesting and packing crops where no New Zealand workers are available.

The RSE policy is geared toward forum member states: Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa and Vanuatu. Employers can recruit from other countries only if the RSE administration unit can be convinced that the employer has made a reasonable attempt to recruit from the Pacific.
RSE employees can stay in New Zealand for up to seven months at a time (or nine if they are from Kiribati and Tuvalu) and can return in consecutive seasons. Employers are encouraged to build long-term relationships with migrant workers and have access to a range of training programmes. They are obliged to pay half of the travel costs, pay for an average of at least 30 hours' work a week, provide pastoral care and contribute to the costs of locating workers who fail to return home.

Between April 2007 and December 2010, more than 21,300 contracts for seasonal work under the RSE scheme had been taken up. The number of contracts does not equate to numbers of workers, because some workers had more than one contract in a given season, and many workers have returned to New Zealand in two or more seasons. The number of individual workers is probably closer to 15,000—around half the 30,200 places on the scheme that were actually approved during the four seasons between April 2007 and October 2010.

The numbers approved for recruitment under the scheme have always been much larger than those actually recruited, especially in 2007 and 2008 (Table 25). Of the 10,139 contracts approved between the start of the scheme in April 2007 and 11 October 2008, only 5,665 were actually signed with workers who came to New Zealand—the equivalent of 56 percent of those approved. By 2010, however, 20,401 of the 29,261 contracts approved had been allocated to workers who arrived in New Zealand—equivalent to 70 percent of the approved contracts (Table 25).

When the scheme was launched in April 2007 the Labour Government had allocated 5,000 places a year for overseas seasonal workers. During 2008 this was lifted to 8,000 places and the National-led Government that came into power in November of that year has retained this upper limit on work contracts for employers approved to recruit workers under the RSE work policy (Ramasamy et al 2008).

In no year has the number actually recruited exceeded the annual target (Table 25—see totals for periods, not cumulative totals). During 2007 and 2008 numbers increased rapidly, but the global recession slowed this recruiting momentum. Unemployment has risen in New Zealand since then. Between the October year-ends for 2009 and 2010 the number of workers contracted for employment dropped markedly—equivalent to just under 13 percent of the number signed on in the year beginning 12 October 2008 (Table 25).

Table 25: ATR applications and recruitment, April 2007 to October 2010

Period	Numbers of contracts and ATRs		
	Approved	Recruited[1]	No ATRs[2]
a) Cumulative totals from ATR reports			
April 2007 to 17 Nov 2007	3260	704	83
April 2007 to 11 Oct 2008	10139	5665	367
April 2007 to 31 Oct 2009	20192	13537	796
April 2007 to 31 Oct 2010	29261	20401	1162
b) Totals for periods			
1. April 2007 to 17 Nov 2007	3260	704	83
2. 18 Nov 2007 to 11 Oct 2008	6879	4961	284
3. 12 Oct 2008 to 31 Oct 2009	10053	7872	429
4. 1 Nov 2009 to 31 Oct 2010	9069	6864	366
Total April 2007-31 Oct 2010	**29261**	**20401**	**1162**
c) Numerical change between periods			
Change period 1–2	3619	4257	201
Change period 2–3	3174	2911	145
Change period 3–4	-984	-1008	-63
d) Percentage change between periods			
% change period 1–2	111	604.7	242.2
% change period 2–3	46.1	58.7	51.1
% change period 3–4	-9.8	-12.8	-14.7

Source: Department of Labour (RSE Unit), unpublished statistics

[1] Strictly speaking, the numbers refer to contracts or permits approved rather than workers—some workers could have more than one contract in a given season.

[2] ATR (Application to Recruit) is the employer's request for permission to recruit workers under the RSE scheme

Despite the reduced availability of jobs for overseas seasonal workers under the RSE scheme during 2009/10, the industries concerned have continued to recruit many islanders. Between 12 October 2008 and 31 October 2009 they signed 6,121 contracts with Pacific workers, compared with 4,557 from April 2007 to 11 October 2008 (Table 26) and 5,223 from 1 November 2009 to 31 October 2010.

