Budget 2022 Initiative Summary – Main Budget Process

Effectively engaging with iwi and managing risks in petroleum and mineral permitting

Section 1: Overview

Section 1A: Basic Initiative Information

Lead Minister	Energy and Resources.											
Department	Minis	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.										
What type of initiative is this?	Critical cost pressure Y initiative			Manifesto commitment initiative	Ν	Health and Disability System Reform initiative	Ν					
		ite Emergency onse Fund initiative	Ν	Savings initiative	Ν	Non-Spending initiative	Ν					
Initiative description [max 800 Characters]	Miner that th proce and e requir	al Estate Appropriation a ne regulator exercising fi sses and systems need nforcement activities un	and the unctions ed to un der the	increasing deficit in the associa and powers under the Crown M dertake iwi engagement, and m CMA. It will also implement the	ited me Mineral: naintain new pe	urces: Management of the Crow morandum account. It will ensur s Act 1991 (CMA) has the resou appropriate monitoring, complia stroleum decommissioning decommissioning as it has bee	re Irces, ance					
Is this a Cross-Vote initiative?	Ν	NA										
Department contact	Priv	Privacy of natural persons										
Treasury contact	Privacy of natural											

Section 1B: Total Funding Sought

Operating funding sought (\$m)		2021/22 Confidential adv	20	22/23	202	3/24	2024/	25 8	2025/26 coutyears		Total
Capital funding sought (\$m)	21/22	22/23 Confidential a	23/24 advice to Government	24/25	5 25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	Total

Section 1C: Initiative Classifications

Is this initiative seeking funding from the Climate Emergency Response Fund (CERF)?	Ν	-										
Is this initiative climate- related, but not seeking funding from the CERF?	Y	Among other things, this initiative enables the regulator to implement requirements introduced by the Crown Minerals (Decommissioning and Other Matters) Amendment Act (the Amendment Act) to mitigate the fiscal risks with maturing petroleum fields as we transition away from fossil fuels to a low emissions economy. The new requirements are intended to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field.										
Does this initiative align with the Crown's obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi?	Strong	Section 4 of the the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (the CMA) requires all persons exercising functions and powers under the the CMA to have regard to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. There are also a number of Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements that set expectations for how the Crown engages with iwi. This initiative will provide the regulator with the resources, processes and systems needed to improve and sustain how it engages with iwi under the CMA and related Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements.										
Specify if this initiative will help reduce child poverty and describe the impact.	No impact	-										
Does this initiative align with the Child and Youth Wellbeing Strategy?	Ν	-										
Does the initiative include funding to procure from NGOs?	Ν											
Does the initiative include funding to support digital and data related investments?	γ	 The initiative includes funding to support information management systems required for minerals and petroleum permit processing and information disclosure requirements under the CMA. The initiative aligns with the "All of Government 'Digital, data and ICT investment principles", in particular the "service delivery investment principle" and "information and data services investment" principles by building and extending on existing digital foundations and infrastructure. Parts of this initiative focusses on gaining insight from data. It also focusses on the efficiency and ease of regulated parties, iwi and the public to interact with the regulatory system by extending and integrating existing capability and platforms (rather than investing in new or replacement systems): service delivery investment principle and the use of open application programming interfaces (APIs) to expose business functions, rules and data to support improvements to customer facing services investment principle in the delivery of data and analytics for decision making and sharing of data; and digital foundations and infrastructure investment principle for a digital public service and preference for cloud-based infrastructure services. 										
Is this a regulatory or legislative initiative (according to the guidance provided)?	Y This initiative is reg	This initiative is directly required to address existing functional gaps under the CMA (e.g. iwi engagement under section 4 of the CMA, monitoring, compliance and enforcement activities) and new monitoring, compliance, and enforcement functions and powers introduced through the Amendment Act.										
	This initiative is required so that the regulator can address functional gaps to implement existing requirer under the CMA and implement new petroleum infrastructure decommissioning requirements through the Amendment Act and associated regulations.											
Is this a significant	N No. Does n	ot meet significant threshold of CO (19) 6										
investment initiative per the definition at section 4.8 of the Budget 2022	Data / Digita ICT	al / N Physical N Organisational N Specialised N Infrastructure Transformation Equipment										
guidance?												