The major Pacific suppliers of labour for the RSE between April 2007 and October 2010 were Vanuatu (7,235), Tonga (3,817), Samoa (3,441), Solomons (1,899), Tuvalu (279) and Kiribati (230) (Table 26). The two countries that dipped the most between the 2008/09 and 2009/10 seasons were Tonga and Samoa.

Kiribati and Tuvalu gained more signed contracts after the Department of Labour introduced its Strengthening Partnerships Programme in 2009, to help these two

countries to engage more effectively with the RSE (see Bedford CE et al 2010 for a review of the operation of the RSE scheme in Tuvalu).

In 2008 Australia announced a seasonal-work pilot programme for four Pacific countries: Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tonga. The Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) was similar in concept to New Zealand's RSE scheme, but it differs quite markedly in how it is organised and the guarantees for income while workers are in Australia. The scheme has struggled to get traction with the labour hire companies responsible for recruiting workers for Australia and managing their pastoral care. In the first two years of operation, seasonal workers attained fewer than 150 of the 2,500 permits allocated to the pilot.

The biggest group came from Tonga (around 100 during 2009 and 2010). Kiribati had 11 in 2010 and Vanuatu six in 2009. The pilot completed its arrangements for recruiting from Papua New Guinea in 2010 and began actual recruitment there in 2011—seven workers had begun by July of that year. At the forum meeting in September 2011, the Prime Minister of Australia announced that the pilot scheme was being extended to include Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. This suggests an extension of the scheme beyond the three-year pilot is highly likely.

Table 26: Number of RSE contracts signed, April 2007 to October 2010

Countries	Recruitment contracts[1]				% change	
	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	Total	2008–09	2009–10
Pacific						
Kiribati	70	50	110	230	-28.6	120.0
Samoa	931	1376	1134	3441	47.8	-17.6
Solomons	303	340	256	899	12.2	-24.7
Tonga	1106	1529	1182	3817	38.2	-22.7
Tuvalu	154	49	76	279	-68.2	55.1
Vanuatu	1993	2777	2465	7235	39.3	-11.2
Total Pacific	**4557**	**6121**	**5223**	**15901**	**34.3**	**-14.7**
Asia						
India	82	67	28	177	-18.3	-58.2
Indonesia	311	375	330	1016	20.6	-12.0
Malaysia	364	404	407	1175	11	0.7
Philippines	80	75	75	230	-6.3	0
Taiwan	0	39	31	70	–	-20.5
Thailand	269	787	768	1824	192.6	-2.4
Vietnam	1	0	0	1	-100	–
Japan	0	0	2	2	–	–
Total Asia	**1107**	**1747**	**1641**	**4495**	**57.8**	**-6.1**
Others						
Brazil	0	3	0	3	–	–
Czech Republic	1	0	0	1	–	–
USA	0	1	0	1	–	–
Total others	**1**	**4**	**0**	**5**	–	–
Total	**5665**	**7872**	**6864**	**20401**	**39**	**-12.8**

[1] The numbers refer to individual contracts signed for workers who were recruited.
The three periods are:
2007/08: April 2007 to 11 October 2008. (No data on country of origin was included in the monthly ATR summaries until September 2008. The cumulative total to that date was available in the September 2008 ATR.)
2008/09: 12 October 2008 to 31 October 2009
2009/10: 1 November 2009 to 31 October 2010

Source: Department of Labour (RSE Unit), unpublished statistics

In both Australia and New Zealand, the Pacific seasonal-work initiatives represent a significant departure from established migration policy, not least because they consider how such migration affects development in the origin communities. The RSE scheme and the PSWPS both apply best-practice lessons on development for the source communities. The RSE scheme was extensively analysed after its first two years of operation (Evalue Research), and the conclusion relating to development impacts was generally very positive. They reviewers observed:

> *Pacific governments welcome the opportunity for their young people and unwaged citizens to earn an income In New Zealand. That is of direct benefit to the workers' families and communities at home. At a national level, Pacific states have the opportunity to leverage off the RSE Policy to strengthen their economy and work towards economic development goals. Although the Pacific economic-development goal may be a secondary aim for the New Zealand Government, the policy is extremely important for Pacific states.*
> (Evalue Research, 2010: 72)

Research by a team of economists from the University of Waikato and the World Bank has reinforced this positive assessment of how the RSE and PSWPS will initially help the islands (see, for example, Gibson and McKenzie 2008, 2010 and 2011; Gibson et al 2008; McKenzie et al 2008; Rohorua et al 2009). However, these authors do stress that it is still early days, and some of the social impacts of workers being away from their families back home for long periods were just beginning to surface after two to three years (see CE Bedford et al 2009).

Pressure for access to temporary work opportunities in New Zealand and Australia has intensified since the RSE and PSWPS were introduced. In New Zealand the dairy and meat-processing industries have asked the Department of Labour to extend the RSE provisions to their primary sector operations. And the post-earthquake reconstruction of Christchurch could also provide opportunities for major temporary work.

The challenge in all of these approaches is how to show a clear demand for seasonal labour—if the temporary work permits are to apply only to employment defined as unable to meet the local labour supply. In addition to the pressure from employers in New Zealand for greater access to short-term temporary labour, island governments are keen to gain for more opportunities for their working-age populations to access temporary work in New Zealand. Samoa, for example, is applying pressure for work that matches its workers' skills and can ultimately help enhance these skills in the workforce back in Samoa.

During the 2000s, the number of temporary work permits and visas issued to Pacific citizens seeking short-term work in New Zealand soared (Table 27). The countries which have participated in the RSE scheme, especially Vanuatu and the Solomons, stand out most prominently.

Table 27: Approvals for temporary work, 2002–06 and 2007–11

Sub-region and country of citizenship[1]	Work visas/permits 2002–06	2007–11	Percentage change
Melanesia	17,188	53,907	213.6
Fiji	16,215	42,295	160.8
New Caledonia	2	5	150.0
Papua New Guinea	470	483	2.8
Solomon Islands	338	1,699	402.7
Vanuatu	163	9,425	5682.2
Micronesia	687	1632	137.6
Federated States (FSM)	10	7	-30.0
Guam	0	0	0.0
Kiribati	618	1,409	128.0
Marshall Islands	3	9	200.0
Nauru	51	203	298.0
Northern Mariana Islands	0	0	0.0
Palau	5	4	-20.0
Polynesia	9,636	27,519	185.6
American Samoa	26	33	26.9
French Polynesia	18	20	11.1
Pitcairn	0	0	0.0
Samoa	4,258	12,806	200.8
Tonga	4,560	13,567	197.5
Tuvalu	774	1,093	41.2
Wallis and Futuna	0	0	0.0
Pacific	**27,511**	**83,058**	**201.9**

[1] Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau are excluded, as their populations have New Zealand citizenship. Note that numbers from the French territories (New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna) are very low—many from these countries enter as French citizens. This also applies in American Samoa and Guam, as part of the United States.

Source: Department of Labour, www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/generalinformation/statistics

Also significant is the rise in work permits issued to Fiji citizens between July 2006 and June 2011—a response to the military coup in December 2006. It suggests that people were seeking a route to longer-term residence through temporary work in the first instance.

No doubt demand for places in schemes such as the RSE and PSWPS will continue to grow in the islands. Only a few island countries are involved in the schemes to date, but demand is growing demand in all participating countries for more seasonal work opportunities in New Zealand and Australia. Fuelling this demand is the persistent shortage of wage-earning opportunities in the islands and the rapid growth of the youthful workforce, especially in those countries with few outlets for migration overseas.

4.6 Temporary forms of movement: students and visitors

Employment is only one reason Pacific peoples have been seeking access to temporary or long-term residence in New Zealand and Australia. One of the earliest drivers of migration from Samoa and Tonga to New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s was access to secondary and tertiary education (see for example Macpherson et al 2000). In the islands at that time, competition for places in the best secondary schools in the islands was rigorous and no university existed. Macpherson et al observed, with reference to Samoans:

> *For many, especially village Samoans, migration offered two principal sets of advantages: higher, safer incomes and free, universal education to university level. For many young parents and prospective parents, the second possibility was very important and assured them that their children would have opportunities they themselves had not enjoyed.*
> Macpherson et al (2000: 65)

One major reason Pacific Islanders give for participating in the seasonal work schemes in Australia and New Zealand is the need to earning money to pay school fees back in the islands or cover the costs of education offshore. Education remains a priority, especially in Polynesia with its well-established tradition of participation in primary and secondary schooling.