Section	2:	Cost	pressure	information
---------	----	------	----------	-------------

Answers must not exceed 1-2 pa	ragraphs	s per section.											
Cost pressure driver	Y	Volume	Ν	Price	Ν	Personnel (driven by volume/price)							
Cost pressure description	appro	inergy and Resources: Man priation) is facing cost pres atory activities under the CI	ssures (due to a decline in third p	arty rev	enue and the addition of new							
	years exper differe FY20 balan declin has re deficit exploi	The appropriation is funded by a mix of Crown revenue and third-party revenue (fees). Fees declined in rece years (from \$5.75m in FY18 to \$4.91m in FY21) due to a decline in petroleum fees revenue. In FY21, total expenditure was \$19.1m, of which \$12.4m was Crown-funded and \$6.7m was funded from fees. The difference between third party fees collected and expenditure funded by third party fees (\$1.8 million in FY2021) is managed through a memorandum account. The memorandum account should trend to a \$nil balance over time as surpluses and deficits, caused by cost recovery timing differences, offset. However, declining revenues and increasing costs mean the memorandum account has been in deficit since 2014 and has remained in deficit despite a fees review in 2016. In FY21 the memorandum account balance was a \$3. deficit. This deficit will increase without additional funding, as the pool of fee payers (in particular petroleum exploration and mining permits) is likely to decrease, while the costs increase with the addition of new regulatory activities.											
	The a	ddition of new regulatory activ	ities is	primarily driven by:									
			blic Ser onships oprove h	vices Act 2020 explicitly rec with Māori under the Treat low it meets Treaty obligation	ognises y of Wai	the role of the public service to tangi. As a result, the regulator							
	 a shift in focus over the past decade from promoting and growing revenue from the Crown Minera to managing and mitigating risks associated with minerals and petroleum permits. For example, C amendments in 2013 introduced new monitoring, compliance and enforcement functions and pow the regulator following the Pike River coal mining tragedy in 2010. The Amendment Act strengther decommissioning requirements provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommission as it has been the case for the Tui oil field. 												
		engaged an external consultappropriation to better understa				are delivered and funded under view is available on request.							
	gaps	ing this cost pressure is cri in the resources, processes the CMA. Specifically, the re	s and sy	stems needed to be able		nave significant functional cise its powers and functions							
		sustain and improve how it me Protocols and Relationship Ag and result in judicial review;				e CMA and Crown Minerals or the Māori-Crown relationship							
		conduct effective monitoring a resulting in serious harm);	and com	pliance, which could result	in regula	atory failure (e.g. illegal mining							
		 fully respond to the increased complexity of managing late-life petroleum permits, including new petroleum infrastructure decommissioning requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which are intended to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; 											
		update aging information mar functions; and	lagemer	nt systems, which could lea	d to an i	nability to execute regulatory							
	•	reduce permit processing time	es which	n can be a bottleneck for inc	lustry.								
		out additional funding the de			, in the second s	so increase.							
		ing cannot be deferred to fu appropriation or other parts o				pritise within existing baselines							
Cost pressure management	by the The la	pressures cannot be funded regulator and funded by the ast notable (\$8.800 million) ad eum Action Plan (PAP) [EGI	appropr Idition of	iation are legislative or regu	latory re a decad	le ago, in FY10 for the							