Participation in primary and secondary education has deteriorated in several Pacific countries since they gained independence, largely because of the costs of maintaining schools and their staff. This is especially so in outer islands and more remote communities. At the forum meeting in Auckland in 2011, the New Zealand and Australian Prime Ministers, John Key and Julia Gillard, reaffirmed their commitment to improving education in the region, where an estimated one million school-aged children did not attend school (Key, 2011a).

The governments hoped to ensure that 500,000 more children in the Pacific would be enrolled in school and 75 percent of all children in the region would be able to read by age 10 by 2021. They agreed that additional investment in improving literacy and numeracy, better benchmarking of education systems and enhanced education management information systems were the answer.

Australia and New Zealand are already investing heavily in developing education in the islands. In the Solomon Islands, for example, NZAID has supported a major curriculum-enhancement programme for many years involving researchers and education specialists from the University of Waikato.

In Kiribati, AusAID has been funding a very extensive overhaul of teacher training and education management in partnership with the local Ministry of Education. Both trans-Tasman countries continue to provide financial support for the University of the South Pacific, the premier regional tertiary institution in the region. But their key challenge has been to ensure the provision of primary and secondary education throughout the countries at a cost that local villages and town-dwellers can afford.

Free education beyond elementary primary school is not available in most countries in the region, and much of the senior primary and secondary education has been provided by different churches or local community groups. Recently the governments of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea moved to fund free primary education for all children, in a major policy shift. The New Zealand and Australian governments also announced in 2010 that they were raising the numbers of funded scholarships for graduates to study in their tertiary institutions.

The numbers of permits and visas issued to Pacific-origin students for study in New Zealand between July 2001 and June 2011 are shown in Table 28. Numbers of permits/visas issued have grown most for Fiji citizens. These more than doubled in the second half of the decade, partly in response to the unsettled political situation and the challenges the Interim Fiji Government has faced in holding teachers and funding its education provision.

Numbers from Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati and Vanuatu—all kick-start states in the RSE scheme—have also shown impressive growth. A surprising counter-trend showed up in Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands, where numbers of permits for study actually fell in the late 2000s compared with those issued during the early part of the decade.

Table 28: Approvals for study, Pacific students, 2002–06 and 2007–11

Sub-region and country of citizenship	Study visas/permits 2002–06	2007–11	% change
Melanesia	**10,522**	**20,665**	**96.4**
Fiji	8,696	18,927	117.7
New Caledonia	13	8	-38.5
Papua New Guinea	772	794	2.8
Solomon Islands	800	602	-24.8
Vanuatu	241	334	38.6
Micronesia	**654**	**688**	**5.2**
Federated States (FSM)	22	6	-72.7
Guam	0	0	0.0
Kiribati	442	626	41.6
Marshall Islands	29	25	-13.8
Nauru	148	24	-83.8
Northern Mariana Islands	0	0	0.0
Palau	13	7	-46.2
Polynesia	**3,954**	**6,270**	**58.6**
American Samoa	55	68	23.6
French Polynesia	17	21	23.5
Pitcairn	0	0	0.0
Samoa	1,486	2,772	86.5
Tonga	1,853	2,932	58.2
Tuvalu	543	477	-12.2
Wallis and Futuna	0	0	0.0
Pacific	**15,130**	**27,623**	**82.6**

Source: Department of Labour
www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/

As with temporary work, study visas/permits can often be a route, via temporary work, towards more permanent residence in New Zealand (and Australia). Table 29 contains details of the numbers of Pacific students issued a permit to study in New Zealand at some stage between July 1997 and June 2005 and who went on to seek a work permit or to seek approval for residence in New Zealand. In total just over 9,000 Pacific students were issued permits to study during the period. This number is smaller than the data for total number of permits issued shown in Table 27, because some students would have had multiple permits enabling them to return for several years to study and each permit is valid just for the immediate period of study.

The Pacific students comprised just over 4 percent of all students issued with permits to study in New Zealand during the period. Higher shares of Pacific

students transitioned to temporary work (6.3 percent of the total) and residence (10 percent of the total) than those with study permits. The inference is that this is a significant route to work and residence, especially for Fiji citizens (Table 29).

Table 29: Transitions from study to work and residence, Pacific students, 1997–2005

Country	1st time SP approvals 1997–05	Transition to work by June 05	Transition to residence by June 05	Transition to work %	Transition to residence %
Melanesia					
New Caledonia	18	0	1	0	5.6
Papua New Guinea	639	32	27	5.0	4.2
Solomon Islands	643	66	46	10.3	7.2
Vanuatu	310	22	15	7.1	4.8
Fiji	3937	566	1569	14.4	39.9
Total Melanesia	**5547**	**686**	**1658**	**12.4**	**29.9**
Micronesia					
FSM	34	0	0	0	0
Guam	0	0	0	0	0
Kiribati	318	18	63	5.7	19.8
Marshall Islands	29	1	1	3.4	3.4
Nthern Mariana Is.	0	0	0	0	0
Nauru	83	9	22	10.8	26.5
Palau	14	0	0	0	0
Total Micronesia	**478**	**28**	**86**	**5.9**	**18.0**
Polynesia					
American Samoa	44	1	29	2.3	65.9
French Polynesia	27	2	1	7.4	3.7
Pitcairn	1	0	0	0	0
Tonga	1419	138	613	9.7	43.2
Tuvalu	367	16	117	4.4	31.9
Wallis and Futuna	1	0	0	0	0
Samoa	1127	109	391	9.7	34.7
Total Polynesia	**2986**	**266**	**1151**	**8.9**	**38.5**
Total Pacific	**9011**	**980**	**2895**	**10.9**	**32.1**
Total all countries	**221718**	**15675**	**28853**	**7.1**	**13.0**
% Pacific	**4.1**	**6.3**	**10.0**		

Note: SP refers to a permit or visa to study in New Zealand. The numbers shown here are for clients from Pacific countries who had their first student visa or permit approved.

Source: Bedford (2008: 166)

Increasing provision of scholarships for Pacific students in Australia and New Zealand will be accompanied longer term by increasing pressure for work and

residence. This will become marked once the students have completed any bonds for service back in the islands that were a scholarship condition.

A better educated local population will also have greater aspirations for work outside village agriculture. This has certainly been the experience of Polynesia for the past 50 years and will become increasingly so in Melanesia over the next 50 years. Fostering this pressure for opportunities to work and live in New Zealand and Australia is more widespread awareness of the lifestyles Pacific peoples enjoy in cities such as Brisbane, Sydney and Auckland. This awareness is enhanced by more intensive visitor flows as well as the rapid growth of social networking (via computers and cell phones) between communities in the islands and their kin overseas.

The short-term flows of Pacific citizens who have entered New Zealand on visitor visas during the 2000s are summarised in Table 30. Growth in numbers of visas issued has been greatest for the most distant countries—those in Micronesia (96 percent) followed by those in Melanesia (Table 30). In Polynesia the greatest increases have been in Tongan and Tuvaluan visitors. Overall the numbers of visitor visas issued to Pacific citizens in the late 2000s have grown more slowly than the numbers of visas/permits for study and temporary work. This partly reflects the GEC's effect on remittances from Australia and New Zealand back to the islands.

In Australia and New Zealand in the 21st century, we've had more censuses, more useful data from arrival/departure cards and visa approval databases, and increased flows of Pacific peoples from the islands. This mobility has affected the smaller Polynesian and Micronesian populations much more than the larger Melanesian populations, except for Fiji.