PAP has been redirected to hase activities over the lest 11 years. Other funding to meet the cost pressures has been time-limited, such as funding received in Budget 16 to improve regulatory compliance and monitoring functions. This funding pavaled at \$1.050 million in PV20 and copied the same year, increasing cost pressure from PV21. The funding available now is not sufficient to meet existing activities on the additional activities to be introduced by the Amendment Act Efforts to reprioritise further funding to meet cost pressures have already been made, including \$0.700m in 2017 and \$0.300m baselined, reprioritised form within the Energy and Resources portfolic any further. Cost pressures cannot be addressed immediately through an increase in third party revenue (fees). The leaf foes review was conducted in 2016 and it was docided to undertake after principles foes review. The scope of the CMA Review is complied in This is because changes resulting from the CMA Review cold result in additional costs or savings for the regulated which would be important to consider as part of a fees review. The scope of the CMA Review is set out in the 2010 Descuring. The Amendment Act accelerated the parts of the CMA Review is are out the 2010 Descuring. The Amendment Act accelerated the parts of the CMA Review is are out perform infravorure docommissioning. Policy work on the creating areas of the CMA Review the transtructure docommissioning. Policy work on the creating result by complete and implement due to the leagl process that needs to be childwed. Further, based on Treasury guidelines, an increase in fees is unlikely to address all cost pressures because: not all increasing activities by the regulator (e.g., improved with engagement) may be considered as cost-recovarable by user charges (fees); and. the		introduced through amendments to the CMA, without additional baseline funding. The funding received for the
2017 and 80.300m baselined, repriorilised from within the Energy and Resources portfolio. There is no ability to re-prioritise from other parts of the Energy and Resources portfolio any further. Cost pressures cannot be addressed immediately through an increase in third-party revenue (frees). The last fees review was conducted in 2016 and it was decided to undertake a first principles fees review once the <u>CMA Review</u> is completed. This is because changes resulting from the CMA Review could result in additional costs or savings for the regulator which would be important to consider as part of a fees review. The scope of the CMA Review is set out in the 2019 Discussion for policy work on the remaining areas of the CMA Review ben udertaken but policy decisions. How onk on the remaining areas of the CMA Review ben udertaken but policy decisions have not yet been made due to other Government priorities, including COVID-19. Cost pressures cannot be addressed immediately because a first principles fees review to increase fees on regulated parties would take a minimum of 12 months to complete and implement due to the legal process that needs to be followed. Further, based on Treasury guidelines, an increase in fees is unlikely to address all cost pressures because: • not all increasing activities by the regulator (e.g., improved lwi engagement) may be considered as cost-recoverable by user charges (frees); and. • there are also some constraints on how high fees can be, as charges cannot unduly be in excess of the cost of providing services so users are not burdened with cost associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase, per continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the regulator is unilkely to be sustainable.		PAP has been redirected to these activities over the last 11 years. Other funding to meet the cost pressures has been time-limited, such as funding received in Budget 16 to improve regulatory compliance and monitoring functions. This funding peaked at \$1.050 million in FY20 and expired the same year, increasing cost pressure from FY21. The funding available now is not sufficient to meet existing activities or the additional activities to
The last fees review was conducted in 2016 and it was decided to undertake a first principles fees review once the <u>CMA Review</u> is completed. This is because changes resulting from the CMA Review could result in additional costs or savings for the regulator which would be important to consider as part of a fees review. The scope of the CMA Review is set out in the <u>2019 Discussion Document</u> . The Amendment Act accelerated the parts of the CMA Review that related to strengthening the requirements for petroleum infrastructure decomissioning. Policy work on the remaining areas of the CMA Review has been undertaken but policy decisions have not yet been made due to other Government priorities, including COVID-19. Cost pressures cannot be addressed immediately because a first principles fees review to increase fees on regulated parties would take a minimum of 12 months to complete and implement due to the legal process that needs to be followed. Further, based on Treasury guidelines, an increase in fees is unlikely to address all cost pressures because: not all increasing activities by the regulator (e.g., improved iwi engagement) may be considered as cost- recoverable by user charges (fees): and. there are also some constraints on how high fees can be, as charges cannot unduly be in excess of the cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost pressures. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: Sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral		2017 and \$0.300m baselined, reprioritised from within the Energy and Resources portfolio. There is no ability