Table 30: Approvals to visit New Zealand, 2002–06 and 2007–11

Subregion and country of citizenship[1]	Visitor visas 2002–06	2007–11	Percentage change
Melanesia	72,655	101,141	39.2
Fiji	65,019	90,979	39.9
Papua New Guinea	3,096	4,149	34.0
Solomon Islands	1,852	2,500	35.0
Vanuatu	2,688	3,513	30.7
Micronesia	1811	3556	96.4
Federated States (FSM)	119	157	31.9
Kiribati	1,343	2,785	107.4
Marshall Islands	82	164	100.0
Nauru	162	331	104.3
Palau	105	119	13.3
Polynesia	98,900	127,984	29.4
American Samoa	158	177	12.0
French Polynesia	2,606	2,682	2.9
Samoa	59,322	67,201	13.3
Tonga	35,131	55,364	57.6
Tuvalu	1,683	2,560	52.1
Pacific	173,366	232,681	34.2

[1] Excluding citizens of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, Pitcairn Island, Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau because they travel on passports issued by France, the UK or New Zealand.

Source: Department of Labour, www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics

A critical issue for regional migration systems is how much recent experiences reveal possible trends in the medium and longer terms. Though we anticipate continuous flows in Pacific migration over the next decade or two, developments over the first decade of the 21st century lead us to believe the system is approaching a major watershed. Policy-makers and politicians addressing issues linked with international migration in Australia and New Zealand are aware of some of the changes. But how will they respond to an increasingly urbanised Pacific population in the future—especially when both governments are committed to helping this population become better educated and more skilled for work beyond the village?

5 CONCLUSION: MAJOR SHIFTS IN PACIFIC MIGRATION AHEAD

By the end of the 2000s, just over half of all visas/permits issued to Pacific citizens travelling to New Zealand had gone to people from Melanesia, mainly Fiji. Three of the six countries with percentage increases above the regional average of 51 percent were in Melanesia: Vanuatu, Fiji and Solomons. The other three were Kiribati, Marshall Islands (very small numbers) and Tonga (Table 31).

Table 31: Total visas/permits issued to Pacific citizens, New Zealand 2002-06 and 2007-11 (June years)

Subregion and country of citizenship	Total visas/permits 2002–06	2007–11	Percentage change
Melanesia	113776	191231	68.1
Fiji	103066	167452	62.5
New Caledonia	27	15	-44.4
Papua New Guinea	4445	5523	24.3
Solomon Islands	3105	4933	58.9
Vanuatu	3133	13308	324.8
Micronesia	3634	6562	80.6
Federated States (FSM)	155	171	10.3
Guam	0	0	0.0
Kiribati	2844	5481	92.7
Marshall Islands	115	201	74.8
Nauru	396	579	46.2
Northern Mariana Islands	0	0	0.0
Palau	124	130	4.8
Polynesia	130203	176355	35.4
American Samoa	321	326	1.6
French Polynesia	2648	2727	3.0
Pitcairn	0	0	0.0
Samoa	75451	92420	22.5
Tonga	48085	76123	58.3
Tuvalu	3698	4759	28.7
Wallis and Futuna	0	0	0.0
Pacific	247613	374148	51.1
% Melanesia	45.9	51.1	

Source: Department of Labour
www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/

Melanesian countries are even more prominent in the visa statistics for Australia, especially given the strong links it has with Papua New Guinea. Melanesia, especially Fiji, has always played a prominent role in the Pacific migration system. But the western Pacific has been much less prominent than the small island countries of the eastern Pacific in political and policy discourses about international flows between the islands and Australia/New Zealand.

In section 3.5 we outlined several forces for change in mobility patterns in the Pacific region. Four of these are likely determine the nature of flows among countries over the next two decades.

The first is the ongoing urbanisation of Pacific populations, and especially the accelerating urbanisation of Melanesians. This has been evident for some time to demographers working with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (see for example Haberkorn 2007/08) and has been the subject of considerable debate amongst social scientists since the 1970s (Connell and Lea 1994 and Connell 2009 and 2011 have reviewed much of the relevant literature). However, as we noted earlier, Melanesia's planners and politicians have tended to downplay the significance of urbanisation given the reality of rural residence for most of their population. This situation is changing quicker than many wish to acknowledge, and informal settlements on the peripheries of the main towns in Melanesia continue apace.