Image: Construction of the completed. This is because changes resulting from the CMA Review could result in additional costs or savings for the regulator which would be important to consider as part of a fees review. The scope of the CMA Review is set out in the 2019 Discussion Document. The Amendment Act accelerated the parts of the CMA Review that related to strengthening the requirements for pertoleum infrastructure decommissioning. Policy work on the remaining areas of the CMA Review to as been undertaken but policy decisions have not yel been made due to other Government priorities, including COVID-19. Cost pressures cannot be addressed immediately because a first principles fees review to increase fees on regulated parties would take a minimum of 12 months to complete and implement due to the legal process that needs to be followed. Further, based on Treasury guidelines, an increase in fees is unlikely to address all cost pressures because: • not all increasing activities by the regulator (e.g., Improved iwi engagement) may be considered as cost-recoverable by user charges (fees); and, • there are also some constraints on how high fees can be, as charges cannot unduly be in excess of the cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost pressures. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: • sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements: • improved monitoring and analysis of pe		Cost pressures cannot be addressed immediately through an increase in third-party revenue (fees).
regulated parties would take a minimum of 12 months to complete and implement due to the legal process that needs to be followed. Further, based on Treasury guidelines, an increase in fees is unlikely to address all cost pressures because: • not all increasing activities by the regulator (e.g., improved iwi engagement) may be considered as cost-recoverable by user charges (fees): and. • there are also some constraints on how high fees can be, as charges cannot unduly be in excess of the cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost pressures. As noted above, in the longer term the pool of fee payers (in particular petroleum exploration and mining permits) under the appropriation is likely to decrease, so continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the regulator is unlikely to be sustainable. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: • improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA • effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tu iol field:		the <u>CMA Review</u> is completed. This is because changes resulting from the CMA Review could result in additional costs or savings for the regulator which would be important to consider as part of a fees review. The scope of the CMA Review is set out in the <u>2019 Discussion Document</u> . The Amendment Act accelerated the parts of the CMA Review that related to strengthening the requirements for petroleum infrastructure decommissioning. Policy work on the remaining areas of the CMA Review has been undertaken but policy
 not all increasing activities by the regulator (e.g., improved iwi engagement) may be considered as cost-recoverable by user charges (fees): and, there are also some constraints on how high fees can be, as charges cannot unduly be in excess of the cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost pressures. As noted above, in the longer term the pool of fee payers (in particular petroleum exploration and mining permits) under the appropriation is likely to decrease, so continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the regulator is unlikely to be sustainable. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements: improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tu oil field: improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public 		regulated parties would take a minimum of 12 months to complete and implement due to the legal process that
 recoverable by user charges (fees): and, there are also some constraints on how high fees can be, as charges cannot unduly be in excess of the cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost pressures. As noted above, in the longer term the pool of fee payers (in particular petroleum exploration and mining permits) under the appropriation is likely to decrease, so continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the regulator is unlikely to be sustainable. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements; improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public 		Further, based on Treasury guidelines, an increase in fees is unlikely to address all cost pressures because:
cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost pressures. As noted above, in the longer term the pool of fee payers (in particular petroleum exploration and mining permits) under the appropriation is likely to decrease, so continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the regulator is unlikely to be sustainable. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements: improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tu oil field: improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permiting regime and public		
permits) under the appropriation is likely to decrease, so continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the regulator is unlikely to be sustainable. Case for funding Additional funding is needed to address functional gaps under the CMA. The outputs the funding would be purchasing include: sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements; improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public 		cost of providing services so users are not burdened with costs associated with past or future activities. A significant increase in fees may increase permit surrenders which could exacerbate existing cost
 purchasing include: sustained and improved iwi engagement as required under section 4 of the CMA and under existing Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements; improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public 		permits) under the appropriation is likely to decrease, so continuing to rely on third parties fees to fund the
 Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements; improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public 	Case for funding	
 Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; improved compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public 		 Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements; improved monitoring and analysis of permit-holder information to support compliance activities under the
maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public		Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for
		• maintained and improved information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public

Section 5: Delivery

Section 5A: Fit with e	existing activity									
The answer must not exceed i	The answer must not exceed 1-2 paragraphs.									
How does the initiative link with existing initiatives with similar objectives?	This initiative addresses cost-pressures for existing activities the regulator is required to undertake under the CMA to manage minerals and petroleum permitting (e.g. iwi engagement, and monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities). The initiative will also support the additional activities the regulator will be required to undertake to implement the new petroleum decommissioning requirements in the Amendment Act and associated regulations.									
Is the initiative an expansion or a cost pressure for an existing initiative?	 Y The initiative will address existing functional gaps and fund additional resources, process and systems for the regulator to: sustain and improve how it engages with iwi under the CMA and related Crown Mineral Protocols and Relationship Agreements; improve monitoring and analysis of permit holder information to support compliance activities under the CMA; effective implementation of the new petroleum infrastructure requirements introduced by the Amendment Act which provides for further administrative, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement activities to mitigate the risk of the Crown having to fund and undertake decommissioning as it has been the case for the Tui oil field; reduce delays in processing permit times; improve compliance and enforcement activities across both minerals and petroleum permits; and, maintain and improve information management systems critical to the permitting regime and public information disclosure requirements under the CMA. If no, move on to section 5B. 									

Provide an overview of existing funding levels for this initiative, and/or initiatives with similar objectives, in the two tables below.													
		Operating Funding profile (\$m)											
	2021/22		2	2022/23		2023/24		2024/25	& c	2025/26 outyears	Total		
Existing funding for this/similar initiatives		19.173	3	19.156		19.148		19.148	9.148		95.773		
Total funding sought for this initiative		Confiden	tial advice to Gover	nment		_		-		-			
% change between existing funding and funding sought		Confide	ntial advice to Gove	rrment				-		-			
Comments (optional)		unding show authority to								ls Estate a	ppropriation,		
				Capi	ital Fundir	ng profile (\$m)						
	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	Total		
Existing funding for this/similar initiatives	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		
Total funding sought for this initiative	Confidential a	dvice to Government						-			_		
% change between existing funding and funding sought	Confiden	tial advice to Govern	nent								_		
Comments (optional)		opriation is ed to suppor								as desks a	and laptops will		

Section 5B: F	unding sought by input											
Provide a breakdow of each output.	vn of what the requested funding will purchase. Briefly explain the formula used, or key assumptions made, to calculate the cost											
Formula and assumptions underlying costings	Costings have been determined from a full profit and loss model, showing the pressure of current operations, plus anticipate additional activities against baseline funding and third party revenue projections. Pressure occurring from the current operation has been allocated proportionately across expense categories, before the below assumptions are applied.											
costings	Resourcing can be spilt into the four key categories:											
	 permanent resourcing to address functional gaps, in particular in relation to iwi engagement, monitoring, compliance and enforcement activities Confidential advice to Government time-limited resourcing to support/set-up the implementation (system and processes) of the new petroleum decommissioning requirements (Confidential advice to Government . Contracts between 12-24 months); permanent resourcing to support the ongoing implementation of the petroleum decommissioning requirements. Confidential advice to Government . Confidential advice to Covernment . Confidential advice to Government . Confidential advice to Government . Confidential advice to Covernment . Confidential advice to Government . Confidential advice to Covernment . Confidential advice to Covernment											
	. Resources have been grouped by seniority for costing. Confidential advice to Government											
	Confidential advice to Government											
	Recruitment includes costs associated with new FTE / Contractors only. Recruitment from general turnover is captured (where applicable) in resourcing costs.											
	Legal Expenditure includes:											
	 general increase in legal expertise due to increasing complexity of assessments; condensed legal expenditure in FY23 to support financial securities agreements for x27 permits; and, expenditure for FY24 onwards to support negotiation of residual liability agreements for x27 permits. 											
	Consultancy and Professional Services includes:											
	 external iwi capability support; specialist engineering support for well assessments; actuarial services for residual liability assessments; and, external review of audit processes. 											
	Systems and Software includes:											
	 maintenance to avoid loss of irreplaceable data; costs to keep existing systems operational and fit for purpose; extending and integrating existing capability and platforms ld); and, client relationships management licences to better support iwi engagement. 											
	Depreciation includes depreciation on additional office equipment only.											
	Funding profile (\$m)Total											
Input – Operating	2021/22 2022/23 2023/24 2024/25 & outyears											
	Input Information											

Resourcing - FTE		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment								
Resourcing - Fixed term contractors		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment	•		-			-		
Recruitment for new FTE / Contractors		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment	•					-		
Overheads on FTE		Confi	dential advice to G	iovernment					•			
Overheads on Fixed term contractors		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment						-		
Legal Expenditure		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment					•			
Consultants and Professional Fees		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment				s 9(2)(f)(iv)			s 9(2)(f)(iv)
Systems and Software		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment								
Other		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment								
Depreciation		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment								
Total		Confi	dential advice to G	iovernment								
			F	TE-speci	fic Input	Informatio	n (if ap	plicable)				
New FTE funding		Confi	dential advice to G									
New contractor funding		Confi	dential advice to G	overnment								
Additional FTE and contractor corporate overhead funding		Confi	dential advice to G	lovernment								
Total		Confi	dential advice to G	iovernment								
# of FTE's (employees and/or contractors)	Confiden	tial advice	to Govern	ment								s 9(2)(f)(
What's the % increase in FTE compared to baseline FTE numbers										Confidential advice	to Government	
				F	unding p	orofile (\$m)						Total
Input – Capital	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/24	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31		
Office equipment for personnel (desk / laptop)		Confidential ac	lvice to Governme	nt								
Total		Confidential ac	lvice to Governme	nt								Confidential a
Appropriations		nis funding opropriatio		crease the	existing	Energy and	Resour	ces: Manage	ment of tl	he Crown N	linerals Estate	