The second development likely to affect mobility within the region is the demand for skilled labour to help with expansion of Papua New Guinea's resource-extraction industries. Skilled labour has flowed into PNG from Europe, Australia, New Zealand and, more recently, countries in Asia. The PNG Prime Minister stated at the pre-forum meeting in Nadi that he favoured seeking more of this skilled labour from Melanesia, recognising the existing shortage of opportunities for such waged employment in the Pacific Islands. People have been migrating to PNG from other parts of Melanesia for many years, partly due to the development of universities in Port Moresby and Lae. But the flows are likely to burgeon in the future, especially if available labour with the skills needed in the resource-extraction industries increases.

The third development is the ongoing environmental deterioration in many of the small low-lying islands of the central and northern Pacific. This has become more marked as already crowded urban areas absorb increasing populations through natural increase as well as net migration. This in turn has severely compromised the availability of fresh water. And the frequent intrusion of sea water caused by higher tides and constant wave damage has continued to degrade the ground water.

These changes are also evident in the small island peripheries of countries such as the Cook Islands, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, as well as in some major urban areas. The numbers who relocate because of these environmental changes remain small at present, but are likely to increase if the quality and supply of fresh water continue to deteriorate.

Fiji's Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs made it clear at the intergovernmental conference on climate change in Copenhagen in 2009 that Fiji would consider taking 'climate change refugees from Tuvalu and Kiribati in the future' (Bedford and Bedford 2010: 90). This offer was made in part because of the historical ties associated with resettlement the Banabans (Ocean Islanders) from Rabi in Fiji in the 1940s, and the Vaitupuans (Vaitupu Island) from Tuvalu on Kioa Island in the 1950s and 1960s. He also noted that Fiji is 'the gateway to these two countries'—Air Pacific, operating out of Fiji, provides the most reliable direct flights to and from Kiribati and Tuvalu.

All of New Zealand's RSE workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu come via Fiji. With intra-Pacific mobility in response to environmental change, some of the larger island countries are likely to provide support for fellow Pacific Islanders from more vulnerable parts of the region.

The fourth development is the increased investment by Australia, New Zealand and the United States in education and economic development initiatives. This was signalled at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Auckland, partly as a counter to China's increased investment via soft loans in major infrastructure and resource development initiatives in the islands. Inevitably, improved education standards and levels of achievement will stimulate increased mobility within the islands as well as to countries on the Pacific Rim. Samoa and Tonga (in the eastern Pacific) especially have experienced this, and it could yet happen in the western Pacific as populations become more literate and numerate and begin to aspire for work and lifestyles not found in rural communities.

Local towns and cities will need to absorb most of the migrants from rural areas—this has been the experience in most countries. However, the populations of some small island states have privileged residence rights in another country (for example, Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau in New Zealand) or have lengthy histories of overseas migration (parts of the Caribbean, Tonga and Samoa). The more skilled and better educated migrants in local towns might qualify for entry into neighbouring metropolitan countries, and it is they who tend to seek residence overseas.

It may be difficult to forecast migration trends in the region with any certainty. But this assessment of several demographic trends show clearly that immigration authorities in Australia and New Zealand should anticipate many more applicants for temporary work/residence visas from the western and central Pacific over the next two decades, as well as ongoing immigration from the eastern Pacific.

5.1 Converting potential into prosperity: a proposal

In his opening speech to the Pacific Islands Forum (2011), New Zealand's Prime Minister, John Key, stated:

> *Our theme is converting potential into prosperity. That means focusing on our opportunities, coming up with practical ideas and taking action. This week will be about bringing together government leaders, business people and other stakeholders, and finding ways to work together to promote sustainable economic development. This is the central theme of the Pacific Plan, which leaders endorsed in 2005. It is also, I believe, the key to unlocking the unrealised potential of the Pacific.*
> Key, 2011b

He also identified four sectors that would be a focus of attention during the meeting as well as New Zealand's year of chairing the forum: tourism, energy, fisheries and education. He made no direct reference to urbanisation or the increasing numbers of educated young people who would be seeking jobs in towns. However, he did observe: 'We need to work harder to get kids into school in the Pacific region, and teach them the skills they need to succeed and contribute to the economy.'