Options analysis	We have considered three funding options to address the cost-pressures under the appropriation. These options prevent the memorandum account deficit (\$3.4 million in FY21) deteriorating further.
	 Option One – Funding to address some of the current functional gaps and implement the new petroleum infrastructure decommissioning requirements (minimum viable option - Confidential). This option would address some functional gaps related to iwi engagement, monitoring and compliance, and information management systems, and enable the effective implementation of the new petroleum decommissioning requirements. However, some functional gaps would remain such as:
	 maintenance and improvements to information management systems required to support iwi engagement and permit processing; adequate number of compliance officers to support enforcement activities; and adequate number of operational advisors to support permit processing.
	Confidential advice to Government
Counter-factual question	If funding is not approved or deferred, the regulator will have significant functional gaps in the resources, processes and systems needed to exercise its functions and powers under the CMA. Implications of not funding this initiative includes:
	 Iwi partnership and engagement likely to remain the same or deteriorate with wider negative implications for the relationship between Māori and the Crown. Regulator not having the resources, processes and systems to complete the implementation of new petroleum
	 decommissioning requirements which could increase the future risk of a petroleum operator defaulting on decommissioning liabilities as has been the case for the Tui oil field. Increased delays in processing permit times leading to bottlenecks for industry.
	 Reduction in monitoring from current levels with increased risk of non-compliant activity (e.g. illegal mining, non-payment of royalties and fees) and regulatory risk. Compliance and enforcement limited to very serious obvious non-compliance.
	 Infrequent and narrow auditing and enforcement activities of existing permit holders. Reduced management and maintenance of IT systems critical to the permitting system and public information disclosure requirements.
	 Increased risk that information management systems are taken offline due to lack of maintenance and security vulnerabilities. Degradation in the management and presentation of physical collection of mineral and petroleum rock and fluid
	samples.

Option overview

Confidential advice to Government

	Confidential advice	to Government											
				_									
				_									
Provide a breakdown c the primary option, brie						m those used for							
Formula and Assumptions	Option 1 Assumptions are listed where different to funding sought for Option 2. Resourcing												
	monitoring, ccTime-limited r	sourcing to address fi mpliance and enforce esourcing to support/	ement activities. Cont set-up the implement	idential advice to Gover tation (system and pr	rocesses) of the								
	new petroleun	n decommissioning re	equirements. (Confid	ential advice to Gove	rnment								
	decommissioning re	n FY22/23 because ti equirements overlaps ocesses established b	with the permanent	ongoing resourcing.	This is to ensure								
	adopted by ongoing implement the petro), less expensive resc Deum decommissioni	ource. Once systems ing requirements, the	and processes are e total number of resc	embedded to ources required will								
		on an ongoing basis esources the breakdo		en grouped by senio	rity for costing. Of								
		ipal Analysts / Adviso or Analysts / Advisors osts / Advisors											
	*includes 3 fixed ter Recruitment – bas Legal Expenditure	rm FTE (18 months) f is per funding sought - per funding sought Professional Service	t.	-									
	engager	t include client relatio nent. red funding to ensure			pport iwi								
	Depreciation – bas	sis per funding sought	t.										
		Opera	ting Funding profile	e (\$m)									
Input - Operating	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26 & outyears	Total							
Resourcing - FTE	Confidential	2.594	2.654	2.815	3.308	Confidential							
Resourcing - Fixed term contractors	advice to Government	1.901	0.527	0.000	0.394	advice to Government							
Recruitment for new FTE / Contractors		0.471	0.000	0.000	0.000								
Overheads on FTE		1.076	1.074	1.133	1.363								
Overheads on Fixed term contractors		0.664	0.167	0.000	0.084								
Legal Expenditure		3.082	1.524	1.618	1.779								
Consultants and Professional Fees		1.531	0.458	0.484	0.578								
Systems and Software		2.305	0.966	1.004	1.140								