Though tourism, energy, fisheries and education are all critical for the development of many Pacific countries, they are not likely to provide jobs to satisfy the demands of a growing workforce, especially in the Melanesian countries. The challenge for the forum's leaders, which Key identified in his opening statement, is 'to come up with new ideas and new ways of doing things—to be creative, innovative and open to new ways of approaching old problems'. He stressed that it was important to 'listen to new voices and explore new partnerships.

In the context of his pledge 'to help make our home—the Pacific region—an even better place to live, work and raise a family, New Zealand's Department of Labour and Australia's Department of Immigration and Citizenship might consider a different approach to assessing prospects for mobility in the Pacific.

The current report has focussed deliberately on some the contemporary and potential future drivers of international migration in the region, with particular reference to demographic trends and issues. Though it has not tried to forecast future levels of international migration, much of the discussion is couched in terms of trends that might be associated with forecasts of the growth and redistribution of island populations.

There are some of the 'more certain' mega-trends or long-term forces that influence everything at all levels of society (de Haas et al 2010). But there are also many uncertainties surrounding technological, economic, social, political and environmental change in the region. There is also uncertainty about the links between these areas of change and the demographic developments that are the focus of this report. A methodology is needed to explore these uncertainties.

The International Migration Institute (IMI) in the University of Oxford's Department of International Development is currently carrying out some innovative 'scenario-building' research on the futures of migration in North Africa and Europe. This has particular relevance to the analysis of futures for the Pacific migration system (International Migration Institute 2010a and b, and 2011a–d).

In concluding this assessment of prospects for migration in the Pacific, we recommend that the Department of Labour and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship consider sponsoring a workshop on the future of migration in the Pacific. The International Migration Institute's key research staff would be invited to present their scenario methodology and lay a foundation for a similar migration analysis in our region.

As the researchers note in their policy briefings:

> *Existing research on the future of international migration tends to focus on relative 'certainties', such as demographic change [as the present report does] and ignores key migration drivers, which are more difficult to predict. The very purpose of the scenario methodology is to expand current thinking about future developments by creating scenarios around key uncertainties. Scenario-building exercises identify which factors deserve the most attention when examining future migration patterns and trends and appropriate policy responses.*
> (IMI 2011c: 1)

In fact, the scenario-building method has similarities to the approach the Department of Labour adopted when exploring impediments to improving productivity in New Zealand's horticulture and viticulture industries in the early 2000s. This research on complex systems ultimately led to the development of the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) work policy (Whatman et al 2005; Whatman 2007; Hill et al 2007).

As the IMI points out:

> *One of the components of scenario methodology is the active involvement of stakeholders in migration such as entrepreneurs, policy-makers, community leaders, labour organisations, scholars, and migrants and their associations. IMI has engaged with these stakeholders by making them active contributors to the production of knowledge through interviews and participation in key events.*
> IMI (2010a: 1)

This approach that would enrich analysis of the context in which migration flows between countries plays out. This is a context not easily captured using conventional labels for different groups of countries ('north' and 'south'), different categories of mover (temporary, permanent, economic, humanitarian, high-skilled, low-skilled amongst others), or or different types of movement (linear, circular, rural-urban, or even internal and international). All these labels tend to encourage researchers to narrow their focus and vision when assessing the complex systems of migration flows.

The proposed workshop would involve the Global Migration Futures Project research team from the International Migration Institute as well as a wide range of interested public- and private-sector stakeholders from New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific. It would contribute significantly to the activities Prime Minister Key has in mind for New Zealand's year as chair of the Pacific Forum. It would certainly deliver 'new ideas and new ways of doing things' and demonstrate a willingness to 'be creative, innovative and open to new ways of approaching old problems'. Ultimately it might help to 'make our home—the Pacific region—an even better place to live, work and raise a family' (Key 2011b).

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