Other	Confidential advice to Government			0.151	C).140	0.1	09	0.168		
Depreciation			0.049		0.049		0.047		0.015 advice Govern		
Total			13.824		7	7.559		7.210		8.828	
	Capital Funding profile (\$m)										
Input - Capital	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	Total
Office equipment for personnel (desk / laptop)		0.165									
Total		0.165									0.165
Appropriations		This funding would increase funding under the Energy and Resources: Management of the Crown Mineral Estate Appropriation.									

Section 5E: Monitoring and Evaluation

This initiative will be monitored by the Petroleum and Minerals Regulatory System Governance Group within MBIE (Governance Group). The role of the Governance Group is to provide guidance and direction to the Regulatory System and its priorities.

A Steering Group (reporting up to the Governance Group) provides direction, oversight, guidance and decision making to support the successful implementation of the new petroleum decommissioning requirements and better implement existing requirements under the CMA.

No additional funding is sought to support ongoing monitoring of the initiative and no formal evaluation is planned for this initiative.

Section 5F: Imp	lementation readiness					
Workforce: Are additional FTEs or contractors required?	 A range of expertise and skills will be required to implement this initiative. The range of specialist skills required for example includes: Iwi engagement advisors Legal advisors Legal advisors Accounting expertise Data analysts Financial analysts Compliance officers Business analysts Petroleum technical engineer These expertise have been costed as a mix of FTE, contractors and consultants. In practice these skills may come from a combination of permanent FTEs, contractor and/or consultants. There may be some difficulty in securing the required FTEs and contractors due to the specific skills/expertise required to build the capability and capacity of the regulator based in Wellington. Hiring people based in other parts of New Zealand may reduce this difficulty. 					
Workforce: Resourcing considerations	A combination of Public Service Commissioner's Public Service Pay Guidance, MBIE's application of the guidance and labour market conditions has been considered in developing resource costs. MBIE is currently in the processes of collective bargaining for a new collective employment agreement. The previous agreement contained enforceable contractual obligations for pay increases. As the outcome of the current bargaining process is undetermined pay increases are assumed to be a scaled down version of current entitlements. The reduced increase is also assumed to capture current tight labour market conditions, where turnover is causing resource cost increases. Resourcing has been costed using a FTE + overheads model for the contractor and permanent resources. This provides a view of the maximum headcount impact to MBIE, enabling better planning, and shows the intention for skills, frameworks and knowledge to be internally generated and retained as the preferred approach to implementation. However, in practice some skills may be procured through external consultants (for example for specialist financial capabilities assessments) if the labour market proves too tight. Additionally, MBIE's flexible working options mean many of the roles could be filled outside of Wellington, further mitigating resource pressure.					
Timeframes	This initiative will be delivered starting in FY22. The main dependency to deliver this initiative is hiring the required level of resourcing.					
Delivery Risks	A risk of delivering this initiative is not being able to hire the required level of skills and expertise in Wellington where the regulator is currently based. To mitigate this risk the regulator can be flexible in where staff are located to increase the pool of people that may be interested in the new positions. With the opening of If New Zealand's borders skilled migrants could also apply for some of the new positions.					
Market capacity	Refer to the resourcing and delivery risks and mitigation strategy discussed above.					
Previous delivery experience	The regulator has experience in hiring resourcing for iwi engagement, monitoring, enforcement, and compliance and information management activities. Therefore, in regards to the resourcing required to address functional gaps the regulator has existing systems and processes in place (e.g. training and support, governance structures and project management structures) to hire and support new staff. The regulator has some specialist financial expertise. However, new specialist skills and expertise will be required to complete the new financial capability assessments, risk based assessments, monitoring, and imposition of financial securities that the new petroleum decommissioning requirements provided for in the Amendment Act and associated regulations will introduce. The regulator will build on the existing expertise and use existing systems and processes in place to hire the specialist skills required to implement the new requirements. Additionally, a part-time contractor has been hired to support the implementation. Implementation workstreams are being established in relation to the new requirements to support the new staff once they are on board.					